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Introduction: American Social
Policy and the Reagan Legacy
JAMES MIDGLEY
Louisiana State University

With the retiremnent of Ronald Reagan from active political life; the long
term effects of his policies and programs need to be addressed. This introduction to fire special issue on The Reagan Legacy and the. American Welfare State draws on the findings of the various contributors t"'
provide an overview of the inipact of Reagan admin istration's policies
on various facets of the welfare stale, and an assessment of their likely
longer term Lfects.
At the time that Ronald Reagan's second presidential term
of office expired, there was mudh speculation about whether
his presidency had produced a lasting legacy that would shape
the character of American society for years to come. Unlike its
predecessors, the Reagan administration set out to produce a
significant and enduring alteration to prevailing institutions and
it is for this reason that the notion of revolution was frequently
used to characterize the administration, especially in its early
days. Indeed, this was an analogy that the Reaganites not only
encouraged but cultivated.
Although other Republican presidents had expressed opposition to New Deal social policies, none had previously mounted
such a concerted and vigorous attack on state welfare programs.
Inspired by radical right wing teachings, the Reagan administration declared its opposition to state sponsorship of the human services, believing that needs and problems should be
addressed through individual initiative, the market, the family
and voluntary effort. These ideas had, of course, been articulated before but they had not been as resolutely implemented.
The massive tax cuts and budgetary reductions of the early
1980s, the incessant propagandistic attacks on the social services and their beneficiaries, and the introduction of so-called
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welfare reform legislation in 1988 formed the vanguard of the
Reagan antiwelfare campaign.
Just how revolutionary these initiatives were, is of course
open to interpretation. While those on the radical left, such as
Piven and Cloward (1982) view the Reagan era as the incarnation of a new class war, writers associated with the right wing
Cato Institute (Boaz,. 1988) have berated the Reagan administration for its failures to secure meaningful, long term changes.
Although these very different assessments may have the ironic
effect of placing the Reagan presidency in a moderate position
along the ideological spectrum, most traditional Republicans,
Democratic liberals and social democrats would reject the imputation of moderation. For them, Reaganism was a radical movement that sought to introduce profound changes.
Significant changes were indeed introduced. The exacerbation of inequalities of income and wealth; the reductions in
social expenditures and the retrenchment of human service programs; deregulation and the weakening of the labor movement;
the consolidation of the 'underclass' phenomenon as a permanent feature of urban life; the huge, deliberately fostered budget
deficit; the appointment of a conservative higher judiciary, and
various other developments are seen by those at the political
center as comprising a radical departure from accepted practices. Although there is disagreement about whether a true revolution has taken place, few analysts believe that these events
are transient in their effects.
The Scope of This Issue
Revolutions do produce legacies and it if there was a Reagan
revolution it should be possible to assess its long term impact.
Despite the notorious unreliability of social science prediction,
it is the social scientist's task to extrapolate the present and to
speculate about the future course of current events. The significance of the Reagan era for the American welfare state presents
a challenge to social scientists concerned with issues of social
policy. When this special issue of the Journal of Sociology and
Social Welfare was being prepared, two years had passed since
Ronald Reagan returned to his ranch in California to prepare
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his memoirs. The time is ripe for an assessment of the Reagan
legacy and its impact on social policy.
The issue has brought together a group of scholars who
have extensive knowledge of the American Welfare State. They
are well qualified to review the Reagan years and to assess the
effects of the Reagan legacy. Although they are drawn largely
from schools of social work, they have different interests which
facilitate a multi-sectoral assessment of. the impact of the Reagan era. They are, therefore, able to offer an incisive examination of the effects of the Reagan administration's policies on the
constituent components of the welfare state including income
maintenance, health care, housing, social work, and urban policy. They have also assessed the broader effects of these policies
on incomes, inequality and poverty, and the position of Women
and people of color. In addition, the issue begins with an overview of the Reagan era and its ideological character.
The issue is concerned with social policy and not with the
many other effects of the Reagan administration on American
society. Although it is true that social policy cannot be readily
divorced from political, economic, judicial and cultural trends
or from international events, it is not possible to embrace these
complex realities within the.limitations of a collection of this
kind. Nevertheless, while the various authors contributing to
this volume focus on the welfare state, they are aware of these
wider influences and allude to them.
Social science commentaries of this kind cannot be value
free. Although objective analysis remains a desired goal in the
social sciences, investigators who seek to transcend simple descriptions of social phenomena must interpret their findings and
inevitably, such interpretations require perspectives that frame
conclusions. Such perspectives, in turn, rely on theoretical models that draw on underlying ideological, cultural and social traditions. For this reason, social scientists are readily identified by
their theoretical leanings. Indeed, it has been argued that the
integrity of social science research is safeguarded by the declaration rather than obfuscation of preferences. The idea that
interpretations of any complex social event are objective in the
conventional sense of the word has long since been negated.
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Admittedly, none of the contributors to this volume are apologists for tle Reagan administration's social policies but this
does not mean that their normative position is invalidated by
partisanship. On the contrary, their perspective facilitates an
interpretation of tile impact of the Reagan years which will be

readily understood and amenable to challenge by those committed to alternative points of view. And, as will be seen, their
accounts offer a lively, interesting and yet reasoned assessment
of the Reagan legacy.
The hnpact of Reaganism and ils Legacy
The authors of the articles in this issue have reached similar
conclusions. Although they have focused on different sectors
of the welfare state, they agree that the Reagan administration
set out deliberately to alter prevailing New Deal social policies.
They also generally agree that while significant changes were introduced, they fell short of what the radical right desired. Nevertheless, most of the authors take the normative position that
these changes were damaging to the welfare of the great majority of American citizens. Low income groups were, of course,
the most severely affected but even the middle class did not fare
particularly well despite the Reagan administration's promises.
In addition, the polarization of society, the business scandals
which sent several prominent Wall Street and lesser known Savings and Loans tycoons to prison, and the budget deficit itself
all generated wider social diswelfares.
The special issue begins with an introductory article by James
Midgley which seeks to examine the historical and ideological
factors leading to Ronald Reagan's election in 1980. lie shows
that Reagan was not just another Republican candidate who
fought a successful presidential campaign but an anointed, carefully chosen leader, who radical right wing activists believed,
would lead the nation out of the international humiliation, domestic economic stagnation, and pervasive moral decline into
which it had allegedly fallen in the 1970s. [his required more
than faith alone. Armed with the dogma of New Right thinking,
and a tenacious commitment to succeed, the Reaganile activists
set about, almost conspiratorially, to achieve their goals. The
article examines the ideological threads which were woven into
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a complex political agenda to comprise the basis of Reaganism. Midgley contends that the remarkable achievement of the
radical right in the 1980s was its ability to combine economic libertarianism, cultural traditionalism and authoritarian populism
and, in so doing, to appeal to a broad constituency.. These ideological themes also informed the Reagan administration's social
policies and although not implemented to the extent intended,
they have had a major impact on the American welfare state.
Robert Plotnick focuses oi the changes which took place in
incomes and standards of living during the Reagan years. lIc,
argues that despite some gains, the record of economic wellbeing in the 1980s belied the Reagan administration's claim that
Americans would be better off if tax rates were cut and if the
welfare state was scaled back. Although the standard of living
rose, income inequality increased and the incidence of poverty
was about the same as in 1980. These developments were the
result of policy decisions made by the Reagan administration.
Reductions in transfer payments fostei'ed an increase in inequality as well as an increase in poverty; however, this was offset by
changes in tax policy. In addition, broader social and economic
factors widened income differentials and failed to reduce the
incidence of poverty despite economic growth.
The article by Howard ]acoli Karger deals with the impact of
the Reagan administration policies on income maintenance programs. The article shows how the massive budget cuts of the
early 1980s, major modifications to the tax system mnd the welfare reform initiative of 1988 all undermined the principles on
which income maintenance programs for the poor were based.
Although an attempt was also made to privatize the nation's social security system through the introduction of individualized
retirement accounts, this did not succeed. Karger concludes that
while income maintenance programs at the core of the welfare
state ideal survived, the present situation is far from satisfactury.
The huge budget shortfall, the recent deficit reduction agreement and the. absence of a 'peace dividend' do not auger well
for those who hope for an expansion of income maintenance
programs.
Health care issues are examined by Terri Comlbs-Ormne and
Bernard Guyer in the following article. Combs-Orme and Guyer
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point out that because of the extensive private health care system in the United States, health conditions are not as susceptible to changes in public policy as they are in other
Western countries where state involvement in health care is
extensive. However, there are two groups-the elderly and
young children-who are most directly affected by government
health care policy and it is on these groups that they focus
their attention. The authors point out tiat although the Reagan
administration attempted to introduce major changes in health
care services for these groups, these were opposed by Congress
and did not have as serious an effect as was predicted. Nevertheless, changes in health care funding and administrative arrangements have had a negative impact on the needy, and, in
addition, it is clear that these effects have been exacerbated by
the Reagan administration's wider social and economic policies
which have contributed negatively to the health conditions of
low income groups.
Mimi Abramovitz is concerned with the impact of the Reagan administration's programs and politics on women and iinority groups. She argues that the growth of the welfare state
was accompanied by the emergence of informal accords with
the trade union, civil rights and women's movements which
were compatible with the needs of political stability and profitable production. However, by the 1970s, as new contradictions made welfare state programs less useful to the needs of
capitalism, these accords ceased to be functional and had to
be undermined. A primary task of the Reagan administration
was to undo the class, race and gender accords which had
characterized the welfare state and brought positive benefits
to many.
In the next article, Beth Rubin, Javnes Wright and Joel Devine
discuss the effects of the Reagan era on housing, especially
for low income families. They argue that the exacerbation of
income inequality, the role of tax incentives for the wealthy
and the middle class, the increase in gentrification and cmdo
conversion have resulted in a major squeeze on housing for
low income groups with the result that many have becone
'unhoused'. The absence of proper budgetary allocations for
housing and of carefully formulated social policies designed
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to resolve these difficulties, have perpetuated the disgraceful
problem of homelessness which, they believe, will worsen as
time goes by.
David Stoesz argues that the Reagan era coincided with
a major shift in the American urban scene from the drab
industrial city to its glittering, post-industrial successor. It also
coincided with a sharp decline in industrial employment and
an increase in poverty, marginalization and the growth of the
urban underclass. The Reagan administration's oblique but suc-.
cessful urban policies decimated categorical grants to cities for
community and urban development and exacerbated the flight
of capital from the rustbowl to the sunbelt. In the absence of alternative policies, the legacy of deindustrialization, the creation
and maintenance of a permanent underclass and the exacerbation of urban blight is likely to be perpetuated with serious
consequences not only for those who live in America's large
cities but for the nation as a whole.
In the concluding article, Karen Haynes and James Mickelson
discus the impact of the Reagan administration's policies on
social work services and on the social work profession. The authors argue that a priority item on the Reaganite social policy
agenda was the creation of a charity model of welfare in which
well-meaning volunteers provide services to the deserving poor
and by which for-profit enterprises cater to the middle and upper class. By slashing human service budgets this model was
vigorously institutionalized creating a huge problem of unmet
need. Although social work has not responded adequately to
the problems created during the Reagan era, the profession can
meet the challenge by becoming more involved in advocacy on
behalf of the poor and needy.
As can be seen, the articles in this special issue are wide
ranging and deal with many different facets of the American
welfare state. However, the overall conclusions of the authors
are similar. Most believe that while significant changes were
made during the Reagan years, the welfare state remains intact.
However, they also believe that the welfarist tradition of the
New Deal has suffered greatly as a result of the Reagan era. In
other words, while the Reagan presidency's drive to abolish the
legacy of the New Deal failed, it did not fail miserably.
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The authors also believe that it is unlikely that any significant effort will be made in the foreseeable future to reconstruct
the welfare state. Most analysts recognize that the huge federal
budget deficit has preempted any major injection of new resources. Popular opposition to taxation, so carefully cultivated
by both Ronald Reagan and George Bush in their campaigns,
further exacerbates the problem. The successful representation
of planning as a failed ideological tool of socialism will perpetuate the fragmented, haphazard and incremental approach
which has long characterized American social policy. The deliberate and propagandistic exploitation of anti-welfarist attitudes
which have been an integral element in American popular culture, present a further impediment to serious reform.
Nor does George Bush's current popularity auger well for
an improvement in the situation. At the time of writing, the
President had secured widespread support for his military initiative in the Persian Gulf and it is likely that this will serve
him well in his next electoral campaign. Despite the rhetoric
of a "kinder, gentler America" which pervaded his administration's coming to office, the President's budget (which was introduced in Congress early in 1991) contained proposals which,
if implemented, will have negative implications for social programs. The apparent absence of a serious Democratic opponent
for the next presidential race as well as the lack of workable
and politically acceptable welfare alternatives among liberal
Democrats also poses a major problem for the proponents of
the welfare state..
Generally, the outlook for the American welfare state may
not be hopeless but neither can it be described as hopeful. Under
these conditions, the most optimistic normative scenario seems
to be the preservation of the status quo. While this state of affairs may be conducive to despair, it should foster resolve. The
creation of the welfare state was the result of complex political strategies promoted and implemented by political beings.
Its weakening during the Reagan years was also the result of
deliberate political action. These historical realities suggest that
political resolve combined with a concerted political effort can
be activated for its renewal.
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Society, Social Policy and
the Ideology of Reaganisni
JAMB'S MIDGLEY
Louisiana Stale University

an(e irl'oogical thmctes which forinerl Me asis for
Reaanisin in tle 1980s ar' fiasted on economic inliidaali.m, Iradition7he comnplex historical

alisin and atlhorilarian pi'jnlism. By Creating al idhloirat.iirnalion

ihlih appeal/cd to a ifide coisituc-tic, righl-roirg ac'iz'ists sougilt to
ieo{'rse the centrist nomsensuts liberalism (If tie New Deal. "''se ideas
also informed tile Reagan admiinistration's social policies ald, a/thon1g/i1
not implmentd as intende, /ham,had a major iiniarl ot fHit' American
wel0fare state.
When Ronald Reaglan entered the White Howise in January,
1981, many believed thal tlw tradition of centrist, consensus
liberalism which had governed political affairs in the United
Slates for decades would be dismantled. In his election campaign, Reagan dramaticalixy confronted the liberal tradition, and
cautight the mood of a disillusioned electorate anenable to new,
simple, homespun messages. Once in office, his administralion implemented radical right wing policies with ruthless resolve. Although the Reaganite agenda was not implemented
as intended, it had a major impact on the nation legacy of
consensus politics.
Many political commentators contend that Ronald Reagan
cane to power as a result of an orchestrated reaction agiainst
establishment centrist politics (Blumenthal, 1986; Kymlicka and
Matthews, 1988; Himmelstein, 1990). They view the Reagan victory not as a discreet historical event, but as the culmination of
a long and, some would argue, conspiratorial period of struggle in which radical right wing activists sought to rtverse the
dominance of centrist liberalism and its pervasive influence
on economic, cultural, judiVial and social affairs. Ironically, the
struggle against liberalism originated at the time that Reagan's
erstwhile hero, Franklin Roosevelt established Ihe New Deal
13

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

and at a time when Reagan, as he himself admits, was a "near
hopeless hemophiliac liberal" (Reagan and Hubler, 1981, p. 18).
Although Ronald Reagan's success may be attributed to
many factors, an examination of the ideology of Reaganism is required if the the Reagan era is to be properly understood. At the
heart of the Reagan phenomenon is a skillful blending of ideological themes that catered.to a broad spectrum of the electorate
and attracted support from very different constituencies. Economic libertarianism, cultural traditionalism and authoritarian
populism were effectively coalesced to appeal simultaneously to
urbane Wall Street stockbrokers, fanatical fundamentalist Christians, mainstream middle class suburban Americans and rural
Southerners. As an ideology, Reaganism offered a credible alternative to the apparently depleted traditions of centrist liberalism. It also successfully challenged the dominant welfarist
ideology of the New Deal.
Reaganism's Historical Origins
As an activist program of social and economic reform, Roosevelt's New Deal lasted for a relatively short time. But, seen in
terms of its broader, effects, the New Deal exerted a profound
influence that lasted for decades. Following earlier and more
dramatic changes in Europe, the New Deal legitimized the institutionalization of statism and welfarism in American society.
Although the New Deal failed to create a highly centralized and
comprehensive European style welfare state, it secured support
for the notion that the state is a central social institution responsible not only for defense and law and order but for economic
planning and the promotion of growth, the ehhancement of welfare and the regulation of many facets of everyday life.
The New Deal also brought about a major political realignment in American politics. Under Roosevelt, the Democrats
ceased to be a predominantly Southern party drawing support
from the cities and from urban workers, ethnic voters and a
large section of the middle class. Re-emerging as a force for
progressive liberalism, the Democratic party also succeeded in
building a coalition between liberal politicians, the labor movement, intellectuals, professionals and the business sector.

Ideology of Reaganism
Above all, the New Deal institutionalized a culture of pragmatic, centrist liberalism that many believed heralded the end
of ideology. Unlike most of Europe, where ideological differences between the major political parties were unambiguous
and readily identified with class and other sectional interests,
the New Deal facilitated a convergence in American politics in
which the two major parties adopted similar centrist policies
and forged a consensus around major economic, social and political issues. This convergence was reflected in the policies of
successive Republican and Democratic administrations.
These developments led many analysts to conclude that the
end of ideology had been definitively reached. In a much cited
work, political scientist Daniel Bell claimed that ideology, had
"come to a dead end" (1962, p. 393). In his attempt to formulate
a generalized sociological construction of the social world, the
celebrated.Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons (1951) conceived
of American society as a well-regulated, homeostatic system
characterized by consensus rather than conflict. Most analysts
agreed and also took the view that radical movements on both
the right and left were aberrations in the smooth functioning
new world of mainstream consensus liberalism. For example,
Richard Hofstadter (1963) argued that organizations such as
the John Birch Society, Christian Crusade and supporters of
McCarthyism were little more than disaffected groups on the
social fringe struggling to deal with their status anxieties.
Those on the radical right took a different view. For them,
consensus politics was not a mainstream phenomenon but the
product of an insidious, left-leaning liberal establishment that
had successfully penetrated both political parties to exert a powerful hegemonic control over the nation. Determined to challenge its dominance, the radical right schemed, organized and
planned in the hope of forming an effective counterestablishment capable of fermenting a counterrevolution to the New Deal
and its allegedly perfidious influence (Blumenthal, 1986).
Some analysts place the origins of the radical right's counterrevolution in the mid-1960s, after the failure of Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign. But its roots are much older.
Indeed, the lineage of right wing struggle against the centrist
legacy of the New Deal is a long one. It can be traced back to
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Hoover himself, the embittered former president whose wealth
and name supported a policy research institute which has vigorously propagated radical right ideas, and served as a a model for
numerous other right wing think tanks. It can be traced to the
eccentric activities of Albert Jay Nock and his prophetic faith in
a 'Remnant' that would one-day rise up and overthrow the New
Deal and its attendant evils. It can be traced back to the publications of works such as The Road to Setfdom in 1944, and The Conservative Mind in 1953 by then obscure authors Friedrich Hayek
and Russell Kirk, and the founding of National Review in1955.
The Reagan victory can also be traced to the failures of the
radical right to exercise real political power during the liberal
post-New Deal years, including those when Republican presidents were in office. Despite its fanatical vigor, the McCarthy
campaign of the 1950s fizzled and while considerable resources
were mobilized, the attempt to send a right wing candidate
to the White I-louse in 1964 ended in embarrassing defeat. Although Richard Nixon had appropriate credentials, he betrayed
the radical right because of his apparent accommodation with
communism, his moderate stance on many domestic issues and,
of course, the Watergate fiasco. His selection of Gerald Ford
as his successor, and Ford's subsequent nomination of Nelson
Rockefeller as Vice President dismayed right wing radicals. As
Richard Viguerie, one of their most dedicated activists reports,
"For many of us, it was the last straw" (1980, p. 28). While Ford
represented the comprising, consensus politics that had dominated Washington's political establishment fur decades, Rockefeller's Eastern establishment background and his opposition to
Goldwater in 1964 personified everything that was wrong with
mainstream Republicanism. As Viguerie notes, the radical right
did not lack money or enthusiasm, nor did it lack ideas and ideologues; what it lacked was a leader who could appeal to the
electorate and convince citizens of the need for radical change.
The leader who emerged to fill this vacuum was Ronald Reagan.
Reagan dates his own conversion from New Deal liberalism
to his early days in Hollywood when he came to believe that
the film industry was riddled with communists whom liberals refused to oppose. By the 1960s, lie had not only become a
dedicated anticommunist but an opponent of the very policies
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Roosevelt had introduced. In 1962, lie formally changed party
affiliation to join the Republicans and in 1964 he campaigned
aggressively for Goldwater. Polonberg (1988) points out that
Reagan's speeches at this time were characterized by a virulent antiwelfarism 'which castigated the welfare state as "the
most dangerous enemy known to man," and ridiculed unemployment insurance as a state sponsored "prepaid vacation plan
for freeloaders."
During the 1970s, radical right wing forces gathered around
Reagan. Disillusioned with traditional republican leaders, they
had considerable resources at their command. Far right business tycoons such as William Simon and Charles Wick poured
millions of dollars into the campaign. The candidate also had
a clearly articulated ideology with specific programs for action.
Beginning with William Buckley and the creation of National
Review in the 1950s, the intellectual base for radical right wing
ideas had been carefully articulated. With the help of right wing
think tanks, and numerous journals and magazines, these ideas
were presented as a plausible program for action. Effective coalitions were built with electorally significant movements such
as the fundamentalist Christian right, and with the support of
highly organized campaigners such as Viguerie and Weyrich,
the stage was set for a Reagan victory in '1980. In addition,
salutary lessons had been learned from the campaign for the
1
Republican nomination in 1976,
Jimmy Carter was an ideal opponent. Despite his effective
use of populist electoral strategies in the 1976 presidential race,
Carter was caught in a web of circumstances that favored the
Reaganite strategy. The economic difficulties of the 1970s were
presented as the result of liberal mismanagement, heavy taxes
and an overgenerous welfare system and not as a consequence
of global difficulties stemming from the rapid oil price increases
or from deindustrustrialization and other international economic events. An increase in permissiveness, moral relativism
and individual choice which had characterized the 1960s was
depicted not as the consequence of inevitable social change
in an advanced industrial society but of the failure of liberalism to maintain social order and support traditional values.
The foreign policy debacle of Iran was successfully portrayed
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as the result of liberal weakness and placatory concessions to
the nation's enemies. Exploiting these problems, Ronald Reagan successfully caricatured Carter and his troubles as a manifestation of failed liberalism and he victoriously secured the
White House.
The Ideology of Reaganism
If events in the 1970s served tie radical right's campaign
efforts, the message they presented is equally important in understanding Ronald Reagan's electoral appeal. Juxtaposing their
new, easily comprehensible and aggressive ideology against tile
teachings of mainstream liberalism, the radical right secured
widespread voter support. While notions of self-doubt, a recognition of the complexity of issues, and the toleration of diverse
views havc long been central ingredients in traditional liberal
thought, these became electoral liabilities. In the context of serious economic difficulties, increased moral relativism and declining international influence, the ideals of liberalism appeared
ineffectual and incapable of dealing with the problems of the
time. Reaganism, on the other hand, offered simple, commonsensical and vigorous solutions. Reagan's aggressive posturing
on international issues, his dogmatic assertion that tax cuts and
welfare reductions would resolve economic problems, and his
promise of better times were effectively packaged.
However, behind the media messages lay a serious and
deadly effective constellation of ideological beliefs which had
been successfully forged into a unitary system through years of
intellectual experimentation. These were cleverly synthesized to
comprise tile new ideology of Reaganism which had considerable appeal. At least three themes can be identified within this
complex ideology: these are economic individualism, cultural
traditionalism and authoritarian populism.
Tie Role of Economic Individualism
The New Deal legitimized state intervention in economic,
social, cultural and other spheres of life and exemplified a concerted attempt at economic regulation and planning. Using Keynesian techniques, post-New Deal administrations intervened
directly to manage the economy. The prosperity of the 1950s
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and 1960s suggested, that interventionism was not only desirable but effective. A few dissenter, such as Iayek and the minority free-market wing of the Department of Economics at the
University of Chicago (where-Milton Friedman's ideas were cultivated) were relegated to the fringe of the discipline.
Keynesian doctrine first appeared to be in serious difficulty
in the early 1970s when the phenomenon of stagflation became endemic. Recessionary tendencies had previously been
amenable to demand stimulus, but now recession and soar-

ing inflation combined to present a new and apparently insoluble problem. Faced with stagnation, escalating energy costs,
increasing trade union activism, falling productivity, de-industrialization and capital flight, Keynesianism seemed impotent.
Suddenly, the advocacy of radical economic individualism
seemed plausible.
Friedman was the first of the radical economic individualists to gain national attentidn. His Capitalism and Freedomn (1962)
was written in lay language and despite claims to positivist objectivity, it offered an attractive ideological formulation which
was highly compatible with American traditional culture. Friedman worked closely with Goldwater to develop a radical right
alternative economic strategy and by the mid-1970s, his ideas
had formed the basis for various economic individualist theses.
"Themost important of these was Arthur Laffer's supply-side
economic theory which contended that large reductions in taxation would stimulate economic activity and, as a result of higher
output, generate higher fiscal revenues. Supply-side teachings
caught Reagan's imagination and provided formal justification
for his instinctive desire to slash taxes. And it was in the name.
of supply-side economics that massive budgetary cuts and tax
reductions were introduced early in the president's first term.
The ideological bases for monetarism, supply-side economics and similar formulations are grounded in classical individualist thought and, as such, offer little that is new. They have,
however, been implemented with considerable effect. In the
United States, supply-side ideas resulted in the massive
de-regulation of broadcasting, communications and the energy
sector. They also resulted in substantial budgetary reductions
particularly to state welfare programs. And, as Phillips (1990)
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reports, they produced a substantive re-distribution of income
in favor of the wealthy.
However, the promised results of the aggressive adoption of
economic individualism have not been realized. Tax and budgetary reductions have not spurred prosperity but have resulted
in a mammoth deficit and in the increased immiserization of
the poor. Contrary to the belief that de-regulation would facilitate greater competition, monopolization continues apace. Privatization of state human service programs has not magically
solved pressing social problems but merely provided new avenues for entrepreneur'ship. Also, the radical right's dogmatic
adherence to economic individualism has not reduced state
power. Instead, the Reagan years have shown that the very considerable resources of the state can be used to promote the sectional interests of the powerful rather than the general welfare
of the population.
7ie Inportance of Traditionalism

A second theme in the ideology of Reaganism is cultural
traditionalism. Conservatives have always valved tradition and
order and this impi1se was successfully inlegrated into the Reaganite campaign. A prinary stimulus for the radical right's obsession with order was the counterculture of the 1960s. The rise
of campus and other revolutionary groups, an increase in labor activism, the urban riots, the popularization of narcotics,
increased sexual freedom and mass opposition to the Vietnam
War appalled conservatives and appearcd to threaten the funclamental values of American society. While the Johnson administration was hardly subversive of established authority, its
liberalism bore the brunt of the traditionalist backlash.
Transitionalist reaction to permissiveness and diversity came
from several quarters. As may be expected, it galvanized fundamentalist opinion which eagerly supported Reagan. The promise of order also had considerable appeal to 'middle Americans'
in the suburbs and rural communities who viewed campus idiosyncrasies, urban violence and loud rock music alike with
increasing alarm. But of equal significance was the reaction of a
group of intellectuals, loosely known as the Neo-conservatives,

Ideology of Reaganisni

who provided the theoretical basis for tie traditionalist conponent of Reaganite ideology.
Although Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz are most
frequently identified as the movement's leaders, numerous
other writers' and academicians including Robert Nisbet(,
Michael Novak, George Gilder, Peter Berger and others have
been associated with Neo-conservative thinking and with their
leading journals Comentary and Public Interest.
Central to the Neo-conservative's critique lies an abhorrence
of liberalism's acceptance of modernity and permissiveness.
Kristol regards the rampant individualism of the modern age
as a primary cause of societal ills. By placing individual rights
above those of duty and responsibility to the wider community, the values of society are dangerously weakened with ihe
result that nihilism replaces order and undermines organically
binding institutions. This has resulted in an increase in crime,
violence, and other social problems and in the demise of the
traditional family with a concomitant increase in welfare dependency. Instead of counteracting these trends by seeking to
impose traditional values, the modern state has licensed permissiveness, and thus undermined vital social institutions.
These ideas have been articulated with particular reference
to welfare and family policy in the writings of George Gilder
(1973, 1980) and Charles Murray (1984), both of whom claimed
that the liberal New ]Deal and its welfare programs had undermined the traditional family and its responsibility to care for
its members. The rise of feminism had further exacerbated the
problem, creating fatherless, rootless families unable to utilize
their own resources to contribute to the good of the community. Similarly, the increase in permissiveness had encouraged
illegitimacy and welfare dependency.
The Neo-conservative's rejection of moral relativism and
their emphasis on the revitalization of traditional values had
electoral resonance. The Reagan campaign aligned closely with
the fundamentalist Christian right and although Carter had previously claimed to be a born again Christian, his support of
liberal causes such as abortion caused massive defections of his
fundamentalist followers. Concentrating their electoral effort on
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those constituencies that were most amenable to traditionalist
appeal, the Reaganites scored notable gains.
There were some attempts to translate, traditionalist ideas
into legislative action during the Reagan years. Although the
introduction of the Family Life Support Bill in the administration's early years was a major traditionalist legislative initiative,
it failed miserably. If enacted, it would have restricted abortion,
prohibited legal aid in cases of divorce, abortion and homosex.
ual rights, required an emphasis on traditional American family
values in the classroom and prohibited teaching materials that
"denigrates the role of women as it has been traditionally understood" (Jorstad, 1987, p. 18). Nevertheless, it appears that the
traditionalist struggle against abortion, pornography and accessible contraception, which is today being waged in the streets
by highly committed groups of right-wing and fundamentalist
activists, is making some headway.
The Appeal of A OhoritarianPopulism
American politics has relied extensively on populist ideological strategies and Ronald Reagan's use of these techniques
were not, therefore, novel. Indeed, Jimmy Carter had shown
in the 1976 campaign that he was a dexterous manipulator of
populist
sentiment. But Reagan played the populist card with
greater effectiveness
not only iiterms of electoral technique but
in terms of ideological cotitent.
Analysts of populism (Wiles, 1969; Canovan, 1981) have
contended that populism has greatest appeal in times of social stress. Effective populist political strategies seek to exploit
feelings of discontent by juxtaposing the interests of ordinary
people against those of the cause of discontent. During the Reagan campaign, the liberal establishment and its big government,
were effectively presented as the cause of social ills.
A major focus of the Reaganite populist campaign was the
economic difficulties of the time. While most politicians recognized the complexities of the situation and supported efforts to formulate intricate solutions, ordinary people became
increasingly perplexed. The presentation of a simple diagnosis
of the situation, and of straightforward remedies in terms that
were readily comprehensible was highly successful. Instead of
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attributing economic woes to complex international and domestic developments, the Reaganites blamed indifference, high
taxes, welfare dependency and, trade union obstructiveness for
the country's economic difficulties. Since this confirmed popular
beliefs, many voters instinctively identified with the candidate
and his simple, homespun explanations.
The Reagan campaign skillfully injected another element
into the- populist agenda-strong, authoritarian leadership.
Casting Jimmy Carter's entanglement in the Iran crisis as weak
and indecisive, Reagan projected a belligerent Rambo-like approach to foreign policy and particularly towards communism.
Here was a leader who would not placate the enemy but as-.
sert American superiority. The "evil empire" would be resisted
with a massive defense build-up and with technologically superior new weaponry that would secure military supremacy.
Even though the president's television appearances suggested
a faltering approach, an indecisiveness when answering. questions, and a preference for jelly beans rather than war, the strong
leader image was effectively cultivated and it had huge appeal.
Other elements which formed the basis of Reaganite authoritarian populism include antiwelfarism, traditionalism, racism,
anticommunism and patriotism. The Reaganite attack on welfare, moral relativism, the alleged excesses of affirmative action,
and the decline in national pride effectively exploited subterranean authoritarian sentiments, and provided comfort to those
who felt that their grievances were being ignored by an indifferent political establishment. The appeal to populism also had the
effect of facilitating social cohesion. The administration's unrelenting attacks on the Soviet Union strengthened the image of
a common enemy and fostered cohesion. By exploiting populist
sentiments, Reagan deftly developed Nixon's earlier notion of
the silent majority. Ordinary people who opposed welfarism,
communism, permissiveness and the excesses of liberalism were
not only in the majority, but the authentic upholders of true
American values and beliefs. In so doing, Reagan not only increased his electoral support but enhanced emotive feelings of
nationhood and fostered an organic identification between the
people and their national leader. Since this reduced the feelings
of alienation and discontent which characterized the late 1970s,
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the claim that the Reagan had restored national pride and selfconfidence has some validity.
Social Policy and the Ideology of Reaganism
The themes which comprised the ideology of Reaganism
have found expression in the administration's various programs
and legislative enactments in social policy. Economic individualist ideas pervaded the substantial budgetary cuts imposed
on the human services during the president's first term. Traditionalist ideas were expressed in the way administrative procedures in the human services were tightened to the detriment of
needy women with children. The Family Support Act of 1988
gave expression to both economic individualist ideas and to an
underlying traditionalist antagonism to single parent families
dependent on state support. By curtailing human service programs, the Reagan administration effectively affirmed dearly
held beliefs about the importance of work, sobriety and success
in American society.
In their campaign, the Reaganites consistently emphasized
antiwelfarist themes, effectively evokirig the familiar image of
the Workshy, freeloading welfare recipient who is luxuriously
supported by the state at great cost to the taxpayer. Although
antiwelfarist sentiments have long had a prominent place in
the folk demonology of American popular culture, Reagan effectively linked economic troubles and the perceived decline in
moral standards to the Johnson administration's social policy
initiatives. Drawing on the arguments of right wing think tanks
as articulated by Murray (1984), he effectively communicated
the idea that American social policy over previous decades had
harmed rather than helped the poor. The alternative, he argued,
was a radical disengagement of the state from social welfare.
Unlike his conservative predecessors who sought to curtail welfare, Reagan argued for abolition.
Although the Reagan administration did not meet this objec-.
five, it certainly tried. In its first two years of office, it imposed
substantial budgetary cuts on social expenditures and by 1984,
as Bawden and Palmer (1984) reported, the administration had
succeeded in cutting .deeply into major social programs. Unemployment insurance had been reduced by 17.4%, child nutrition
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programs by 28%, food stamp expenditures by 13.8%, and the
Community Service Block Grant program by 37.1%. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, a primary target of the administration's antiwelfarism, suffered by a cut of 14.3%. These cuts
were accompanied by reductions in benefits levels and by the
imposition of stringent eligibility requirements which excluded
many needy people from receiving any form of aid. Moffit and
Wold (1987) have shown that the cuts in the 1981 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act alone terminated as many as 35% of
Working AFDC recipients.
The attack on the human services was accompanied by substantial tax cuts which were intended not only to implement
supply-side doctrine but as David Stockman (1986), the administration's budget director cynically admitted, to starve
Congress of the revenues needed to restore the cuts and to
introduce new programs. Tax cuts benefited the wealthy and
the corporations. Citing just one example of the massive subsidies directed at the commercial and industrial sectors, Harrison
and Bluestone- (1988) show that changes to the rules governing
the depreciation of equipment resulted in taxpayers subsidizing the full costs of business capital outlays. The antiwelfarist
developments of the 1980s were consonant with Reaganite ideology which had consistently condemned state involvement in
welfare. Instead, self-reliance, the family, the voluntary sector
and the for-profit commercial human service sector would replace the state as primary providor. As Carlson and Hoplins
(1981), two Reagan White House aids explained, state provision
would be permitted only for those who could not work and had
absolutely no other means of support.
Two factors- impeded the realization of the radical right's
antiwelfarist goals. First, Congress resisted the cuts and with
the return of a Democratic majority, the Reaganite agenda was
thwarted. Second, the cuts and the recession combined to generate a highly visible poverty problem. As Friedmanite monetarist prescriptions were introduced by the Federal Reserve,
and as interest rates soared, GNP fell by 4.9% in the fourth
quarter of 1981 alone and by another 3.2% during 1982. By the
end of 1982, 4.5 million more people were unemployed than
in 1979 (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988). Homelessness became
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a serious problem and the incidence of infant mortality and
hunger increased. Faced with these dramatic consequences, the
administration reluctantly began to soften its position. Monetary
policy was relaxed and budgetary appropriations for military
and other items were increased.
But while the welfare state survived, the Reaganites succeeded in severely undermining its legitimacy and budgetary
base. It is perhaps ironic that the administration's artificially
induced recession and its massive budget cuts impeded its primary goal of abolishing the- welfare state. Had the-recession not
been so severe, and produced negative reactions, the administration may not have reVersed its position, And, had the budget
cuts not been so ruthlessly and carelessly implemented, the voluntary sector might well have emerged as a credible alternative
to state provision. Instead, as Salamon (1984) noted, budget appropriations for the voluntary sector suffered major cuts and
this effectively hindered its ability to replace state services.
The Reagan Legacy: Durable or Transient?
The Reagan administration's coming to office in 1981 heralded a major change in American politics. The radical ideology
of Reaganism coupled with an aggressive political style suggested that Reaganite resolve would engender enduring economic, political and social changes. Now, ten years later, it is
possible to make some initial assessment about the significance
of th Reagan years.
As has been suggested earlier, the Reagan administration
did not achieve all its objectives. The welfare state remains more
or less intact even though its eff(ctiveness has been impeded.
Although somewhat more fragmented that before, welfare pluralism continues to characterize the American approach to social
policy and despite the Reagan onslaught, the country remains
what Jansson (1988) and others have called as a 'reluctant welfare state'.
On the other hand, the administration clearly introduced
significant and durable changes. Perhaps the most important of
these for social policy is the budget deficit which will effectively
preclude the generation of new revenues for social expenditures
in the immediate future. The successful facilitation of populist
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antitax sentiment through tax cuts, tax reform and skillful canipaigning, have reinforced popular antipathy to new revenues,
especially for the human services. Of equal importance is tihe effects the Reagan years have had on the Democratic party which
has failed to mount an effective counterattack. While the Reagan
administration did not succeed in bringing about a fundamental political realignment in electoral politics, it weakened the liberal consensus. As Schneider (1988) observed, moderates within
both parties who previouly formed tie core of centrist liberalism, have been swept to the side while those on the right now
appear to hold sway. The hardening of public opinion as well
the deliberate weakening of the trade unions has exacerbated
the problems facing the Democratic party and its traditional
allies. While welfarists within the .party search for ways of presenting their ideals in ways thai are electorally realistic, many
have turned away from the party's historic commitment to welfare. In this situation, it not clear who will effectively represent
the deprived, needy and powerless in American society.
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The record of economic well-being in the 1980s belied Reagan's clain
that Americans would be better off if they scaled back the welfare state
and cut tax rates. Though the standard of living rose, its grozoth was no

faster than during 1950-1980. Income inequality increased. The rate of
was the same as in 7980. Cutbacks in
poverty at the end qf Reagan's terin
income transfers during the Reagan years helped increase both poverty
and inequality. Changes in tax policy helped increase inequality but
reduced poverty. These policy shifts are not the only reasons for the
lack of progress against poverty and the rise in inequality. Broad social
and economic factors have been widetning income differences and making
it harder for families to stay out of poverty. Policy choices during the
Reagan Administration reinforced those factors.

One overarching goal of the welfare state is to promote and
ensure the economic well-being of its people. Since World War 11
the cohsensus-view in the United States has been that this goal
is best pursued by developing and expanding social welfare
policies concerned with income maintenance, health care, housing, education and job training, labor market outcomes, and
social services. The Reagan Administration challenged the consensus, arguing that the Nation's economic well-being would
be promoted more effectively by scaling back and reorienting
the modern social welfare state. Though Congress resisted the
massive cutbacks of social welfare spending proposed by the
Administration, it did acquiesce to substantial reductions relative to the trends of the 1960s and 1970s.
Did this shift in policy direction increase Americans' economic well-being, as Reagan's policy makers claimed it would?
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Did it make us worse off? Or, despite the heated debates and
political maneuvering, did it. make little difference either way?
To assess the general level of economic well-being in a society, we need answers to a relatively small set of questions:
What is the average level of economic well-being (the standard
of living)? Has it been increasing? How many people have standards of living that are unacceptably low? That is, what is the
level of poverty and what is its trend? How equitable is the
distribution of economic well-being, and is it becoming more or
less equitable? Because defining and measuring "equity" raise
insuperable problems, analysts usually rephrase this last questiort in terms of the level and trend of inequality of economic
well-being.
The first task of this article, then,, is to describe the changes
in poverty, inequality and the standard of living during the Reagan years, and compare them to trends of the prior 30 years.
These are the broadest indicators of economic well-being and
the ones most frequently used, but are hardly exhaustive. One
might also want information on life expectancy, infant mortality, hunger, homelessness, leisure, and related social indicators.
Because these three indicators omit important aspects of the
quality of life, one must always keep in mind they are indicative of economic weli-being, not human welfare.1
Poverty, inequality and the standard of. living are products of complex social and economic forces. Many, such as the
pace and nature of technological change, international economic
trends, and. demographic change, are largely outside the control of the public sector. Others, though, are not. Policy choices
about the size and nature of cash and noncash income support programs, oversight and regulation of the labor market
through minimum wage, antidiscrimination and other policies,
the development of human resources through public education
and job training programs, and the character of -the tax system
can significantly altei the distribution of income and level of
povert%. Depending on their. character, such policy choices can
counteract market-driven and demographic influences on poverty and inequality, or reinforce them.
To what extent did the changes in social welfare policies
during the 1980s produce the observed changes in poverty and
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inequality? To what extent were they products of more fundamental economic and social forces and, therefore, would have
occurred regardless of who held the Presidency and set the domestic policy agenda? The article's second task is to address
these questions,
Economic Well-Being Before and After Reagan Took Office
The Standard of Living
The quality of life depends partly on a person's consumption
of material goods and services, but also on intangibles such as
freedom, degree of security from crime and violence, the quality
of family and personal relationships, and spiritual contentment.
So, while we wquld like to know the trend in the average quality
of life before the Reagan era, and how it changed in the 1980s,
no one knows how to fully measure this concept. Instead, we
examine the material standard of living.
Column I of Table I shows the trend in real median family income measured by the Census Bureau. The 1980 value is
indexed to 100 as a convenient point of reference.
Although the trend in real median family income is a widely
used indicator of the.standard of living, it can be misleading for
several reasons. A growing fraction of Americans have chosen
to live alone, cohabit with partners or otherwise have living
arrangements that do not count as "families" according to the
Census Bureau definition. Looking at median family income
ignores the trend in income among the increa.ing portion of
the population living as "unrelated individuals.I Also, because
average family size has declined over time,.in recent years the
same real income can buy a higher standard of living for the
typical family. The trend in median family income does not
adjust for the decline in average needs.
To deal with these problems, column 2 shows the trend in
real median income after three adjustments. First, all income receiving units are included, not only families. Second, the income
of each unit is corrected with an "equivalency scale" that adjusts observed incomes for differences in the age structure and
size of families. Third, instead of counting each unit's equivalent income once to derive, the median, each person in the unit is
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Table 1
Trends in Real Median Income Under Alh'r'rntivze Measres of Income and
Reporting Unit, 1950-1988 (1980
1100)
Census Tl+Iu'aLi

Family [ncome
All Families
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1973
1975
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Adjusted Family Income,
Person Weights, All Persons
NA
NA
NA
NA
87
96
93
103
100
98
97
99
102
104
108
109
112

NA = not available
Source: Column 1: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990b, tablt 727). Column 2: Karoly
(1990, table B.I).

assigned its equivalent income. The equivalency scale is the one
implicit in the federal poverty thresholds (discussed below). The
median is then computed over all persons. Each person, rather
than each family, carries equal weight. As in Column 1, the 1980
value of median "adjusted family income with person weights"
is indexed to 100. These data are not available for as long a period as the standard Census Bureau measure. (See U.S. House
of Representatives, 1990, pp. 1070-1071 for explanation of the
approach. Though an improvement compared to using median
family income, this approach is still problematic because the
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income concept used in the series excludes noncash forms of
income and does not deduct direct taxes.)
Real median family income grew steadily from 1950 to 1973
and nearly doubled over this period. The oil crisis of 1973 and
ensuing recession produced a sharp decline by 1975, but incomes recovered by 1979. The severe recession which began
in 1980 and continued during the early years of the Reagan
Administration drove median family income sharply down in
the early 1980s. Since 1982, median family income has gradually risen and in 1987 finally reached the level last experienced
in 1973.
From 1950 to 1980, the average growth rate of real median
family income was 2.1% per year. In contrast, during the eight
years of Reagan's term the annual growth rate was only 0.7%.
Compared to the prior 30 years, the Reagan era was not a prosperous one. On the other hand, it was far better than the trend
from 1970 to 1980, when real incomes stagnated.
The evidence in column 2 leaves a rather different impression of the Reagan years and how they compare with the 1970s.
The decline in income during the early 1980s appears less severe and the recovery looks much stronger. Real adjusted family
income grew at a rate of 1.4% during the Reagan years, twice
the rate in column 1. However, real adjusted family income
also-grew by 1.4% during the 1970s. Based on this income measure, then, the Reagan years did not produce an improvement
in the growth rate of the standard of living compared to the
prior decade.
Column 2 isprobably closer to the "truth." Because its income measure is based on reports from the entire population,
corrects for needs, and gives all persons equal weight, it better
captures the trend in the standard of living for the median resident of the United States. Under either measure, though, one can
reasonably conclude that on average people had higher incomes
when Reagan left office than when he entered, but that the Reagan years did not increase the growth rate of the standard of
living compared to its record over the three prior decades.
The 12% increase in living standards from 1980 to 1988 (from
column 2) was not uniformly enjoyed by all types of families.
For person in families with a married couple and childrdn, real
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mean adjusted family income rose 14.3%. For those in families
with a single mother and children, however, the real mean actually fell. 1.3% Among the nonelderly childless, it rose 11.3,;
among the elderly childless, it rose 13.0%.2
Incomne Inequality
Table 2 shows the trend in the distribution of income based
on a simple summary. measure of inequality: the ratio of total income received by the top 20% of the population to total income
received by the bottom 20%. Of the many ways to measure income inequality: this one has the advantage of being available
for the distribution of income.among families as defined by the
Census Bureau and for the distribution of adjusted family income with person weights. Thus, the columns in table 2 use the
same concepts of income and reporting unit as the corresponding columns in Table 1.
Column 1 shows that income inequality among families ex,
hibited little trend from 1947 until the- early 1960s, declined
modestly until the late 1960s, and increased modestly until 1980.
The Reagan years witnessed a sharp increase in inequality without precedent since 1920 (Williamson and l.indert, 1980, pp. 7677). The summary measure increased 18% between 1980 and
1988, to the highest value observed since 1947, when this data
series began. And it was higher yet in 1989.
The data in column 2 tell nearly the same story. Inequality
of adjusted family income rose slightly in the 1970s, and rapidly
in the 1980s. In contrast to-the pattern in column 1, inequality
crested in 1986-1987 and dropped slightly in 1988. (Information
for 1989 is not available.)
Poverty
The official measure of poverty is derived from a set of poverty lines which vary by household size, the age of the head
of the household, and the number of children under 18. (Until
1981, sex of the head of household and farm/nonfarm residence
were other distinctions.) The poverty lines are updated yearly
by the.percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, so they
represent the same real purchasing power each year. For 1988
the average line for a family of four was $12,092. If a family's'
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Table 2
Trends in Income Inequality Under Alternafite Measure of In:ome and
Reporting Unit: Ratio of Shar? of Top 20% to Share of Bottom 20%

1947
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1973
1977
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Census Bureau
Family Income
All Families

Adjusted Family Income,
Person Weights. All persons

8:6
9.5
8.6
8.6
7.9
7.6
7.5
8.0
8.0
8.2
8.4
9.1
9.1
9.1
9.5
9.5
9.5
9.6
9.7

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
7.4
7.9
8.0
8.3
8.9
9.7
9.9
10.0
'10.3
10.3
10.3
10.0
NA

NA = not available.

Source: Culurnn 1, computed from dala in U.S. Bureau Of the Census (1989) for
1947-1987; U.S. llureau of the Census (1990a, p. 30) for 1988-1989. Column 2,
computed from data in U.S. I lousm of Representatives (1990, p. 1092).

annual income falls below its poverty line, its members .count
as poor.
The official poverty definition measures income by counting
cash income from all public and private sources, except capital gains. It does not take into account public or private noncash benefits such as food stamps, subsidized public housing or
employer-provided health insurance, nor does it subtracl taxes.
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Table 3.
Percentage of Persons in Poverty, 1959-1989

1959
1965
1969
1974
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Official Poverty
Measure

Official Poverty Measure
Adjusted for Selected
Noncash Transfers and Taxes

22.4
17.3
12.1
11.2
11.7
13.0
14.0
15.0
15.2
14.4
14.0
13.6
13.4
13.0
12.8

NA
NA
NA
NA
9.9
11.6
13.2
14.2
14.6
13.9
13.5
13.1
12.6
12.0
NA

NA = not available
Source: Column 1, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990a, p. 57); column 2, U.S. House
of Representatives (1990, p. 1042).

Yet both noncash benefits and taxes affect a family's standard
of living.
The first column of Table 3 shows the rate of poverty among
persons according to the official federal poverty measure. In
1959 22.4% of Americans were poor. In the next decade the
poverty rate declined dramatically to 12.1. After a small increase
-during the mild recession of the early 1970s, it decreased again
to 11.1% in 1973, the lowest level ever observed. The level of
poverty rose slightly in the mid and late. 1970s but was less
than 12% at the end of the decade. The economic downturn
during the early 1980s drove poverty sharply up. It peaked at
15.2% in 1983, the highest rate since 1965.:During the remainder
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of Reagan's term, poverty gradually declined as the economy
expanded. By .1988 it had fallen merely 2.2 percentage points to
13.0%, higher than any year from 1968 to 1979 and equal t0 the
1980 level. A year later, the poverty rate was 12.8%, the same as
in 1968, and 31.5 million persons were poor, 3.2 million more
than in 1980.
Arnong major demographic groups, only the aged have
made sustained strides against poverty. Their 1988 poverty rate
of 12.0% was the lowest ever for this group and marked a'decline of 3.7 percentage points from 1980, just before Reagan Look
office. Poverty among children, in contrast, soared to more than
22% in 1983 and was 19.5% in 1988. This rate was 5.6 percentage
points greater than in 1969, the year when child poverty was
lowest, and 1.2 percentage points greater than in 1980. Children
are now the poorest age group in the United States, and have
been since 1974.
Poverty among blacks was 31.3% in 1988, 1.2 percentage
points lower than in 1980 but no lower than it was throughout
most of the 1970s. Among Hispanics, 26.7% were poor in 1988,
1.0 percentage points greater than in 1980. And arong whites,
the 1988 poverty rate of 10.1% was virtually identical to the
3
1980 rate.
Column 2 of Table 3 shows the recent trend in poverty using a modified measure of income in conjunction with the same
official poverty lines. Means-tested noncash transfers from the
federal food stamp, school lunch and housing programs are valued at their estimated private market cost and added to the income measure. Medical benefits are not included because there
remains substantial disagreement about ]low to properly measure their value to low income persons. Federal income taxes
and the employee share of federal payroll taxes are subtracted.
(See U.S. House of Representatives, 1990, pp. 1038-1039 for further detail.)
Because low income persons receive most food and housing
benefits and pay relatively few income and. payroll taxes, these
adjustments lower the poverty rate in each year by between 0.5
and 1.4 percentage points. They do not, however, significantly
affect the trend during the Reagan years. the poverty rate still
peaked in 1983, then declined slowly. One minor difference is

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

that in 1988 it was slightly greater than in 1980. According to
this measure, there were 29.2 million poor persons in 1988, 3.2
million more than in 1980. (Data for 1989 are not yet available.)
Economic Well-Being During the Reagan Years: The Bottom Line
A central tenet of Reagan's 1980 campaign was that Americans would be better off economically if they scaled back and
reoriented the modern social welfare stale, and cut marginal
tax rates. Bowing to the ensuing political mandate, Congress
launched a great experiment to test this dairn by cutting back
the expansion of social welfare expenditures and passing major
tax cuts. How did it turn out?
Not very well. On the positive side, the standard of living
rose. But its growth rate was no faster than during the 19501980 period, and persons in families with a single mother and
children were, on average, worse off in 1988 than 1980. The
gap between the most and least affluent widened substantially.
Indeed, the gap widened so much that, even though real median.income rose, the average real income of persons in the
bottom fifth of the adjusted family income distribution declined
by about 2% between 1980 and 1988 (U.S. House of Representatives, 1990, p. 1092).
The deterioration in economic well-being among lower income persons was best captured in the poverty statistics. The
level of poverty at the end of Reagan's term was identical to
its level in 1980. Throughout the Reagan years, poverty affected
a larger percentage of Americans than in any year from 1968
to 1979.
If there is a "Big Tradeoff" between equality
and efficiency
(Okun, 1975), the efficiency oriented policies of the Reagan Administration, pursued at the expense of efforts to directly reduce
poverty and income differences, might have been expected to
pay off by producing more rapid growth in the standard of living. From this perspective, the record of poverty and inequality
in the 1980s may not be surprising. What is surprising is the failure of median adjusted family income to rise faster than during
the 1970s, a decade widely perceived as economically stagnant,
and one when social welfare spending rose rapidly.
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Did Reagan's Policies Make Poverty and Inequality Worse?
This section presents evidence on the extent to which the
changes in poverty and inequality can be attributed to changes
in income maintenance and federal tax policy enacted during
the Reagan years. The analysis concentrates on these policies
because they directly affect the net incomes of many families.
Other recent changes in social welfare policy have affected poverty and inequality by altering the distribution of market
income. For example, federal policies on financial aid for college students affect attendance choices and, consequently, adult
earnings. These more indirect effects are difficult to detect, have
received little attention, and so will not be discussed.
Accounting for Changes in Poverty Between 1980 and 1988
Three basic factors drive changes in poverty. Changes in real
earnings and other private sources of income (market income)
affect "market poverty," the number of persons who are poor
if only their before-tax market incomes are counted. Second,
because income support programs and taxes alter most families'
market incomes, changes in these policies affect the number of
poor after transfers and taxes are counted in income, given the
level of market poverty. Third are demographic factors. Overall
population growth would increase the number of poor even
if the rate of market poverty and the impact of transfers and
taxes on poverty did not change. Demdgrnphic shifts towards
groups with higher (lower) than average rates of poverty would
tend to increase- (decrease) the overall level of poverty, other
things equal..
Table 4 shows how much of the 3,184,000 increase in the
number of poor persons between 1980 and 1988 can be accounted for by each of these components.4 The measure of poverty is identical to that in column 2 of Table 3, which includes
benefits from food and housing programs in income and subtracts major federal taxes.
A clear story emerges. Gains in market incomes during this
period acted to reduce the number of poor by 973,000. The net
effect of changes in federal tax policy was to further reduce
the number of poor by 450,000 in 1988. t'he Tax Reform Act -of
1986 eliminated income tax liabilities for nearly all poor pers'ons
and families and expanaed the earned income tax credit. The
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Table 4
Between 1980 nid 1988
Sources of (he Increase in ihe Poverty Populaunld
Change in number of posttransfer, positax poor due 1o:
Market income changes
Social insurance program changes
Means-tested program changes
Federal tax changes
Average population growth
Demographic shifts and other
Total increase

-973,000
250,000
1,734,000
-450,000
2,163,000
460,0(10
3,184,000

decline in poverty produced by these reforms was partly- offset
by increases in Social Security taxes.
Cutbacks in social insurance and means-tested transfer programs, in contrast, raised the number of poor by 1,984,000.
Without this increase, the rate of poverty would have been 0.8
percentage points lower in 1988-below the 1980 value instead
of above it. Cutbac'ks in means-tested benefits were responsible
for the bulk of the increase. Controlling for changes in market
incomes; government transfers and federal tax policy, simple
population growth plus other demographic factors would have
added 2,623,000 poor persons.
The cutbacks in welfare programs, especially AFOC and
food stamps, were championed by the Reagan Administration
as a means to reduce dependency and encourage work. Success
in these objectives was minimal, and at the high cost of increasing poverty. The increase was particularly felt among persons in
single parent families with children. The cutbacks pushed more
than 1.1 million of them below the line and raised their rat of
poverty by 3.9 percentage points.
Though federal welfare policy changes under Reagan bear
much of the responsibility for helping to increase poverty, the
states are also partly responsible. During 1980-1988 most states
allowed their AFDC benefits to fall in real terms, thereby further
reducing the antipoverty effectiveness of this important element
of the safety net.
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Accounting for Changes in incorne Inequality
Gramlich, Kasten and Sammartino (1900) have analyzed the
impact of federal taxes and cash transfrs on inequality of adjusted family income with person weights during the 1.980-1990
period. (This is the same income concept as-in column 2 of Table
2.) For 1990, they compare the pretax, pretransfer distribution of
income to the posttax, posttransfer distribution to compute [he
impact of taxes and transfers on inequality. Then, the analysis
holds the distribution of pretax, pretransfer income at its 1990
level and adjusts taxes and transfers to what they would have
been if 1980 policies had remained in effect, but benefits and
taxes had kept pace with the growth of other incomes. This procedure isolates the effects of policy changes from other economic
and demographic changes between 1980 and 1990. The impact
on inequality is then recomputed. Table 5 displays the key findings using the Gini-coefficient, a measure of inequality ranging
from 0 to 1, wi-th smaller values indicating less inequality.
Table 5
Impact of Federdl TxLs and Transfers on Inconie Inequalily (A'hasured by
the Gini Coefficitct)

1980 Market Incomes,
Transfers and Taxes
1990 Market Incomes,
Transfers and Taxes
1990 Market Incomes,
1980 Transfers and Taxes

Pretax,
Pretransfer
Incomes

Posttax,
Posthansfer
Incomes

Decline
Due to
Transfers
and Taxes

.473

.395

.078

.523

.463

.060

.523

.452

071

Source: Gramlich, Kasten and Samnimartino (1991), tables 4, A.

Comparing rows 2 and 3 shows that inequality of posttax,
posttransfer income would be slightly less if the 1980 transfers
and taxes had remained in place. The 1980 policies would have
reduced the Gini coefficient by. 071; the actual 1990 policies
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reduce by. 060 or 15% less. Most of this decrease can be traced to
a decline in the redistributive impact of federal taxes caused by
large reductions in marginal income tax rates for persons with
high incomes combined with increased payroll tax rates for low
and middle wage earners. Again the message is clear: changes
in tax and transfer policy during the Reagan years contributed
to the increase in inequality.
On the'other hand, these changes have played a relatively
small role in the overall increase in inequality since 1980. The
observed posttax, posttransfer Gini coefficient rose from .395
to .463, or by .068. With 1980 policies in place, the rise would
still have been .057, only 16% less. The surge in inequality since
the late 1970s owes far more to broad labor market and other
economic factors than to shifts in tax and transfer policy.
The Policy Verdict
Did policies enacted during the Reagan Administration
make poverty and inequality worse? Yes. Cutbacks in transfer
benefits helped increase both poverty and inequality. Changes
in federal tax policy helped increase inequality but, on balance,
reduced poverty.
At the same time, it would be a serious mistake to attribute
the lack of progress against poverty and the increase in inequality entirely to these policy shifts. The extent of poverty and
inequality is determined by many social and economic force
besides social welfare policy. Beginning in the mid to late 1970s
and coitinuing throughout the 19,80s, strong, poorly understood
market and demographic forces have been widening income differences in the U.S. and making it harder for families to stay out
of poverty. Even if 1980 tax and income transfer policies had.
remained in place, the 1988 poverty rate based on adjusted income would have been 11.2%, 1.3 percentage points higher than
it was in 1979. And the Gini coefficient for income'inequality
would have been. 057 higher in 1990 than in 1980.
No politically feasible set of transfer and tax reforms could
have fully counteracted these market and demographic factors
(Grarnlich, Kasten and Sammartino, 1990, p. 18). Perhaps the
policy response would have partly done so if persons holding traditional views of the welfare state's function had been
in control. Instead, the temper of the times and the character
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of the Reagan Administration produced policy choices which
reinforced those factors.
Implications for Poverty and Inequality in the Future
The rise in inequality is receiving greater public recognition
and has emerged as a target for Democratic politicians. These
political developments, in concert with continued concern about
the deficit,have, as of this writing, thwarted Bush Administration proposals to reduce the capital gains tax, and are creating
pressure to modestly raise tax rates on high income persons.
The disequalizifig effects of the 1980s changes in the income
tax, therefore, will probably not continue and may be reversed
to a small degree.
Child support obligations will be more widely respected and
enforced in the 1990s. This will help reduce poverty and welfare dependence among single parent families. In addition, the
work-oriented welfare reforms of 1988 will become more widely
implemented in the 1990s and are likely to make a small contribution towards reducing poverty among such families. There
also appears to be increasing concern that ghetto poverty (the
"underclass") and poverty among children can no longer be neglected. Major initiatives to address these problems have not vel
been adopted, but may.emerge in the next- few years.
In a fiscally conservative climate, it may well be possible to
reshape tax and social welfare policies in a manner that reduces
the level and growth of spendihg while preserving or even extending their antipoverty and equalizing impacts. The Reagan
Administration and Congress chose not to try. The recent past,
however, does not necessarily portend the future. There are
grounds for thinking that policy developments in the 1990s will
not contribute to greater poverty and inequality, and may even
help reduce them. If so, the American welfare state will return
to its long-standing function of preserving and enhancing the
economic well-being of its inhabitants.
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Karoly (199)0, table B-i) because this source had a longer record clI
data
on adjusled family inconie,
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A precise definition of income maintenance. a le'ast within
the American context- -is elusive. Some policy analysts define
income maintenance programs solt,ly as public assistance pigrams, such as Aid Io Families with Dependent Children
(AFD(), General Assistance, and Supplemental Security Incomt
(SSI) (Karger and Stocsz, 1990). Others defint income maintenanct, programs nu re broadly Io include public assistanice
programs and social insurance programs such as Social Security, Uncmployment Compensation, and Workers' Cormpensation (1)iNitto and Dye, 1987). For the purposes of this article the
more inclusive definition of income maintenance will be used.
This article provides a brief historical background of income
maintenance programs and describes the major changes that
have occurred in those programs over the last fifty years. It
also) examines the Reagan agenda for limiting [lie income maintenance sector, and tht, major shorl- and long-term impact oI
income maintenance programs resulting from Rcagn adminis.tration initiatives.
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The Pre-Reagan Welfare Slate
Since its origins in the mid 1930s, (he American welfare
state has been an amalgam of ideologically disparate programs.
Unlike European welfare stales such as Britain, the American
welfare state did not emerge from a coherent social vision. Instead, Franklin 0. Roosevelt created a patchwork welfare state
in response to the social volatility of [heli )epression and lhe
need to salvage what remained of capitalism. Ongoing public
assistance-based income maintenance programs for the poorwhat has been transformed into AFDC arid SSI-were peripheral to the primary social insurance focus nf the New Deal. Even
the tenuous security offered by the fledgling American welfare
state was uneven. For example, unemployment insurance was
not generous in its benefits, and Social Security originally excluded certain groups of workers, notably domestics and agricultural workers. Despite these flaws, public assislance-based
income maintenance programs grew because they addressed
importanl social needs.
The expectation that welfare programs would lead to greater
equalily, social justice, and Ihe redistribution of income and resources occurred in its most focused form during the Great Society and War on Poverty programs of the '1960s, a period that
came to represent the halcyon days of liberal social welfare policy. Important social welfare policies of die iid-1960s included
the Food Stamp Act and the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid. At the same time, aggressive social plans were designed
that promised a poverty-free America and a nonsligmatized,
community based, and easily accessible system of social welfare.
To realize these objectives, the Johnson administration developed myriad programs designed to help low-income children,
families, and communities. Ingrained within these programs
was a belief that the welfare state could ensure equality of opportunity and a redistribution of social, economic and political
resources. In one of the rare instances in recent American history
where rhetoric was backed up by fiscal resources, the number
of federal domestic aid programs rose from 200 to 1,100 from
the early 1960s to 1975 (Gilberl, 1986).
America's brief flirtation with bold social welfare initiatives
ended by the early 1970s, and Liberals had few successes to
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point out when pressed to justify the massive expenditures of
the 1960s. While AFDC rolls iripled (from 3 million to 9.6) front
1960 to '1970, social problems, such as drug addictimu, crime,
teenage pregnancy, child abuse, and mental illness continued to
grow. By 1968 the Great Society prograns had become unpopular with the American public and stinging critiques of them
began to appear regularly in newspapers and magazines.
The American welfare stale entered a paradoxical period
with the election of Richard Nixon in 1968. While the bold
social experiments of the War on Poverty were terminated or
reassigned to mainstream federal bureaucracies, the more established income maintenance programs-Social Security and
AFDC-grew dramatically.' In addition, when Nixon took office again in 1972, lie attempted to streamline income maintcnance programs by proposing a Family Assistance Plan (FAP),
which called for a guaranteed annual income to replace AFDC,
Old Age Assistance (OAA), Aid to the Blind (AB), and Aid to
the Permanently and Totally Disabled (AFrD). While the FAP
was rejected by Congress, the OAA, AB, and APTI) programs
were federalized under a new program called Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Although the Nixon administration's alnbivalence toward social welfare was followed by two low key
presidencies, the relative lull in social welfare thinking from
1975 to 1979 was abruptly shattered by the explosion of the
Reagan administration.
Vision and Action: The Reagan Welfare State
Unlike the more pragmatic Nixon, Reagan viewed income
maintenance through a highly ideological lens. Charles Atherton ('1989) outlines five propositions that sum up the New
Right's-and by implication Reagan's-socio-political philosophy of income maintenance programs.
First, conservative analysts claim that the welfare state is
paternalistic and antilibertarian. They argue that any state with
the power to shift resources from one group to another represents a form of econonic tyranny. As such, they focus on
the abridgement of the rights of those coerced into subsidizing the poor. Second, Conservatives argue that the welfare state
is both ineffectual and counterproductive. Third, Conservatives
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contend that the welfare state is too expensive, its results are
spurious, and they doubt whether the gains made by welfare
programs justify spending 17% of the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP). Fourth, Conservatives believe that the welfare state
is based on faulty principles of social engineering that eventually lead to centralized planning and a managed economy.
Lastly, the welfare state is viewed by many conservatives as
having lost sight of basic American values (Gilder, 1981). According to these critics, the welfare state does not reinforce the
work ethic; the goal of self-sufficiency, self-suppoir, and selfinitiative; the importance of intact families (Mead, 1985); the
fiscal responsibility of the parent to the child; and the notion
of reciprocity-the idea that recipients have an obligation to
behave in a socially acceptable manner in return fur receiving
assistance.
Reagan's views on income maintenance were informed by
the simple philosophy that the way to wealth and national income growth-and out of poverty for the poor--was through a
vibrant, nonregulated marketplace and personal initiative.
Shortly after assuming office, Reagan signed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. Among other things,
O3RA substantially cut public assistance benefits and punished
recipient family heads who were trying to improve their economic lot. After passage of the OIIRA legislation, AFDC recipients found their child care expenses capped at S160 per month
per child; their deduction for work expenses limited to $75 per
month, and their earned income disregard (the first $30 per
month and one-third of income thereafter) eliminated after four
months. Combined with other measures, OBRA had a profound
impact on AFDC rolls, resulting in .408,000 families losing eligibility and another 299,000 having their benefits reduced. In
effect, 5% of the total AFDC caseload became ineligible due to
OBRA, and about 3.5% of those who were workiiig were terminated (Moffitt and Wold, 1987, p. 248). Monthly income loss
resulting from OBRA ranged from $229 in )allas to $115 in
Boston. In addition, former AI.)C beneficiaries in these cities
also lost Medicaid coverage. In Dallas, 59% of terminated fanilies could not secure alternative health insiirmici ; in Boston,
27% (Moffitt and Wold, 1988).
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All told, the budget cuits of 1981 resulIed in a 11.7% redtclion in AFDC funding, siffer eligibility reqtirements,'nnd a 19%

reduction in Food Stamps (other food programs were reduced
by 13%). In addition, the duration of unemployment insurance
was reduced by 13 weeks (Day, '19H)), Because of bldgt cuts
and other fiscal policies, the poverly rate in 198I climbe'd to
15.3%, higher than any year since the early 1960s (Kirg,,r and
Stoesz, 1990).
For Conservatives, simple redtictions in wel fa1rL' blaefits
failed to get at the licart of the problem. What was needed was
prew,iive medicine: the transformation of the very la\ siruclure that generated the revenues necessary for welfare benefits.
Conservatives justified their position 1y arguing that if taxes
were less progressive, the rich would benefit; however, if the
poor were also providmd rebates they would benefil as well.
By exempting the poor from a predatory and reenssive tax
strirclure, Conservatives could cut (he flow of vital rv'ewTV'ns for
welfare programs and improve the lot of those in ecoinomic difficullv. Thus, Lax policy became social welfare policy., it in a
manner antithetical to the liberal understanding of both tax and
welfare policy (Stoesz and Karger, 1991).
Tax policy was reptatdly substituted for welfare' poliCy during the Reagan adiniist ration. 2 Claiming that the lii,'rde, of

inflation disproportioilutely affected those on limiled iiwo-mes,
Reagan'successfully argued for a tax cul soon after taking office, lhe concept of using tax expenditures-indirect paym~elts
through tax exemptions, credits, or rebates-as a proxy fior di-

rect welfare payments was a relatively recent possibility. In 1975
the -arned Income TIx Credit (EITC) was instituted wherCby
low-inco(me tax-payers were given a rebate. The EITC proved
to be just the program that conservatives were looking for as a
substitute for direct income maintenance payments.
Despite the increases in EI'C, the tax rebates failed to compensate for the deep cuts in welfare programs macle mnder Reagan. According to Kevin Phillips (19t9t0), "L o w-in c o m e families,
especially the working poor, lost appreciably more by ctls in
government services than they gailnd iin tax reduct oWV' (p). 87).
Moreover, because the wealthv continued to benefit fnrll less
progressive taxation, the income disparity between rich and
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poor widened. Between 1980 and 1990, the federal tax burden
for the richest quintile of taxpayers decreased 5.5%, while taxes
of the poorest fifth increased 16.1%. This loss of income occurred
despite the increased level of I'TC payments (Greenstein and
Barancik, 1990).
Although public assistance programs were an important larget for Conservatives, the lion's share of federal expenditures
were in the social insurances. By tle middte 1970s Social Security began to show signs of being in trouble. Between 1975
and 1981, the Old Age and Survivors Fund saw a net decrease
in funds with a deficit in the reserve of between $790 million
and $4.9 billion a year, an amount that threatened to deplete
the reserve by 1983. Moreover, the prospects for Social Securily
seemed bleak. While the ratio of workers supporting beneficiaries was one to three, by the end of the century Ihe ratio was
expected to be two to one. The long term costs of Ihe program
would have thus exceeded its projected revenues.
Through 1981 OBRA, the Reagan administration was able to
exploit the Social Security crisis by whittling away at benefits,
including the elimination of benefits for postsecondary students,
and restrictions on payment of the death benefit. These reductions were expected to save the program $3.6 billion by 1983,
an amount insufficient to make up for future shortfalls. In order to insure the future integrity of the Social Security sys(em,
the Reagan administration quickly empaneled a bipartisan commission. Facing short and long-term problems, Congress moved
qtickly and passed P.L. 98-21-the Social Security Amendnients
of 1983. This legislation included various changes, such as a
dela'y in Cost-of-Living-Adjustments (COLA) and a stabilizer
placed on future COLAs. In addition, Social Security benefits
became taxable if taxable income plus Social Security benefits
exceed $25,000 for an individual or $32,000 for a couple. And,
by 2027 the retiremeint age was to be increased to 67 for those
wanting to collect full benefits. Although People could still retire by age 62, they would receive only 70% of their benefits,
down from the current 80%. L.astly, coverage was extended:
new federal employees were covered for the first time, as well
as members of Congress, the president and vice-president, federal judges, and employees of, nonprofit corporations. For 1990,
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these changes added over $308 billion to lie Old Age Strvivors Insurance and Disabilily Insurance 'i'usi Funds (StoesZ
and Karger, 1991).
Although Liberals viewed the 1983 Social Security reforms
as a success, the major Conservative victories were less apparent. By trimming benefits through ()BRA, UCmservatives hl
reversed decades of steady expansion of the Social Security program; by increasing the regressive payroll tax through the 1983
amendlents they placed the solvency of thU p1rogram squarely
on the shoulders of middle-income workers. Thus, while total
annual federal revenue receipts from income lax fell from 17%
to under 45%, revenues from Social Security increased from 31
to 36%. Senator George Mitchell pegged the resulting income
redistribution from midde-income workers to the wealthy at
$80 billion (quoted in Phillips, 199(1, p. 8(0),
Despite the conservative ben of tlhe 1983 Social'Securitv
Amendments, the sharp erosion of income experienced by recipients of public assistance programs was not rellicated inthe social insurances. This was not for lack of creativity. Conservatives
fashioned privatized approaches to almost every governmen[a] function, including the substitution of Individual Retirement
Accounts for Social Security. And, despite his campaign pledge,
Reagan took on 1he social insurance programs. Through more
restrictive determinations for disability under Social Security,
the Reagan administration sharply reduced the number of beneficiaries for disability payments. From 1981 to 1984, the number
of initial terminations for disability insurance were four times
that for the period of 1977-1980. B3etween 1978 and i83, the
number of disability beneficiaries declined by more than one
million, a reduction of 21.7'%. Although over half of those terminated were to have their benefits restored by 1987, the net
result was the termination of 37% of cases (Committee on Ways
and Means, 1991)).
One of the areas hardest hit by the Reagan administration
was Unemployment Insurance (UI). In 1N75, over 75% of all

unemployed workers were covered by UI; by '1980 that tnm1ber
had dropped to 501%; and by 1988 ithas dropped to a record
low of 31.5% (Karger and Stoesz, 1990). Beca use rates of iiiemployment insurance coverage differ on a slate-by-state basis,
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these aggregate figures telt only part of the story. In states such
as Texas, -Virginia, South Dakota, Louisiana, Arizona, Indiana,
Georgia and Florida, the percentage of workers receiving unemployment benefits in 1988 was at or below 20%.
While the unemployment rate came down from a high of
9.7% in 1982 to 5.5% in 1988, the status of the unemployed did
not return to the 1979 level. Specifically, the typical person who
became unemployed in 1979 remained out of work for a shorter
period of time (10.8 weeks) than in 1988 (13.5 weeks). Moreover,
in 1979 there were 535,000 people who were unemployed for six
months or more compared to 809,000 people in 1988 (Shapiro
and Nichols, 1989). At the same time that spells of unemployment increased, federal and state changes in the UX system made
it more difficult for unemployed workers to qualify for benefits.
For example, in 1988 it was more difficult for states to provide
extended coverage for an additional 13 weeks to workers who
had exhausted their 26 weeks of standard unemployment insurance benefits. In 1981, the threshold in which a state can pay
these extended benefits was substantially increased at the behest of the Reagan administration (Shapiro and Nichols, 1989).
In short, federal policies enacted during the Reagan administration formed a disincentive for states to extend or liberalize
their unemployment insurance coverage.
Income Maintenance Programs and the Reagan Legacy
The Reagan administration left an important ideological
legacy for the American welfare state, one that was cemented
through the creation of a massive budget deficit. The realization
of Reagan's ideological promises is best illustrated by the adoption of the Family Support Act of 1988, the crowning domestic
achievement of his second term.
Although Conservatives were concerned about Social Security, UI, and S5, their real attention had always been focused
on what they saw as the most vulnerable income maintenance
program-AFDC. Until the Reagan administration, welfare reform had a liberal connotation and reform proposals usually
called for expanding the scope, benefits, and eligibility of welfare programs. However, by the 1980s conservative scholars began to develop plausible proposals for welfare reform, including
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serious proposals in the areas of workfare, community development, and child welfare (Rabushka, 1980; Anderson, 1980;
Gilder, 1981; Meyer, 1981; Murray, 1984; Butler and Kondratas,
1987; Novak, 1987; Lind and Marshner, 1987). Within a short
period, the liberal hegemony in social welfare was confronted
by a group of scholars, who held a vastly different view of the
limits, scope and responsibilities of the American welfare sate.
Out of this melange of conflicting interests emerged the Family
Support Act of 1988.
The Family Support Act of 1988 was a compromise bill that
emerged from a Congress besieged by a huge federal budget
deficit. Although inherently conservativet the Family Support
Act appeared moderate in light of the proposals coming .from
the Reagan White House. For example, an earlier proposal made
by the Reagan administration, the Low-Income Opportunity
Act, would have effectively eliminated a poor mother's entitlement to support from federal welfare programs. This proposal would have given states wide latitude in program
design, eligibility guidelines, benefit levels,.and the allocation
of program resources.
Despite its conservative features, Representative Thomas
Downey, Chair of the House Subcommittee on Public Assis•tance, hailed the Family Support Act as the first "significant
change in our welfare system in 53 years" (Eaton, 1988, p. 15).
Under this bill, $3.34 billion was to be allocated over the first five
years for states to establish education and job-seeking programs
for AFDC recipients. During 1990 and 1991 states would have
to enroll at least 7% of AFDC parents in "workfare," and by
1995, the mandatory enrollment would rise to 20%. Although
the AFDC-Unemployed Parent program (covering two-parent
families) was made mandatory for all states, beginning in 1997
one parent will be required to work at least 16 hours'a week
in an unpaid job in exchange for benefits (Rich, 1988). Among
the more progressive provisions of the bill were the extension
of eligibility for day-care grants and Medicaid for one year after
leaving AFDC. This bill also mandated the automatic deduction
of child support from an absent parent's paycheck. Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chair of the House Ways and Means
Committee (which oversees most welfare legislation), estimated
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impede self-sufficiency if beneficiaries were forced to do makework instead of seeking real work in the labor markel. Garnishing wages of the noncustodial parent was also unlikely to
increase the economic independence of many female-headed
households or of low-paid male workers. In cases of marginal
incomes, garnishing wages of low-paid male workers can create a disincentive to work.
The Family Support Act also did not alleviate the longstanding erosion of cash grants to poor families. AFDC benefits
currently remain below the poverty level for all states, excepl
Alaska (Committee on Ways and Means, 1988), From '1970 to
1988, the median state's AFDC benefit dropped 35% (in constant dollars) as a result of inflation. In other words, if AIFDC
benefits had kept up with inflation, beneficiaries in 1988 would
have received an additional $5.88 billion. 'he welfare reform
bill would redistribute to the poor only 57% of this lost incomne
($3. 34 billion) over a five year span. Moreover, even this inadequate reallocation would be diluted by channeling it through
a compulsory workfare program (Karger and Stoesz, 199).
Lastly, the Family Support Act bill failed to tackle one of the
most serious problems in AFDC-the lack of a national AFDC
benefit standard. Specifically, this bill did not rectify a system
which allows states such as Alabama, Kentucky, L.otisiana, Mississippi, Teninessee, and Texas to award a family of three an
AFDC grant of less than $200 per month (Karger and Stoesz,
1990). (In comparison, Alaska, California, Vermont, and Connecticut pay the same family over $600 per month.) Despite its
obvious shortcomings, three fundamental values of the Reagan
administration were reflected in the Family Support Act of 1988:
reciprocity, productivity, and familial responsibility.
Recipricity
Conservatives insist that welfare programs contribute to dependency and dysfunctional behaviors, especially when benefits
are not linked to an expected standard of conduct. Charles Murray (1984) maintains that the very system designed to help the
poor has created dependency by penalizing the virtuous anti
rewarding the dysfunctional. Although reciprocity is promoted
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as a way to encourage socially desirable behavior in welfare
to aid tie
component
pnecessary
recipients, it is also becoming a
public credibility of welfare programs.
Prodtciivilry

In order to survive in a highly comptlitive global economy,
the U.S. is forced to consider new ways to more effectively
utilize its labor force. Given the new economic realities, flie
ascendence of conservative values, and lhe severe budgetary
restraints, the federal government is likely to force social programs to become more congruent with economic productivity.
Within this context, relief will be defiled from-an emphasis on
welfare to one of work. Allying welfare with productivity will
also draw social programs closer to the American economic svs.,
tern, a strategy that may be necessary to justify future social
welfare expenditures.
Familial Responsibilily
Another ideological premise of the Family Support Act is the
belief that government should abandon its role as the "rescuer
of first resort." Retreating to traditional values, this philosophy
dictates that biological parents have the ultimate responsibility to support ticr offspring (thus justifying the stringent enforcement of child support laws). The values institutionalized in
the Family Support Act are likely to guide income maintenance
policies for at least the present decade.
To ensure that his domeslic agenda IVottId not beC temporary,
Reagan presided over the largest budget deficit in the history
of the United States. The scope of the federal budget deficit
is difficult to grasp. While the 1989 Gross National Product
(GNP) of the United States was $5 trillion, the budget deficit
was rapidly approaching $3 trillion. In other words, the federal budget deficit equalled three-fifths of the entire GNP in
1989. In 1988 the world traded a total of $2.7 trillion worth of
goods, less than the $2.83 Irillion U.S. federal budgel deficit in
the third quarter of 1989. Broken down, the federal debt exceeds over $13,000 for every man, woman, and child in the
United States. By creating anl enormous debt (from about $50
billion a year in the Carter term to betwevn $145 to $200 billion
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a year in the 1980s), [lie Reagan eco1omic legacy Piarilyzed the
growth of fiscal-based income maintenance programs, until the
next century.
While the Reagan adminis ration could rightfull y.claimi-najor successes in reshaping American social welfare policy duriing
the 198s, its mosl important achievemenl was in ciealing a farreaching conservalive ambience. This lqacy is most visible in
the budgelt deficil reduction ipckage of I1990(.
The framework for the 1990 budget package was crealted by
the Lax-cits of the first Reagan ternn, which contributed it at, n
precedented budgel deficit. Thruighout
Ihe late 1980s, Congress
and h1w Reagan, then Bush administratiolls, postponed tile day
when tie budget would have to be reconciled with the GrainiRudman-l[ollings Deficit Reduction Act. I lowever, facing a
huge i'evenue shortfall in 1990), [lie Con1greSS and the pr'esidenl
were forced to develop a more viable budgtl packag,. Reflecting
the difficult consequllences of aly serioUs budget cnnpronlise,
the initial deal was ctt beyond 1e view of' IhC public and press
at Andrews Air [Force Base. [ailing to get past outraged liberal I)einocrats and conservative Republicans (who had signed
a campaign pledge not to raist taxes), another round of bargaining ensued.
On October 27, 1990, the louse and Senate appi'we-d sweeping budgetaty legislation that maide changes in numliroulS entitlement programs, raised Laxe% , placed ceilings oin defense
and noi-entit]ement spending programs, revised the GrammRudman-I lollings deficit targtls, and made important changes
in Congressional bitdget procedures. Tht next day, Congress
approved the final thirteen appropriations bills for fiscal year
1990 that set specific funding levels for htindreds of programs.
All told, these measures were desigled to reducc the deficit
by $42.6 billion in fiscal year 1991 and $496 billion frn 1991 to
1996. After a decade of punishing program cItIs, Liberals greeted
the budget compromise with relief, since, it increased domestic
expenditures over a five year period by $22 billion (Shtosz and
Karger, 1991).
The deficit reduction program consisted of five eltlnenis: (a)
reductions in entitlement programs, (b) reductions in defense
spending, (c) increases in user fees foir government services,
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(d) tax increases, and (e) reduced interest payments on the national debt. Taken together, this budget package represented a
mixed bag of reforms. On the positive side, it contained progressive tax increases (the tax burden on the wealthy was to
go up more than for the middle class, and the tax burden on
households with incomes of less than $20,000 would actually decline), the out-of-pockets costs borne by Medicaid beneficiaries
was reduced by two-thirds (poor Medicare beneficiaries were
shielded from the moderately higher Medicare rates), federal
programs targeted at poor or unemployed people were protected, Medicaid coverage was extended to poor children up
to age 18, low-income families with children were to receive
new or expanded tax credits under the 1ITC program (they are
slated to receive over $18 billion over the next five years), two
new grant programs were established to provide day care services for low and moderate income families, and Medicaid was
expanded to include the functionally impaired elderly living
at home. In addition, the budget package contained increases
for Head Start, low income housing programs, and [lie WIC
program (Leonard and Greenstein, 1990). Significantly, Social
Security was safely "Off-budget," guarded by "firewall" procedures in Congress (House Budget Committee, 1990). Congruent
with conservative values, the main beneficiaries of the budget
package were not public assistance recipients, but pour working families with children.
On the negative side, this package prohibited (he transfer of
funds between defense and domestic appropriations for three
years, thus precluding any peace dividends. In effect, prohibiling the transfer of funds between defense and domestic budget lines meant that social programs must compete with each
another for a fixed amount of funds, thereby making it more
difficult to fund new welfare initiatives. In addition, changes
in budgetary procedures shifted power fron a relatively liberal
Congress to the more conservative Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). For example, any breach of spending ceilings
for defense or domestic nonentillement programs will trigger
an across-the-board cut in that particular category of programs.
Hence, no entitlement program could be increased unless
such measures are offset by other entitlement programs or tax

binome Mainteniance

changes. The final arbiter of whether spending ceilings have
been violated or whether new tax thresholds have been reached
is the OMB (Leonard and Greenstein, 1990).
Although the tax changes in the deficit compromise were
progressive, Ihey did not profoundly affect the increasingly
skewed income distribution in the United States. A House Widget Committee noted that the total tax increases under 1990
OBRA, 2.2% over five years, paled in contrast to the 1981 Reagan tax cut of i6% (House Budget Committee, 1990). Moreover,
extension of Medicaid to cover every poor child is phased in
over a twelve year period, meaning that all poor children will
not be assured of health care until October 2002 (Leonard and
Greenstein, 1990).
The successes of the Reagan administration seems likely to
influence income maintenance policy tlirou ghnu t the present
decade. Income maintenance ideologies that stress reciprocity,
productivity, and familial responsibility represent a return to
traditional values of self-reliance, independence, individual responsibility, and the limited role of government. For Liberals
who advocate expanding social welfare programs, these values
represent a deterioration of the traditional liberal consensus that
guided American social welfare policy since World War 11.
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Notes
I. \lthough Nixon ended many of Ihe experimental programs of Owc,
Great
Society, he did not curb welfare expenditures, which grew at a healthy
rate during his administralion. See Diane M. [JiNillo and "'hormasR. Dye,
Social welfare: Politicsand publit' policy (lEnghwood (Cliffs. NJ: Pn'nlict-I lall.
Inc., 1987).
2, Reagan's emphasis on using tax payments as a suhslitute for diret welfare
payments waus continued through lhe Tax Re'forn Act of 1986. As a result
of a compromise with Liberals who were coit.rni-d about the cMiinued
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erosihn of the inconi of the working poor, t1w Tax Reform Ac of 1986
effectively removed roughly 6 million low-iicoie families from the tax
rolls, Inslad of paying laxes, these famillies received cash payments from

the Treasury through the EITC. On the olher hand, Liberals also agreed
to a more regressive lax structure in which the previous fourteen income
gradatimis were collapsed into just two.

America's Health Care
System: The Reagan Legacy
TFI.RR COMBS-ORME AND BERNARD GUYER
John Hopkins University

li'anse'of the doinace o" lht private sector in health care in the United

Slates, health conditions an' notl as susceptible to cuangrs in public pliy as they are in other Western countries. low'ever, he elderly and!
youplg children are direct.ii affected by the federal gon'rmntent's health
can- piolicies and while hoth gro)s were the focus (if major changes
introduced by the Reagan adminisiration, these changes w.ere opposed
buy Congress. Nevertheless, changes in health care f(unding and adminisra ire arrangements have hail a negative impact on the needy and,
in addition, they have ben exacerbated by the Reagan admiistration°s
wider social and economic poli'cis which tave cantriln ted negatively to
th' health conditions of ithe
poor.

Analyzing the effect of the Reagan Administration upon the
American heath care system is a challenging task. The subject
is not health itself, but rather specific public health care policies
and programs. Health as it is conventionally defined is relatively
insensitive in the short run to political influence, due largely to
the multiplicity of personal and societal factors that influence
the health of individuals and groups, and the incremental effects
of these factors on health, Many of the traditional indicators of
health, such as infant mortality, for example, change slowly;
important trends can be seen only over long periods of time.
Also, most health care interactions occur in the private sector
(Litman, 1990), and under limited, if significant, government
influence.
There are two important exceptions to this generalization:
the elderly and low-income women and children, two groups
who are called "dependent" by Preston (1984) due to the fact
that they are not part of the work force and are largely supported by that work force. It is within these two groups that
the effects of governmental policy are most evident; this analysis
63
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focuses on low-income mothers and children, the 1105 dulndent (f these two groups,

This paper analy7es hit' Reagan effect on

Arerican ii,lii

care by first describing he Reagan agenda and- aciorm, hY ihe
Ad mi nist ra Lion. Next we assess early reactions by hei lith advocates, ;nd finally we exanint' it, immediate and ll)g,-trn
effects of the Reagan Administration's actions on th Anirican
health cdre system.
The Reagan Proposals For Health Carh,
It is notable that the Reagan speeches do not contain refert'llC
to a "health agenda"; lvallh apparently was not a ta iiipaign issue nor a major parl tf lit' "Reagan revolUliion' except
as it concerned the financinpg of liealth care. Greenherg (19'80)
noted that "Health policy, in faci, was barely touched tin in Ihev
campaign" (p. 1542). Davis nted in 1981: "The mosi si riking
ol
gap in the Reagan Administration heialth policy is tialilt'
any pusitiv agenda to address pressing problenis inhiI' health
care suctor" (p. 328). Indeed, in one of the PresideIII'S Iew direl coniments on health in a speech an the annual invting cf
the American Medical Associatiln (June 23, 1983), tit I'resident
concentrated on health financing ralher than heallh itself:
Health care cost are conIulmilg a growing pti:Iitin or hlit Natiin's
wNeailth, and that is wealt h that cannot be spo tlon vdiicul in ir
housing or other social needs ... It", high time that we pot hellih
cal' costs uinder the knife and ct iway the wash' and inlliit'licv.
(r. 907--90(8)

lie also reiterated a traditional, and arguable, corst'rvalive
position:
We' have the best health care in the world, because ii has rein.iincd
private (p. 908).

The health-related issme tlat did dominate Ihe Reagan campaign was abortion, althou.h it was cast not as a health issue
but as a moral one. There is no tiiut that Reagan presented
himself as opposed to ahtolin. I-Ie sted this ptsition during the Presidential campaign arid courted support fromi [Ile
pro-Iife movement. Early on inhitl' Ad ministration, lie sintud
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his pusilii on abortion hill did not support a conslititioillal
ame intnil to ban aborlini:
Nmw, I happen to have I.liieved and stated many lint"' 1ha I
believe in an abortion we arte takig a hunman life. But if this is 0t,1t
determined, then tleTr isn'I really any need for an a11(lu10t1,
herause once you have delt-rmined Ihis, (he CoiStilltiml alrealy
protecds the right to hirman lif'. (NIarch 6,1987, p.212)

Nathan and colleagus (1987) summarize the lrt'eminent
goal of (he Reagan Administralion as retrenchment in so.al
policy in (he broad sense. 'lowaIrd Ihis end, the Adminisralic '
proposed a new philosophy of government, his New lederalism, and economic renewal initiatives as operaliOali>zed by
reductions in spending.
New I t'crralis'n
Reagan made his viws on tlit role of governnni knovoi
at the rnnent of his inati1lurntl address, January 21, 1981, calling gl.'rvImen t the problem ralher then the solhlit n: "It is

timeu to check and revt'rse Ilie growth of governmnent, which
shows signs of having grown beyond (ie consent of (lie governed" (p. I). These comments and the proposals that followed
focused on the Federal government, although Nat lln (1987)
raises evidence to indicate tha he
it Administration intendtd lo

achieve retrenchment at all levels of government. ''e R'agan
analysis concluded thatl titraI government had grown I yond
tile inlenl of tile Constitition. 1 his growth in the size ald role
of the Fede ral Administration was attributed to Itie inflfunces

of special interest groups till lhe Congress. The ('ollstiIutional
argumenlt led the Administralion to propose lit, siralegy of
returning powers and responsibilily to the states: "II is iy inlention to curb the size and influence: of the Federal establishment

and to lemand recognitioi ohf
tlhdistinct ion betwe t Ilhe 1owers granted to the Federal Goverinment and those reserved to
the Stlt, or to the people" (January 20, 1981, Ii. 2).
BIock (;r

siI

The vehicle for implenenting
the

New Federalism (devolv-

in; p'ower to thle states) was to lt, block grants, Iniinp.-smns of
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money designated for broa lIv defined pitrposes t) Le speinl .c-

cording to the needs of the individual stales. Block grants had
their beginnings in 1966, when nine formula grants for various health programs (denial health, tuberculosis, etc.) wVre

combined into the Partnership in I leaith Act. The principle
that guided government's involvement in its citi/viis' health
as the Reagan Administralion assuiamed power originated with
the Sheppa rd-Fowner Act in 1921 and res1ulILed ill Ile ]tedhral
grants-in-aid s;ystem that was instittiionialied in thv Social Se-

curilv Act in 1935. Tille V of the Act was Ilie vehicle through
which the Federal government funded services to mothers and
children, through grants-in-aid Io tle stales on a matching basis. An enormous niumber of calegorical programs developed
over the years, creating a patch-work system of health tnre.
Now President Reagan proposed consolidating till or part of
83 of these categorical heallh programs intoi six human-service
block grants of $11 billion, claiming that the categorical programs burdened th0 states with regulations and paperwork:
Ineffective targeting, wasteful administrative overhead--all can be
eliminated by shifting the resources and dht ision-mniking authorilV to hcal and Stale government. This will also consolidale programs which are scattered throughomut the I lerd' bureiiaIcrcy,
hringing government closer to the peolh' and saving $23.9 billion
over the next 5 years. (February 18, 1981, p. III)
The earliest objective of the Administralion was 1o criate a
single health care block grant in which all if [he discretionary,
categorical Federal health v'are programs would be inocludedl. 10
implement this proposal, hotwever, required agreement frIom a
large number of congressional conmmiitees that had ii risd i ion
on various pieces of legislation. Important Cungressional laders like Robert Dole (Republican of Kansas), who chaired the
Senate Finance Committee and had jurisdiction ov.r all of the
Social Security Act p-rogram1s, would not relinquish any aulithority. Thus, Congressional opposition led to legislation for four
block grants. These were: the alcohol, drug abuse and cornmunit.y men!.al health grant;the preventive health svivices grant;
the community health centers grant; and the Maternal and Child
Health (MCI t) Services Block Grant (glehart, 1983).
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The MCI I Block (;rant consolidaled seven previous calgorical programs: the basic MCH program (which provided
maternity and infant health care and pediil1ric services), ('rippled Children's Services, special services for disabled children
receiving SUpplcmenll Security Income, lead-based painlt lisoning prevention, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome service',, genetic screening and counseling services, lienophilia truatnent
services, and the adolescent pregnancy programin.
"rhe legislation to implemntiithe block grants was carefully
crafted. The Administration had done a hmendous amount ft
homework to identify all the relevant pieces of legislation and
the corresponding citations and cross referunces to dhe health
legislation. In addition, they carefully identifie'd all tof the regulations attached to these laws as Ile regulalions were oflen
highly prescriptive.
The legislative vehicle for enacling the block grant consolidations was the Omnilbus BudgRet Recknciliatin Act. Lsing; this
process, the Administration was sniumltaneously able to circumvent lhe process of Congressional hearings and debate and at
the same time, achieve the budget reductions. David Stockumin,
the )irector of the Office of Manage'ment and Budlet, was able
to use te re'conciliation process in Congress to evade the powers of the nppropriations comrnillees and introduce program
changing legislation through the budget till. That roced.)1)t'tllre?
has dominated Federal policy-making ever since and introduced
the acronym, OIBRA (The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act),
into the Ailerican political lxicon. (The must recen( Congress
enacted a new budgetary vehicle called "pay-as-you-go" lhat
replaces 013RA (Congressional Quarterlv, P1990).)
In addition to crealion of the block grants, the Admini.,rlation made changes in Medicaid that enhanced slates' abilities
to limit benefits. Medicaid isa parlnership between tlhe Federal
government and tihe states, with stales pernitted to sot eligibility standards and reimbursement levels within hroad Federal guidelines. Changes in 1981 permitted stales to negotiate
rates of reimbursement rather than pamying "usual and cusltomary" rates, and allowed stat's to assign recillitnts li)providers
inslead of selecting the providers of their choice (Nathan &
Doolittle, 1987).

lournial of Slt iology & .Soc.ial Welfare

1leregulaliui
As part of devolving power down to it,stateIhlvel and
restructuring' the Federal role in tlhe funding of pr,,,rams, the
Reagan Administration sought specifically 1t)
reduce regutlation.
The regulatory aspects of heallh care seern ti have been inibedded in a more fundam1ental assessment f government regulations as interfering with [lie competitive forces of 1himarket
place. And on this issue the Administralion had donet its honiework; in a February speech, President Reagan already knew the
number of pages of law and regulations lhal would le reduced
by block grants and deregulation:
In the health and social services area alon, tie plan wv.'r, proposing will substantially reduce lhe need for ,165 pages of liw, 1,401
pages of regualilns, 5,000 Federal eniployevs who presently administer 7,600 st.parate grants in about 25,tl00lt separate, location,.
Over 7 million man and wlman hours (f work by Stale and local
officials are required to fill owil governmeiil forms. (Febriary 18,
1981, lp. 11.1)
In the case of health care, however, the drive Lo deregulate
was tempered somewhat by ihe self-interest of the Federal government in reducing its massive health care expenditures. The
Administration believed that competition would reduce health
care costs (January 27, 1987, p.7)), and tiled the experience of
the Carter Administration in Irying to reduce the expansion of
health care costs [Iihrough regulation. Cerlificates of Need and
other cost containment strategies were generally seen as failures,
although evaluation data were scarce and could be interpreted
as showing some slowing of the expansion of hospital capital
costs ()divis, 1981). Reagan introduced the conservative notion
of treating health care as a commodity and using competition
in the market place as the vehicle for reduced expendiltures.
One case involving Federal regulations illustrates the President's tendency to approach social policy issues through anecdotes and his preference to address theni through personal
intervention. Early in the Adninistration, lie learned of the
plight of Katie Beckett:
Thu incident of just a few clays ago thai I know youi're all aware,
of--that almost accidentally caame to our alention--of 1he little
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3 1/2-year-old girl who had never lived at home with her parents
and couldn't, actually, because of a regulation with regard to the
government grant they had to have for medical exptnses of 10
to 12 thousand dollars a monili. And Dick Schweiker fond out
within 24 hours after we made it public that, by golly, he could
change that regulation and got it changed. And I had the pleasure
of calling those parents and speaking to them and their mispeakable happiness that the fact that (heir little girl was going to comle
home. (November 18, 1981, p. 1072)
Katie Beckett was a child with serious chronic lunIg dis-

ease owing to premalure birth and resulting in dependence
on an artificial respirator. She spent much of her youn, life in
hospital. Under the SSI-DCP (Supplemental Security IncomeDisabled Children's Program), Katie was eligible for SS benefits and Medicaid while hospitalized. The Blecketts, an educated
family, wanted to take Katie Iione and take care of her with
home-based technology. Were this to happen, however, Katie
would no longer be eligible for SSI and Medicaid because her

parents' income would be counted. Despite the fact thatithe
government could have saved thousands (if dollars in expensive hospital costs, they would not provide Medicaid to Katie
once she went home.
This little case-you know an example of what we're trying to cutre
is this one that, God bless them, Dick Schw,iker grabled a hold
after I made it piblic the other day of the little girl out in lowa, and
how quickly we made this change Tb think that our governmentand I was wxrong; I had old-fashioned figures when I sdid S6,0U0.
It was costing between $10,00) and $12,011 a month for Medicaid,
and even (lie doctors said she should be home, that she'd be better
off at home, and it would cost $1,000 a month at hone. But that
was more than her family could afford, so thev couldn't take; her
home because they couldn't lake over the cost, But here was the
government shelling out $10,000 or $12,000 every oillnth, when
a silly regulation stood in the way of them getting it for $1,000
a month. Dick found a way it ignore that, make an exception to
.that regulation, bul you wonder how many more cases are out
there in the country like that. (November 11), 1981, p. '1076)
The President's decision, of course, was correct. The policy
was foolish and short-sighted. However, rather than undertake
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a comprehensive reform of the way-Medicaid, SSI and other
Federal programs for the disabled interacted to create disincentives to appropriate care, Reagan preferred to solve the single
dramatic case. Regulations were subsequently written to allow
states to seek Medicaid waivers in tile cases of other ventilatordependent children.
Reductions in Spending
Asthe 1970s drew to a close with steep increases in the cost
of health care and rising Medicaid and Medicare expenditures,
cost containment was the major by-word. Federal efforts to curtail health care costs had been evident in efforts by Presidents
Nixon, Ford, and Carter in the 1970s to set limits on reimbursements to hospitals and physicians (Aaron & Schwartz, 1984).
Further efforts were made by state governments (l3ovbjerg &
Holahan, 1982). Thus when President Reagan assumed command in 1981 cost containment as already a major heath care
issue, and much of the focus was on the cost of the Medicaid
and Medicare programs.
Two areas were prime targets for spending reductions: the
entitlement :programs of Medicaid and Medicare, and tile new
block grants' The powerful lobbying arm of senior citizen
groups made Medicare (Title 18 of the Social Security Act, enacted in 1965) less of a target than Medicaid. Moreover, Medicare, which financed medical services for the elderly, enjoyed
wide popular support, in part due to its image as an insurance
program, in contrast the Medicaid, which was viewed as welfare. Nevertheless huge Medicare expenditures were a major
concern of the Administration's as they had been of previous
administrations. Doomsayers predicted the complete collapse of
the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund and the Medicare program
itself (McCarthy, 1988). As a result, Public Law 98-21, the Social
Security Amendments of 1983 were enacted to limit Medicare
spending.
The new legislation limited spending by creating a system
of prospective payments to hospitals based upon a system of
categorizing all diagnoses into 383 Diagnosis Related Group
(DRG) categories with preset reimbursement levels. Certain adjustments were made to the payments made based on location
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of hospitals (urban vs. rural), and local differences in wage rates.
Although hospital costs for the Medicare population nonetheless continued to rise, DRGs did result in reduced admissions
and lengths of stay for the Medicare papulation (Dougherty,
1989). Although the effects of the DRG system .on the quality of care for the elderly are more difficult to ascertain, many
physicians feel that pressures on physicians to reduce costs
are resulting in patients being discharged "quicker and sicker"
(Dougherty, 1989).
Medicaid (Title 19 of the Social Security Act, also enacted in
1965), which financed health care for certain categories of poor
persons who were believed to lack access, to care, was originally almost a tack-on to Medicare and was generally believed
to be quite unimportant. It was a Federal grant-in-aid program,
with the amount of Federal match (between 50 and 801%) being
higher for states with lower per-capita incomes. The popularity
of Medicare lay in part in its image as an insurance program,
in contrast with Medicaid, which was viewed as "welfare."
The Federal government had become a major payor of
health care costs through Medicare and Medicaid; the two programs accounted for more than 39% of all Federal health care expenditures in 1980 (U.S. Health Care Financing Administration,
1988). Because Medicaid and Medicare are entitlement programs
(open-ended, and all eligible persons must receive included services), Administration objectives to reduce Federal taxing and
spending had to be met through mechanisms other than restructuring to block grants. (On the other hand, Nathan and Doolittle
(1987) maintain that Reagan hoped to restructure Medicaid to
a functional block'grant.)
Thus, claiming that the program was not cost-effective, the
President proposed: ", . . to put a cap on how much the Federal
Government will contribute, but at the same time allow the
States much more flexibility in managing and structuring the
programs (February 18, 1981, p. Ill).
There was an early proposal to swap Federal and state responsibilities for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and Medicaid (State of the Union, January 26, 1982,
p. 76). Under this plan, the Federal government would ha'Ve assumed all the costs for Medicaid while the states made
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welfare-AFDC-an entirely state program. Legislation to implement the idea was never proposed, perhaps due in part to opposition by the National Governors' Association (Iglehart, 1983).
In the 1981 OBRA, the Administration reduced spending
in t'wo ways. First., the eligibility level for AFDC was reduced.
Thus in 1982, at the end of a recession with increasing poverty, there were 597,000 fewer recipients of AFDC than there
had been in 1980 (U. S. Social Security Administration). Because
AFDC conveys automatic eligibility for Medicaid, these women
and childreri'also lost their health Insurance. After a decade of
improvements in access to health care for low-income women
and children, advocates feared reversals.
In fact, some reversals did occur-In prenatal care utilization,
for example Low-incoxne and'minarity womni, who do not
generally receive the same level of prenatal care during pregnancy as more advantaged women, but whose risks for poor
pregnancy outcome are greater, made significant improvements
during the 1970s.that.generally were attributed to Medicaid and
Federal Maternal and Child Health programs (Davis & Schoen,
1981). As Figure 1 shows, these gains were partially lost in the
1980s, although of course it is not possible to demonstrate conclusively why this occurred. Health advocates.were particularly
concerned that no progress was made in improving prenatal
care for black women.
It was in the area of lost benefits that the President's greatest
image problem plagued him. The President played on the old
American notion of a truly needy class and the existence of.a
safety net of supports to meet their basic needs. The net was
intended to prevent the undeserving poor, the working and
able-bodied poor, from benefiting:
We will continue to fulfill the obligations that. spring from our
national conscience. Those who, through no fault of their, own,
must depend on the rest of us--the poverty stricken, the disabled,.
the elderly, all those with true need-can reset assured that the
social safety net of programs they depend on are exempt from any
cuts. (February 18, 1981, p. 110)
A cartoon by the syndicated cartoonist Dan Wasserman is
illustrative. It portrayed David Stockman, Director of the Office
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of Management and Budget (OMB) and the chief architect of
the Reagan budget proposals, in four frames saying, "To simplify the fight over budget cuts," "we're.planning an elirnination tournament.." "The farniers can take on. the elderly, the
jobless vs. the school kids, etc." "The Winner gets to.go one-onone with the Pentagon."
The President clearly brilled at this image of cruelly:
Contrary to some of the wild charges you may hIave hcard, this
administration has not and will not turn it back oil America's.
elderly or America's poor, . ,The entitlement programs that make
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up our safely net for the truly needy have worthy goals and many
deserving recipients... Don't be fooled by those who proclaim
that spending cuts will deprive (he elderly, the needy, and the
helpless... (January 26, 1982, pp. 74-75)

In 1986, James C. Miller succeeded Stockman at 0MB. Wassermann portrayed a Congressman asking, "Mr. Miller, you call
for cuts in Food Stamps, Medicaid, nutrition and job training."
"How does that square with the President's pledge not to balance the budget. . ." "on the back of' the man who is poor?"
And in the final frame, Miller replied, "Congressman-these cuts
would mostly affect women and children!"
The second proposal to cut costs was to reduce.
the Federal burden for Medicaid by placing a cap on the percentage of
Federal contribution to the program. Congress, under pressure
from the nati0i's governors, modified this proposal to reduce
the percentage of Federal matching to Medicaid. The net effect' was a 5% reducLion in Federal expenditu res for entitlement
programs between 1981 and 1982 (p. 50).
Figure 2 shows the number of Medicaid recipients .and expenditures from 1972 through 1968 and demonstrates two irn."
portant facts.. First, the cuts in numbers of recipients are not
obvious; this is due to the effects of the recession of 1981-82,
with ltcreasing numbers of persons qualifying for Meditaid despite stricter requirements. If not.for the stricter requirements
that moved many women and children from AFDC eligibility,
there would have been a steep increase in AFDC-based recipients during the early 198(s. Second, despite moderations in
the number of recipients, costs continlued to clirb due to the
increasing cost of health care. This 'is particularly evident for
non-AFDC-based recipients, wh6 are mostly comprised of elderly and disabled recipients. The bulk of Medicaid. payments
for this group consists of.hospital and institutional care costs,
which are very expensive.
Creation of the block grants also provided 'the opportunity
to reduce spending. Part of the rationale for block grants was
that greater efficiency and reduced duplication would reduce
wasteful'administrative costs (Omenn, 1982). Yet tle General
Accounting Offi;e (1982) was unable to find evidence that block
grants resulted in cost savings. (This appeared to be due to the
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Figure 2
Medicaid recipicils and paymenIs IyIasis of eiil'ility', Fiscal 1972-88.
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lack of requirements for evaluaLion and accountability by th6
slates.) Reductions in spending authorization varied among hlle
four block grants. Mental health and preventive health services
were reduced by the 25% that had been proposed; the Maternal
and Child Health (MCI-I) Block Grant authorization level in FY
1982 was about 13% below the total (in real dollars) for the
individual categorical programs in fiscal' 1981 (Iglehart 1983).
(See Figure 3.)
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Figure 3
Tille V or MCH Block, Granl Appropriations in numinil and 1967 C.P.AL
adjusted dollars, Fiscal Years 1967-89.
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Successes and Failures of the Reagan Proposals
Reactions to the Reagan Adn'inistration's plans and proposals were swift and generally full of rhetoric. Some feared
polio epidemics (Boston Herald American, February i1,1982)
or "dead baTies" (Boston [-lerald American, Noveniber'25, 1981),
while the Children's Defense Fund called Reagan policies "an
unconditional war on children" (Boston Globe, 1982). Statislics
on child deaths due to Administration policies were widely
quoted (Common Health, 1984).
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More restrained reactions also emerged. Da~is (1981) noted:
This policy represents a profound.shift in direction in the health
sector. It encompasses a far-reaching reexamination of the role of
the federal government in financing health care services, administering direct programs to pronote, preventive and primary care
services, regulating costs in 1he healih sector, sponsoring biomedical behavioral,: and social science research, and supporting the
-training of health professionals. (p. 312)
The Block Grants
Rosenbaum (1983) of the Children's Defense Fund, a highly
effective child advocacy group, noted some positives in the
MCH Block Grant, including some useful guidelines for planning. In fact the MCH programs had always been very loose
with regard 1t regulations, and the Block Grant provided some
improvements. For example, although no regulations were
included to guarantee implementation, ORA 1.981 prohibited
discrimination and contained requirements that addressed the
issue of quality of care.
But neither did. the block grants omne.out of the Coingress in
the way Reagan had originally proposed. Congressioiial committees exercised their influence, and special interest groups
were not about to be pushed- aside. President Reaga-n complained that his plan to consolidate 86 "'duplcative, regulationridden" programsinto block grants had been rejected and criticized (lie legislation (June 19, 1981, p.. 545):
First, many of th& measures that are needed to curb the aitomatic
spending programs have not been .adopted. These reforms would
target programs more directly toward the truly needy while they
help to eliminate waste and abuse.
Unfortunately, 'the House corhmittee has adopLed oi-ly one'third of the savings that these reforms would bring. And the result,
if unchallenged, lwill be $23 billion in additional red ink and inflationary pressure.in the next several years. Doing only one-third
of the job is not good enough.
Secondly, tertain House committees have not yeL reeived Lhe
message of last November that the American peop'le want less
bureaucratic overhead in Washington and les, red tape typing up
State and local..gov4inment.
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Nonetheless, 'ne' year after taking offieu, President Reagan
wouuld report the success of his New Feder'.lisil:
"lii~vlier, after 50 years of taking power aw.iy from the hands of
[lie people in their Slates and local conlintinities, we' have started
relurning power and resources to then (hanu.irv 26, 1982, p. 73).
Not only did Congress not pass the block grants the way
the President wanled; they were not iniplenivided as the President had hoped they would be. States ised a nuimber of tactics
In blunt le effects of 11e block grants. Feldman's (1985) sludy
of the impact of MCI I Block Grant cutls on five states (Texas,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and California) and four
large urban areas (Boston, l)eiroit, New York City, and San Antonio) found that states used "carry-over" foods and increased
their own contributions to block grant progriinis to reduce the
imjact of spending cuts. Some states delayed implementing Ihe
block grant mechanism for a year. There was great variability
in cities' abilities to draw on other funds, however. With the
exception of San Antonio, real service reduclions did occur in
maternity and pediatric services. Nathan and I )ooJlittle's (1987)
extensive study of the eff-cls of Reagan's policies on the states
also emphasizes the states' successes in forestalling many effects
of thu cuts. This expansion occurred'through tilt replacement
of Federal funds with stale dollars, new fiscal coping mechanisms, delaying measures, and administralive reform. Some 38
states raised taxes and increased real spending during lhe years
[984-86 (GAO, 1984; Nalhan, 1987). indeed, their study showed
that several states used the increased flexibility in Medicaid to
expand their programs, rather than contracting then.
Perhaps rnost important, however, is that after an initial period of dramatic success, a kind of political blitzkrieg, Congress
reclaimed authority and after 1981, rejected most of the Administration's proposals for further budget cuts and even approved some new domestic spending. Most notable, in 1983,
Congress reacted to lhe st(ip recession of 198 1-82 with an emergency jobs act that added $2.8 billion to dlmiieslic programs,
including many of those cut in earlier years. For example, passage of the bill added $105 million to the original $373 million appropriation to Title V. The FY 84 appropriation had beUn
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$399 million, 35 percent lower than necessary to maintain 198()
service levels (Feldman, 1985). Federal aid outlays stayed about
the same (in real dollars) from 1982 through 198.1, then increased
in 1985. Outlays were below tlhe 1981 levels, but cmsiderably
above what the Reagan Administration had l,1nrLv'd (Nathan
& Doolitlle, 1987).
Aedicaid Reductions
l'resident Reagan's elforls to reduce Medtlaid also were
short-lived Although OBRA 1981 reduced the F-ederal match
for Mediciaid, total Med icaid expenditti re increased each year
betweet 1979 and 1987 (I ieaith Care Financhi Administration,
that removed
1988). (This occurred despite changes in AI.
over half a million recipients from the prog).ram.) Moreover,
while [lie President was wo rking to reduTe Miedicaid, child
health advocates were working to expand the log.,1ra i. In 198.1,
Federal ma,itching levels wvcre returned to the le\els they had
been in 1981 (Children's l)efense Fund, 1984I). Other changes
that year returned Medicai iO many families .i'estoring their
AI:[)( eligibility.
'lhat year also marked the beginning or a s ries of expansions that included (lie (hild Ilealth Asstiraie Program
(CI-tA'). The Children's D~efense Fund called these changes,
which uncupled eligibility fur Medicaid fron categorical propoor
grams such as AFDC, "the biggest victory inCongress -or
children and families inseveral years" (p. I). Oherg (1990) docimnLts how legislation passed each year beg,,innir g in 1984 expanded Medicaid to i'llide women who w'r pr'egnant for
the first time, women in t\vo-parent families, and childrei from
i
permit ted
birth to age five, and then age eight. States w\:ere first
in 1985 lo include individutals up to 100% of (h Federal poverty level, then permitted to iiclude those ul In 185% and in
1988 reqluired to include those uip to 100(% (OBRA 1989 further
mand.Led pregnant women Mnd children wilh family income>
less than 133% poverty.)
Coninmily Health" Center;

A nijor failure of the Reagan plan was the destruction
of Community Health Centers (CHCs), identified early by the
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Administration as an "infrasiructure for a national health svrvice" (Clark, 198,1). Cl ThCbean as part of tihe War on Poverly,
and were designed to address the problem of lack of access to
health care in many areas. Freeman, Kiecol, and Allen's (982)

analysis of a large data set on two surveys in five commtinitles
found that CI-Cs vere the primary source of cart' for many lowincome persons-disp)ropor'Lionately soi for childin. Mor'n iver,
they found C-ICs to reduce the use ifmore exptensive hospital
clinics and emergency rooms and to lower hospilalization Iites.
The Community Health Centers (C:I IC) progralm had been
funded in FY 1981 al $324 million; 815 centers wtre funded to
serve about five million persons who wer :mostly women and
children (Wallace, 1983). Funding for the converled block grant
was $281 million in FY 1982, but was increased to $360 in FY
1983 (Library of Congress, 1984).
WIC
Reagan also wanted to fOlLdh
lhe Special SUppleiental Not ri[ion Program for Women, Infants, and Childrenl (WIC) inlo ile
MCH Block Grant (Rush, '1982; Food Research Action Center
1983), but Congress rejected Iis idea, as well as cuts that would
have reduced funds substantially. (The WIC pro .,ram, ealcted
in 1972, provides certain highly nutritions foods, and nutrilional
counseling, for pregnant and lactating wolen, and yoLIng children. Services are available to low-income wonen and children
who are. deemed to be.at nutritional risk. Allliotgl the evilIation data are mixed (Rush, '1982), most MCI I advocates sipport the program (Paige, V)82).) The Presidenl did manage to
cut other nutrition prograis by about, one third in inflationadjusted dollars (Robbins, 1983).
The VIC prograr was lht soure of a major confrontation
between the President and the health community. The Fod Research and Action Center (BRAG) had released data in 1982 that
it claimed showed increasing infant mortality in many slates
and linking those increases to proposed cuts in the WIC program. There was wide press coverage, and Edward N. Iranidt,
Assistant Secretary fur lealth, ItHFIS, lestified before a St'nate
subcommittee. Although Brandt's testimony mainly consisted of
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clarifying (ih data and 1ion sonic true' methodological shortcomings of the ]RA(' report , this conl rovcr's); mcii'ibuted ti
President's coldt-hCa lied irrag'.
Mhen the political cost. of attempis to Cut WIC b'came too
, Dote
great, the Piresident (with the .11ljport ol Vrra Lor'1s R rIhrt
and Jesse I ltrns) conceded ithe nced for thet program for pre,nant womn and infants bt allten pLed to remove older childil
lruiu the program. Again, the I're ident faiied and V l(' was lNl
relatively unilouched.

Researc/h
Two lealt lh-related areas did receive ite I'resident's support.
"lie first was Federal funding foir research. The only area of ex-

pansion of the Federal health budget. in 1982 was the pr'opo.sed
$168 million for the, National Instit utes of I ttalih (I),vis, 198I).
flow this oc tUrred is not entirety clear, but the Pre.sident's inldulirial and business supporters placed high value (on the nlalion's scientific position (Greent i'rg, 198(0) and Dl-t IS Secretary
Richard S. Schweiker was a vigorous advocate of tit, Nationil
Instilules of I iealth (Iglehart, t983).
During the canpign Reagan had criticized the Carter bldgelt cuts for rescari (Greenbvg,, 1981). The Presitlunt's arln ellilt( of a $100 million increase for hiomedical resea hli
11011
dlring his 1982 State of the Union m ssage was 1t only healihrelated refrnce in the speech (p. 75). In fact, Congres.s al
proved considerably more than (lie Admiinistration rqueslt!d
(e1t, harl 1983).
Yet althigh research fared welt, the related ite if data and
information systens di not do well. Oin of the Carl\. victims of
yrli
W,'V I/
the Adminisl iration's cuts was Ihe MVorbidil 1 and AloNr lf1
Report (IlMWR), a publication from the CI)C. For 21 years, the
MMWR had become a trustod and valued publication, sent fie
Io thousands of official agencies and practicing physicians. As
a budget-saving device, the Administration initiated a very exilwnsive subscription thal had lit, effect of reducil.ri ci rculati n
of the MM\,W dramatically. It is not easy to interpret this event,

By reducing, [he availability of the MMWR the AtLIni nistratloir
undermined the not ion that a Federal agency might b, v:iewed
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as highly effetliv and esseni ial. The effort also fits with(oller
efforts to reduce Federal data systems (Rliman, 1982).
These other efforts include culs innalional health intrviw
surveys, and reductions at the National Cciihr I Health Statistics. It is possible that the Admiistration iiilvnded to limit lhe
availability of Federal information as a nethod of preventing
any links bet ween Federal cut-backs (in biilivct and role) anld
adverse health oucomes for the population . If the infornalion
was not available, (lien critics toold not draw ilie associations.

Medicare
The second health-related area that was the subject

ofI the
Administration's interest concerned catastrophic health care
coverage for the elderly. In contrast to li 'resident's dedication to reducing social services programs and spending. and il
opposition to inany of his usual allies, he ( leclaired his inI'rest in
this program a his 1986 Slate of the Union address. On lIilv I,
1988, Ile signtd lie Medicare- Ualas[rophic Coverage Ad of 19,88
(P.. 100-360). The bill marked the most signifla it expansion of
the Medicare program since, its 1965 inception (Iglehart, lPI).
The program would have expanded Medica'e to includL insurance against Ireatment for major acule illness, and it also
ended the necessity of one spouse's becoming impoverished in
order to entilh, the oiher 1o Medicaid coverage of long L1rm

care. Nevertheless, the program still left maniy gaps in health
care coverage, including lie most important one of long-term
can'.
In the end, however, Ilit hill was rt'l''aled not because
of its many gaps, but because, of the opposition bv the lderly,
whose copayments and prenihms would have financed Most of
th, program. Approxinall'v one-third (if the costs of (lie l _
gram would have come from a fixed monthly premium, while
the rest would have come from an incoii,-relatcd surchariige
paid by approximately one third of the mor' affluent elderly
(L.evitan, 199(1).
IOeregulation
On the goal or deregulation, President Reagan appears to
have been successful. At a news conference in October of I181
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he held tip six pages of block grant regulations and boasted
that they replaced 318 pages of ,-egu latiurs for 57 categorical
prograns that had been replaced by lhe block grants. In his
State of Ih liUnion Address one year afler liking office, President
'
h1of new
Reagan would report: "Togtether, we have cut the growl
Federal rtegulations nearly in -half. In 1981 there were 23,000
fewer pagevs in the Federal Registcr, which lists new regulations,
than Ihere were in 1980" (January 2fi, 1982 p. 73).
Federal involvemeni was reduced under the block grant approach, alth iugh it has hegun to spring back under [lie Bush
years. The (.Ii RA 89 amendments to Title V give the Federal
government renewed authoritV to specify how funds irt spent,
and they require the stales to submit an application for their
block grant funds in a fornat now prescribed ini "guidance"
(not by law or regulatioms).
Abortloln
On abortion, the Pre'sident accomldishd litil Ihal was sub-

stantive. In fact, he probably learned that lie had relatively
few tools with which to influence th, abortion debaite. Ht' did,
however, nominate Dr. C. Everett Koop, a nationally respected
pediatric surgeon from Philadelphia, to I he position of.Surgeon
General of the United States, in parl because oOl KoOp's well
known opposition to abortion. In one of the great ironies of
the administration, Koop became converled to the iblic health
mission, tie campaigned for strong government positions on
smoking and other public health nv,,tres that ny have rankled Republican st, ppoers of the Ireside'int. Fie took .i national
leadership position ol AIDS. And, finally, lie cquivoctled on
the abortion issue.
In 1983, the Administration acted io close down one of
the few explicitly abortiun-related activities of the Federal government, lite Abortion Surveillance Branch at [lhe ('enters for
Disease Control (CDC). The director of that uilit, I)r. Willard
Cates, had carried ot iimirnerous slidies showinlig that .legal
abortion was mich s.ftr for wonte than cither illegal abortion
or, in many cases, pr,'egnantcy itself. "Mls' work was freqely
quoted by prochoice advocales. Dr. (iates was transfirred to the
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CI)C's section on sexually tranismitte d diseases aLiviI "
v.Later in
he Admirtnistration, however, it becairnc evident tn Ilie prolife
lobby that they no longer had an\ dala on .hilch Iomake their
cas that the numnber of abortions Ineig carried turt ill
Ile U.S.
was excessive. In another reversal, the Aborthon Surveillance
Branch was put back to work to revive its annu, l reporls.
Late in the Administration, Surgeon General IK<tp was
asked by the 'Administration to come up with it dilat
that
showed the psychological damage to wvomen of aborlims (July
3), 1987, p. 898). An expert cormlithce was convc'itd ,itthe
CI)C. Their report indicated that there was no scietlific evidence
for such an effect and a large scale study was unwarranted. It
appears that Koop himself was convinced by this finding and
moderated his stance on abortion. Tiv Administration and its
right-to-life constitLuency were said to be furious. 11is likely that
this episode was an important component of the decision of the
new Bush Administration not to reappuint Koop as Surgeon
General in 1989,
President Reagan expressed his sopport for Ili,,
'onstitutioual Abortion Amendment in a Sepitember 8, 1982 Iiter, and
in a speech on Seplember 14 made an istmonishing claiin: "I think
the fact that children have been prerlmalurely born, e\en down
the 3-month stage, and have lived to---ie record slltovs-to
grow up and be nrmral human beings, that ought lo be enough
for all of us" (p. 1151). The bulkc of the President's action on
abortion during his two terms consisled of such rhetoric. -Ie
ofte,n spoke of abortion, nearly always linking it with Ilhe issl. of school prayer, in numelotlS ,s
ljprarances before rteligious
groups such as the National Associalion of Evangelicals (March
8, 1983) and the Nalirnal Religious Broadcasters (j iluary 31,
1983). He regularly offered support for the Hyde Aimendment,
prohibiting Medicaid payments for abortions, and otlher legislation. At a luncheon for membt,rs of a conservalivc I'olitical
Action Committet on February 20, 1987, he said:
L.ast week we sent to Congress lTgisliliom to enact (n a pi'rmanent, government wide basis the I lydt, amendmeni r'L,;rictim on
Fwderal funding of abortion. Our p'oposal would also cut off funding, under lith, ItM, to private (,aiiaitii(ms licit nfr oir
perforl
abortions except when a niothrs: life is in danger (p. 167).
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AIthough tile Presideii was not succt'ssll in passilg a ('onevClie so 1 OLbjeTcstitutional amendmcnll, once again he did i
tives ill the financing lsp ct of aboriti . I lis other sillctt,%;, in
keeping tlh conservalivt, postion before the public, is mor'
difficult to measure bul was certainly not a complete failre.
Subsequent failures in sevr rI, states ht furl her limit accs,; to
abortion would suggest that neither wis his rhetorical ca ilpaign a c,,m plele SuccL'SS,
Suimary: The Legacy
Overall, the legacy of the Reagan Administration on Amwrica's health care delivery system was ,1)l the catastrophic One
that was predicled. The worst of the spendinlg rCdulctions, while
severe, were relatively shorl-lived and partly compensaIt'd [or
by the slates. The most significant cuts occu rretd in 1981; 0VtlI,
there wt.s a 7,, cL1 in -eder,l granis-hi.-aid io state ;lnd loal
governmenits.- 12% in real Ierms (Nathan & )oolittle, 1987). Ill
the cast' if tIhe MCI I Block G rant, a maijr vehicle for d'livery
of services to poor woniii' and children, ihe Reagan culs ooly
continued a trend of erosion of funding. In the case tOf MVdicaid, 1I Reagan efforts were off-set by a powerful advocacy
movement. In fac, the e\pans;ions thal occo rrcd in the mild-lo
late-1981k, and will coilinti' to 2002, are il'ofouL nd and, il lihe
absence of creation of a national health instirlance program, will
provideh health care stciril' for hundred'; of Ihousands of lowincome women and chilirUn.
Yet iln mistake shor lti be made: the effects of the red clI i0:
in speiuding on health care fell mosI dra
i't or,
4 mat ically on Il
and parlicutIlaly on poour women anid chidren. At least ftr a
time, matit'rnily and iiilint services wT're lost. 'ihe Chihliren's
Defense Fund reported in 1983 that in th prtvious 1$ nonths
every stille, had reduced'0
health services for [it! poor (New York
Times, January 17, 1983).
The Children's )efense Fund also reported (New York
Time:s, January 17, 1983) that the reduclion tuf funding for ihe
Community I lealth Centers of 18% In (to $373 million) had resuiled in 725,000 persons being denied services, with 6,4% of
those being children or women of child-bearing age. terlhiii'
many of those services were later restored, btl some damagi
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probiably occurred from [he interruptlion of health c rt expeiienccd by many persons. It is difficult' t0 assess the additive
effects of cuts in Medicaid, which pro\vided acct's; lto
private
sector health cart', aid these other cuts which redu1cedl Iii, availability of-public-sector health care.
Second, it is clear that the Reagan efforts to redtict. Federal authority in favor of the stalevs has resulted in ,,'alti'r state
Ilower (Nathan & Doolitle, 1987). What is not entirce-ly clear is
what that greater state power means for health care fot- the poor.
Althtough liberals have always assutmed slate authority to corresjiind with retrenchieit in social policy and more restrictive
programs and policies, this does not appear to be universally so.
I.arger, more liberal states spent more than more conservative
ones, but most buffered Federal cuts to some extent. Itong-terr
effects on health and welfare programs will be difficult I assess
until the economic recession abalt'.
A more profound impact on Ihli hewalth care delivery system
may be due to the deficit left by eagan's simullaneu., tax cuts
and increases in dhfense spending. \hetn he assumed ilice in
1981, the deficit was $78.9 billion, aild lit, said "this kilid of irrespoinsibility can't go on" (March 2, 1981 p. 177). When President
Reagan left office, it stood at $155 billion (Office of Managemenit and Budget), Nathan and Doofittle (1987) enphasize the
long-lerm -ieaning of the deficit: " . . what is not debatable is
the inhibiting effect of the deficit oil proposals for new federal
programs. The signal from Washington was clear; new social
pgrograil initiatives would have to occu r elsewhere" (p. 13)..
Sonie other Irofound influence,; are more phihoi
iihical.
First, the Reagan Administration clearly reversed il -ommitnient to the "workiing poor" that had beecn evident ini the Carter
Adlinistration. Yet with the Family Support Act of 1988 (which
extended Medicaid eligibility for six months for faiiiilies who
lieve AFDC dut to finding eniptoyioyient) and the mirntloo i:ling
of Medicaid from AFDC, much of Ihai commitment seeimis to
have been recovered.
Second, the Reagiin years conlintire l a pronoiced shift in
conceri and resources away from children and Uovard the elt'rly. 13). 1984, for example, Federal t'xt'enditures pe'r hild were
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only 9% of thl, per capita expenditures for ihe elderly (Preston,
1984). Diring the 1980s, the r'al benefits of Medicaid eligibility
for AFDC children decreased b\v 30% while the benefits for the
elderly increased 10% in il'lalion-adjushd hetrms (Schiesitiger,
1989), The rsults are C'ldaltly demonstrated in increasing. nin-

bets of childlren in poverty, contrasted to dt-creasing nlmIe'rs
of elderly persons. It is difficult to determine exactly how Uli,,
shift has occu rred, but de ographic chang-es, as well as a s 'olig
political lobby on behalf of (Ie elderly, have probably bieen
influenliaI.
In conclusion, there is no coubt that (h Realgan Administration madu a significant impact. upon the American health care
system Soni of the negative impact on low-income mothers and
children 'uaiMitS; muc-0h of it has been ameliorated by status antid
subsequent I:deral action. In ihe long riml , however, the 111,1jor impact of the Reagan Adninistralion ontihe health care of
women and children and lw-income families may hcivu occurred Ihrtlillh the Adninis ration's social aill econolic poli
cies, whichh are discussed it other articles in this issue.
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The Reagan Legacy: Undoing
Class, Race and Gender Accords.
MIMi A[IRAMOVITZ
-limier College

I' iiipact of Rcagimuosics on woiien, torkers, an U pr'psrl,if color
is exlPloired it looking tit sirnicuratfJcn.', in the politicil econitiiy that
oiicOIti ,' 1ijSint.K-s asid goilersssest (iit
a
fitic Ie sitl drfalit! anolh'r
listi' to tiudcrtisw the r'fivsre
,
stiate. Vih expansion o ' fit'r i'lefit' str c
fivins 1.935 to the sid-'1970s iesh ed well willh the needs v./ptofittfsle Iletiwliosi, political legitilimcy ail jntrio-hal control. With the ero'riiir
crisis of the 1970s, fire w'(ur'rstalrh' u'cam' too co1lit dive th'tli itrl
lcsflsslhifsoi and too stlpo'live ofa'stspotr 'rc'd popltrr sno''nTlrlt:Is e11d
1iart io go. Wonren, perosft; of colo, tut lihe poor raked righ attut.u"
fruity p/1tt.
hris
the victiss of the tiw

The 1935 Social Security Act, widely viewed as niarkiin the
birth of the modern welfare staill in (he United Slates, was t'nacted duhring a crisis in which te political and economic irrangements supportive of capital accurmulation, socini stability,

and patriarchal controls from the 1890s to the 193(0s collapsed
(Bowles, 1982; Bowles & Gintis 1982; Bowles Gordon, & Weisskopf, 1983, 1986; Kotz, 1987, 1990). Signaled by Ihie 1929 stock
market crash, the crisis revealtd what many already knew: thll
the drive for high profits and low wages that characterizes capitalist production, could not assure the levels of wages and e(mployment needed to suppori the average family unless IhIt' siat
intervened. The state had to step in and absorb man'oftJ the
costs of family formation and naintenance since pr-ofitable production depended heavily onl the family system (and wonen's
unpaid labor within it) to produce, nurture, and socialize the
current and future labor for'ce; to provide care fr Ih
lu,;c to
young, old, sick to car'e for- themselves; and to assure Ihat individuals affiliate with and inlegrate into society (Gough 1980;
Dickinson & Russell, 1986; Sokoloff, 1981).
9)I
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The enactment of the Social Security Act ('r'ectively legalized federal responsibility for social welfare. li flu, short run,
this major reslructiuring of [le svslt'iii of social welfare provision cushioned the immediate blows of Lhe I)epression. It p1t
cash into emnllty hands and increased purchasing power, which
assisted people in need while ,limulating the depressed econOIT1y. In tht long run, bringing Ilie federal gove'rll men I into social welfare acknowledged that Ihe slate had to socialize 11w
costs of family lift' on a perman ,ilbasis. Instead of relying on
families, chari*ties, religious institutions and local governments
to mediate between economic profits and econornic security, the
federal government had to provide minimal sipporlt (Bowles,
1982; Bowles and Gintis, 1982; liowles, Gordon & Wei-skopf,
1983, 1986; Kolz, 1987, 1991).
The Social Security Act alsii lit-Ilp to restore (lit' political legilimacy of the stat. The thirties witnessed wid'spreI.ad agitation
by trade union and numerous other ipopular noivemnlents sg,,eking redress from tlie collapse amid underlyin, inItc'tlu iies of tlie
niarket. In Iie short run, the Ntw Oeal prograilis helped to
rest ore political and economic etl 1 llibrium by providing some
economic relief to thousands of jitople, legaliZing ulnions and
Ipopular movecollective bargaiing, and bringing; the lea derg
eients into the New Deal Admriinislration. In Ihe long run, Ihe
welfare state stabilized the ne'v economic ordter, restored the
political legitimacy of the state, and muted ithe class conflicts
,enerated by organized labor and other dislocated and discofranclised groups.
eaI ily on restorThe rest r,'u ring of social .VelfrilC focusI .Ili
ing business activity and containing class conflicl. Much less
attention was pid to the demands of the tarly tivil rights
and women's movements. The NAACP, the Urban League and
early part
women's rights movement had been active since lhth
.of the century but still lacked the voting power and politicat
clout to secure its agenda (Piven & Cloward, 1971; Skocpol,
1988). Althoutgh Roosevelt sup ort ed New )eal programs tha i
benefited African Americans and white women, his administration did not challenge the discrimination and the disenfranchisement of black Americans nor Ihe lack of equal opportunitly
for women. Both Ihe civil rights and women's novement faulted

Accerds

the New Deal for excluding their mim rs. Blacks in addition
criticized Roosevelt for not introducing antilynching laws or
passing civil rights lgislation during his four presidential lerlns
(Letichlenburg, 1963; Silkoff, 1981), The women's movenmenl critiqued the New Deal p ograms for placing then in sex sterotyped jobs, offering then benefits as dependent sp(ses, and
refusing to undo Iavs barring employment by married woien
(Abriamovitz, 1988; Scharf, 1983, Ware, 1981).
The Post War Expansion (ifithe Welfare Stale
I)ktrThe welfare state expanded rapidly after World War 11.
ing this period Congress liberalized the Social Security Acl and
created new social service programs, Fuled by prosperily and
political struggles, the Cxpansion conlinted into the sixties with
the War on Poverty, lh' Great sociely, (Ind 'new laws Lo pr,,tect
civil rights, women's rights, the workplace, and the environment. The postwar ins( it liIionalizat ioll of (lhe welfare, slat'i imwolmen,
proved the standard of living and delnncrilic rights (if
bisiness
with
well
It
also
meshe-d
of
color.
people
and
labor,
profits, political stability, and patrimare-hal controls. Rlect~iing
y alld
the acceptance of goverillent reglii m (ifthe ec-riiln
concessions to popular movements, the, expansion of lle welfare slate was und(rpimd by CogitLion economic Ilhwory .and
the lrade union, civil rights,
di
informal accords negol iated wi
and womIleln's movellie'ls.

Keynesian Econmlics
Keynesian economics actively sanctioned a more interventionist state. It called for governmnlen[ SlA ling and rel, ations
to assure that the economy recovered from its periodic crist' of
low p ixiduction and high unemployment. The theory lromii.ed
that if government lax and spending policies increase-d aggregate demand, toleraled a moderate del'icil when necessary, and
controlled inflation, hightr profits for business and a btter standard of living for workers would result. The emphilsis on increasing demand and therefore consum;ption, reversed earlier
economic practices which extracted profits by lowering ratlher
than raising the stlandard of living. By arguing that Ilie careful
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use of fiscal and monetary policy would benefil Ihe rich, the
middle class, and the poor, Keynesian economics drew support
for active government involvement. It did not, however, predict
that the informal accords negotiated with the trade: union, civil
rights, and women's movements would later turn the expanded
welfare state into an arena of i)olitical struggle.
The development of capitalism itself eroded the institutional
arrangements ihai previously shLided the economic activity of
business and the state from polilical influence (Piven & Cloward, 1982). While promoting a more interventionist state, Keynesian economics could not eliminate the drive for high profits
and low wages nor could it promote greater equality. The resulting inequities led the trade union, civil rights, and women's
novements to gain strength and to intensify their struggles.
The labor, race, and gender accords granted important disiributional and political gains to each group while ensuring the
continu'ed dominance of business and the state. The accords
functioned until the mid-1970s when profound problems in domestic and inter'national economies forced a new restructuring
of the social order and made the postwar accords susceptible
to attack.
Labor-ManagenientAccord
The postwar period witnessed a reorganization of labormanagement, which until this time had been highly contentious
and disruptive. According to Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf
(1983, 1986) labor and manageient negotiated a new but informal pact which took hold after World War 11. Grounded in part
in New Deal legislation, the pact stabilized labor-management
relations, increased the bargaining power of unions and expanded the welfare state. The 1935 Social Security Act,
especially Unemployment Insurance, provided workers with
an economic backup which strengthened their ability to resist
unfair wages and working conditions. The 11)35 Wagner Act
legalized collective bargaining which further sI regthened labor's hand and established the National Labor Relations Board
to mediate labor-management conflicts. Tile 19,16 Employment
Act brought tile federal government into the picture to control
prices, unemployment, and inflation. Tle new laws gave management control over the workplace with fewer strikes, longer
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,union contracts and new shop floor rules. In exchang. for its
cooperation, labor won a share in capitalist prosperity thrIOgh
wages, better working conditions, greater job security
:,and f'ewe'r anti-union campaigns. Tlhe government agreed to
regulate economic conditions and mediate the disputes.
* The accords smoothed the way for postwar business profits,
integrated labor into the political mainstream, and made labor
relations more predictable. Paradoxically, however, the accords
also empowered labor. [he expansion of the welfare siale, the
growth of the trade union movement, and the enforcement of
-higher

newly won gains by Ihe state improved labor's standard of living and gave unions a grealer say on tilt' shop floor. The 1947
Taft-l-lartley Act and the 1950 Macarran Act and the rise of
McCarthyism narrowed labor's advances. But at the time of the
merger of tie American Federation of Labor and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations in 1955, a record 35,'",. of the labor force
was unionized. A higlwr standard of livihii backed by si ronger
unions and new welfare slale pr6grams made it possible for labor to challenge the power of business and government through
most of [le postwar years. Tlhe struggle for control never ended,
but in the mid-1970s, the cost of fringe benefits, the expansion of
social programs, and labor's empowerment weakened buin ess'
control over labor and contributed to tile demise of I1w accord.
The labor accord analysis developed by Bowles (1982),
Bowles and Gintis (1982), Bowles, Gordon, Weisskopf (1983,
1986), Piven and Cloward (1982) anmong others does not directly
deal with issues of race and gender. lint the historical records
show that by the late 1960s, business and tile state had negotiated similar pacts with persons of color and woniei. A key
goal of Reaganomics was to undo all three accords in order to
contract tie welfare stale and disempower popular movements.
The Racial Accord
The postwar period also witnessed reorganizatioi of race
relations as tile "go slow" politics of the early civil rights movement gave way to mort, militant demands for integration and
civil rights in the mid-1950s. Until then Jim Crow remained
strong and the dominant wing of the civil rights moveilveiii accepted limited change throuiglh self-help, litigation, and lobbying
and tokenism. African Americans lacked the resources needed
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to win the fight for racial integration despil, a tenfold increase
in the membership of [ie NAACP and tlhu formation of the
Congress of Racial Equalily. But with the I.5 Montgornery flus
Boycott the civil righlis movement became more mifiilanl. Tired
of gradualism and tokenism the civil rights movement turned
to direct action such as sit-ins, pray-ins, wade-ins, boycotts mid
Freedom Rides to secure its ends. The NAACP's numerous court
victories against segregation, but especialiy the 1954 Supreme
Court decision banning separate but equal schools empowered
the movement.
The growing size and militancy of the civil rights movement eventually forced state action to maintain civil order and
1956, anrestore black confidence in the government. When, iri
Party
to
protest
its lack
voters
left
the
Democratic
gry black
of support for civil rights, politicians took note. In 1957, Eisenhower reluctantly sent Federal troops into Uittle Rock, Arkansas
to enforce the 1954 Supreme Court decision. That same year
both Democrats and Republicans backed legislation which protected the right of blacks to vote ahd created the Commission
on Civil Rights (Piven & Cloward, 1971). At the same time,
the blatant and often violent refusal of Southern white officials
to obey federal civil rights laws engendered sympathy for the
cause among working-class blacks an( nortlher whites. ]linally,
[ie civil righlis movenent escalated its demarinds lillvil ['frollm'
constitutional prolections to equitable distribution of societal
power.
The race accord, negotiated by Kennedy who owed his narrow 1960 presidential victory to the swing black vole (Meier &
Rudlwick, '1976) reduced racial barriers to voting eniphlyment,
education, and housing and expanded social welfare programs.
The shift inthe Democratic Party's civil rights stance was signaled when Kennedy appointed blacks to high federal positions, forced Governor Wallace to desegregate the University
of Alabamria, recommended a sweeping civil rights law, supported the march on Washiiigton led by )r. Martin ,uther King,
and privately encouraged nearly 100 corporale and loundation
leaders to contribute over one million dollars to the five major
civil rights groups (Meier & Rudwick, 1976; Silkoff, 198 1). After
Kennedy's assassination Johnson offered to seat the Mississiplli
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Freedonm Democratic Party al the 1964 Democratic Convention.
Congress followed suit and passed the 19()4 Civil Rights Act and
it passed the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Ihe movement's demands
for greater economic justice were met with The Great Society
and the War on Iloverly which further enlarged the welfare
state. Sargent Shriver, who directed the War on Poverty, said
it created "a new relationship and new grievance procedui'
between the pour an the. rest of society just as the National
Labor Relation Act did for unions" (liven & Cloward, 1971,
pp. 270-271).
Negotiated by business and .government to contain the civil
rights movement without modifying white supremacy, the racial accord eased tensions for a while. Business and government secured increased political loyalty from the rising nimber of African American voters who from 1960-1964 firnislwdl
Democrats with the presidenicy and control over both houses of
Congress (Sitkoff, 1981). Race relations were stabilized without
any loss of while privilege or control of the political process.
In exchange for their cooperation, African Americans and other
persons of color won basic rights and greater access to the political and economic systems, But the race accord also empowered
the civil rights movement and modified the balance of power,
making it easier for persons or color to challenge and at times
threaten the dominance of the while power structure. In the
late 1960ls, these challenges included the "long-hot summers,
the spread of the civil rights movement from the South to the
North, and the replacement of the integrationist call for "ilack
and White Togetlher" by the more radical demand for "Black
Power" (SitkLoff, 1981). li the '970s, middle-class African Ameicans won local and state office and in 1984 Jesse Jackson was
a candidate for President of the United States.
1e Ge:nder Accord
The post-war period also witnessec a reorganization of gender politics due to changes in women's role that posed threats
to patriarchal authori'ty and fueled the rebirth of the feminisl
movement. Under the accord, the state reduced gender barriers
to employment, education, credit and pensions, expanded social
welfare benefits and reproductive rights, and granted women
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greater access to the state. In exchange for these advances, the
women s movement promised less militancy, conliinued political allegiance, and demands that would not challenge the utnderpinnings of patriarchal arrangements.
The women's movement had been in the doldruns during
the 1940s and 1950s, but it did not disappear. A small network of
middle class women sustained mutually antagonistic voices in
behalf of women's rights wili one wing supporting legislative
reforms for poor and working wonen and 1ie )lher pressing
for the Equal Rights Amendment (Evans, 1989; Rupp & Thylor, 1987). African American womtn kept segregation, lynching,
and race discrimination on the political agenda; and workingclass women of both races struggled to preserve Iheir wartime
employment gains (Evans, 1989; Gabin, 1990; Rtpp & Thylor,
1987). Meanwhile, changes in tlW sLructure of work and family
life exposed thousands of women to discriminalitm, led them
to ask why the equal-opportiunity-for-all promise did not apply
to them, renewed interest in the Equal Rights Amendnient, and
eventually revived the feminist nimovement.
Kennedy initiated the gender accords in 1961 to fulfill promises to the womien who. voted for him, to side-Itrack renewed interest in the ERA and to keep increasingly independent women
voters tied to the Democratic party. Pressed by Esther Peterson,
his appointed head of the Women's Bureau, Ktennedy established the Commission on the Siatus of W'Vonwn in 1961 (Evans,
1989, McGlen, 1983; Rupp & Taylor, 1981). Its 1963 report, American Wonen paid careful obeisance to the centrality of women's
traditional roles, but documented the realities of female inequality. Although the report opposed the Equal Rights Amendment,
it exposed many problems of em ployment discrimination, unequal pay, the lack of social services, continued legal inequality
and other gender inequities.
Although stlpportive of women's traditional role, the Commission's Reporl activated many wornen. It generaled commissions on tilt status of women in most stLates and led to the
passage of the 1963 Equal Pay Act which otllawed genderbased wage discrimination (Evans 1989). But patriarchal resistance persisted. Congress refused to provide equal pay based
on comparable worth, the broader pay equity concept favored
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by the women's novemrent. A legislalor added the word "sex"
to Tille VII of the 196,I Civil Rights Act in hopes of defeating the
bill which prohibited employment dist-rimination (Evans 1989;
Rupp & Taylor, 1987).
Just as the state's rehictance to enforce the 1954 Brown decision catalyzed the civil rights movement in the late 1950s,
the refusal by Equal Employment Opportunity Comniission to
act on thousands of sex discrimination complaints mobilized
the feminist movement. 'lired of gr'adualism and tokenism and
angered by the widening male-female wage gap (Bird, 1968),
middle-class women formed new feminist organizations ii the
1960s including the National Organization of Women (NOW)
(1967), the Women's Equity Action League (WEAL) (1970), and
the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) (1971). The insurgency crossed 'ace, class, and age lines with the aplear'anlce
of the National Welfar-e Rights Organization (NWRO) (1966),
National Black Feminist Organization (N31FO) (1973), and, the
Coalition of Labor Union Women (('I.UII) (197,1). Younger
women activists in the Student Non-Violent Organizing Coimittee (SNCC) and Student For a Dernocratic Society (SDS)
angered by male domination of their organizations and personal
lives began to call for women's liberation, not just women's
rights (Chafe, 1978, Evans i980, 1989).
The new militancy expanded the genlder accord in Ihi eairly
1970s. President Johnson issued ExecutivE. Order 11375 in 1967
which mandated affirmative action to redress discrimination by
firms wilh federal conlracts. In 1972, Congress passed Ihe ERA
although right-wing opposition in a few key states pIevenited
its ratification. This was followed by Title IX of the .1972 Fducation Act Amendments, the 1974 Equal Credit Act, and li. '1978
Pregnancy Disability Act. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
women in a host of class action sex discrimination stilts and in
1973, it legalized the right to abortion. Women also secured access to party councils, political appointlments, and elected officeNegotiated to contain the women's liberation movement
without modifying patriarchal arrangements, the gender accord
expanded women's rights, welfare statlt benefits, awd econmic
opportunities. Gr'ealer economic independence, reproductive
control, and access to the state modified the gender balance
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of power and made it easier for \vornerl (Ii challel, tile patriarcha powers of business and the state.
Taken together in [lie short run, lie postwar accords enhanced economic profitability, political legitimacy, ind stabi-

lized class, race and gender relations wilhout coslin, business
and the stale, undue loss of coin rol. In fact, they contained popila r movements. By confinnin. the contest to democralic rights
and distributional gains, they directed 11 struggies away from
theC structural roots of inequalit'y. But in 1iew long iun, the accords had paradoxical effects I thaievenit uily caulsed busii-tss
and government to retreat from lhern. They increased [lie political influence of popular movements who e protests spread to
new issues and new .roups. The demands of the empowered
lovements turned (lie welfare state as well as th workplace
into highly contested lerrains. The harIl-won victories of irade,
unions, civil rights and womein's groups, amlong others, Chillenged the once impervious structures of cl,iss, race, and gentthir
dominance in the family, the market, and slate (Bowles, & intis, 1982; lowles, Gordon, & Weisskopf, 1983, 1986; Piven &
Cloward, 1982).
In brief, the accords leveled the playing field too much for
business and the state. Like [he nation's founding fathers wiho
worried that with "too much democracy" the landless majority might (ovtrrule the landed minority (Farrand, 1972), today's
leaders explored ways to roll back increasingly effective clhallenges to lthe power structure (('rozier, I luntinglon, & Watanulsi, 1975; Dickson & Noble, 1981; Wolfe, 1980). The accords
110 longer achieved their ends and had hi be undone.
Breaking the Accords:

'rhe Reagan Legacy

Tlhroughout most of the pistwar period it seemed that the
modern welfare state, fueled by Keynesian economics and the
three accords, would expand forrever. But hindsight reeals thal
business and government's support for the welfare state was
t ne of a series of time-bound solutions ole
0
)roblems of CopilAl accumulilaon and social conflict of ilpartictilar historical
period. ly [lie mid-I971)s, these post-wanr solution; had begun
to unravel due to th-e loss of United Slals world helemony,
increased inlernalional economic coril ' il
ion, rising nalional
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indebtedness, declining corporate profitability, chronic eco!rganiizeCtpopulii Iar
nomic stagnalion and activte resistance from
movements. Trhe erosion of the nation's economic and political power reached crisis proportions in the 19V70s and reqtuired
plans to restriachure the political economy. While its prior restructLuring Cluring the Great Depression had expanded the wel-

fare state and strengthened the trade union, civil risghts, and
women's movewents, Ithe new political srtegy emphasized
igaiins offthe previous pc.
austeritv and sought to roll back lhe
riod. Its goals included redistributing income ipwards, cheapening lie cost Of labor, and cu rbing the infltlience o1 p0u Ular
movements (Pivet & Cloward 1982; Weisskopf, 1981). Accomplishing this goal included shattering the postwar consensus on
government's expanded role, in the economy, and undoing the
labor, race, and gender accords.

Shattiring the Po,.;Iwar Consensus Oil ,Ac'

( iN*erim'll.

The Reagani revohltion began Iw attacking big government.
The prevailing economic orthodoxy now held that couliniries
with low labor and welfare state costs fared best in domestic and international trade. Reflecting this, a special l97-1 issue of Busim'ss Week on the capitalist crisis, called for Ir,; governnent spending to promote priva te investment. The reporter
acknowledged that idea of doing with less so that big business could haw, more would be a hard pill for Americans to
swallow. The allack on big government meanl Keynesian econolics had to go. "Supply-side eco.1ornics," its replact';nenl,
blamed the nation's econonlic ills on "big goviernnent" and
called for lower taxes, reduced governmenl spending (military
exempted), fewer government regulations, and more private
sector initiatives. Supply-side economics undercut the welfare
stale by intentionally creating the largest deficit in the nation',
history. David Stockman, Reagan's first budgcvt direc or, later
coniftessed that the Adlinistralion hipped that the deficit would
justify domestic progran cuts for ,'ears to comie (Bloek, 1987).
1 [urns and dCiniThese policies combined with economic d iwi
dustrialization redistribilh'tl inconte Ulwards, loweredl the slandard (f living, and put opular antovenents Oi the deftnsivc
(Phillips, 1991; (reenslein &lBarancik, 199(1). Withoul totallv
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eliminating Keynesian demand-side policie., supply ,ide ecoIlonlics Weakened th inatelial ard the ideolgical support for
government intervention in the economily, especially in the social welfare arena.
The attack on big governmert and thei retreal from the
accords went hand in hand. 1loth were part of Ilie effort by
business and [he state to transftr' the costs (of prodiction anti
r,production back Lo l poor and work nll; class, and to re-ainover the family, the market, and the slate. To recontrol
distribute income upwards and to curb lhe irllueut'u, of popular
iovements, it was necessary to 4ltnch all assault on [lie welfare state and on lhe groups whose demands cont'ibuted to
its growth. The lower standard of livin, that followtd is confirmed in regular media accounts of thie feminization ol poverly,
the loss of civil rights gains, the rise of Ohw working ior, and
lhe declinirg middle class.
indoing lie labor Accord
During the postwar years, econonic prosperity, relatively
low unemployrment, and the laboi-management accord brought
a degree of harmony to the workplace and [lie state, especially
in the highly unionized industries. By the mid-197is, facing a
profitability panic, business turnud against[ the unlions and Hie
we.tll re state whose victories ii vwinterfer'l with its abilitv to
lower labor costs anti control lab w-rnanagem[ent relations. Tilt'
post-war labor accord which had increased the power of lhe
unions and expanded the welfare state had to go.
By all accounts, Reigan signaled thi' end of [li p'ost-war
labor management pad in 1981 wien he fired over 1I,(]00) slriking air traffic controllers. This action, combined wi lh antilabor
appointments to the National Labor Relalions Board. imnplicitly granted employers permission to reviv long-shinned antiunion practices: decertifing 1in1ons, O.t1-soLtircing productii,
and hiring permanent replacenients for striking workers (Kilborn, 199(1; t'rokesch, 185). To strip unions of their excessive
power, busilless fought labor taw reforms and encorraged li e
formation of new antiinion groups such as tie Council for a
Union Free .lnvironment (Boye 1986).
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Combined with plan closures, bankrull'cies , and Ihe decline of jobs in ianufacturing, the atitck on lbor weakelnd the
labor movemen. Union membership fell to 15" of lhe labor
force, down from its 1955 peak of 35%. Unablk to fight back,
workers and unions accptted smaller wage increases, less favoraile work rides, and a host of other take h.acks just IU SILVe
their jobs. But according to most experts, the promised exchange
of job security never malteiialized (P'rokesch, I 985).
Shrinking social welfare progra ni 1ot o l transferred the
cost of family maintenanct back to workers and the pto', but
helped management regain control over labor. It restored the
disciplinary power of unemp1.loym1ent which managemnl had
historically counted on to keep wages down, hit1i which e1anding cash assislance programs had uindercuL. Despite their ineagerness, programrs such as Aid. to l)ependent Children (AFDC)
and Unemployment Insurance (UI) crealed an economic cushion for workers. The cushion helps employed workers risk joining unions or ot lierwise fighting for better paying jobs. Inflation.

and the Reagan cuts reducud purclh. iig power and the ritltuber
of people who qualified for both UI and AF)C. The Adniinistration's refusal to raise [he minimum wage 'rl-n ILJo1-1990
pressed wages doVwnr as did tht 1988 Family Support Act
which channeled many poor womenll into low-paid jol', ill tit
rapidly expanding servite sector where labor shortages Ihrcatened It force wages ill-.
Retrea! From The Race Accord

The civil rights revolution bror ighl a degree of harunrmv to
race relations. it strengtlhened the )emocralic pary, secured
black allegiance to the stale, and began to redress historic racial
grievances. However, Ihe registration Of more black voters, the
dramatic increase in the number of black elected official!;, and
the imlplernenlalion of affirmalive action programs that compensated blacks for past inequalities also challenged white sopremacy. Support for the race accord vas shnl-lived and came
to an abrupt end. Uncomfortable with expinded civil rights,
many white Americans began to regard them as reverse discrimination. For business and the slate, the empowered civil

journal of Sin itilogy' & Social Velfare

rights move:ment had become too strong, too demanding, and
too expensive.
Once viewed a central to electoral victories, bothIl)eiocrats

and Republicans began to ignore black voters, I .espite Ilie dovastating riots that fullowed the assassinItion of Martill lut[her
King Jr., the issue of racial equality dropjped from the political agenda of boh major political parties (Orfield, 1988). The
1968 presidential campaign was the last to seriosly debate the
problems of the Urban ghetto. Aniideological campaign helped
to justify the shift. From Moynihan's I%,5 repoirt that blamed

poverty on the black family, to Nixon's Souther'n Strategy" 1t
Willie 1-orton's appearance in Mish's 1988 cam paigr ads, the
GOP wooed disaffected white Democrats lby main ipula oting
racial
tensions. The Republicans carried the white vote in every election between 1968 and 1984 (Sitkoff, 1981). Smarting fron their

losses, the l)emocratic Party backed away from tHe race accord.
To keep white volers, blacks were asked to lay low and to desist
from pIushing their agenda too hard. In contrast to the l'arty's
historic pattern of rewardiui, loyal intere;l groups, when blacks
did not obey, party leaders tarred thetir with the special interest label implying that they were selfish and motivated by
self-interest (Wellman, 1968; Edsall and l-dsall, 1991),

With the cooperation of many D(Jernocrats, the Reagan
AdminisLration dismantled the civil rights pro1grans that comprised the racial accord. It equated affirmative action with cluo[as and reverse discrimination, decimated the budgels of civil
rights enforcement agencies, and appointed civil rights opponents to the Civil Righls Commission and the Supreme Court
(Chambers, 1987). In 1990, Bush veLoed the C'ivil Rights Act
which tried to redress sone of these wrongs. In 1991, lie nominated Clarence Thomas, a conserv tive African Anerican
opposed Lo affirmative action, to replace the retiring liberal Supreme Coulrt jurist Thurgood Marshall. The Administration's
domestic cuLbacks also weakened the position of people of color.
thev focusecd heavily on rneans-tested programrts. sich as
AH)C, Mclicaid, and subsidizing, hotsitig---which serve disproportionate numbers of imnpoverished people of color while
tre ading more lightly on Medicare and Social Security which
serve more middle-class whites (Slessarev, 1988).
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The hard-won gins male by persons of color faded dli rng
the eighties. The number of poor families of color rose sha1irply
while in all classes, persons of color lost ground. Their standard of livin,, life expectancy, and hekalth status declined while
infant mortality aid diseases rates climbed. Fewer lrer' , s of
color received student loans, graduated from high school or altended college. Morigage hlais become less available, and Ilihir
neighborhoods became more segregated, My retreating fromr lhe
racial accord, the nalion's leaders put the civil rights noveneni
on the defensive. They divided the nation on racial gLrounds,
and implicitly provoked the rise of hate violence,
Undoiny Tl' C 'iider Accord
The gender accord stabilized gender relations by bringing
the law into line with the changing realities of women's live",
correcting [ong-slniding ge-nder inequities, aind granmting
women a place in electoral politics. Buit it also expalIdCd tl
welfare state, empouered Ilit' wolen's movemint, and mndercut palriarchal arrangements. like the racial and labor accords,
the gender accord came to in abrulpt end. The result la" been
cheaper labor, a redistribution Of income iIpwa rds, anId the
strenjt,hening of palriarchal siruthtres.
The 198 Platform of the Rlepublican 'arty sii11 led ilit' end
of the post-war gender accord. It dropped the party's former endorsenent of the l-kpaal Rights Anendnit'nl, called for a constitutional amendment Ioend abortion, affirmed the Party's belief
"in the traditional role and value of the family in our society,"
and emphasized tht imiportance of rnothehood and honemaking in maintaining the nations value (McGlen & O'Connor, 1983,
p. 74). If fully implemented, the Family Protection Act of '1981
would have made societal institutions more patriarchal. i proposed to end federal support for child care, abortion, family
planning, women's shelters, rape crisis centers and welfart, programs believed to undermine lhe traditional nuclear family. II
prohibited legal aid lawyers from handling aborlion, divorce,
lesbian or gay rights cases, banned sex education in ,chools,
coeducational sports, and [ie use of federal funds for s;clhool
materials depicting homosexualily aid non- raditional gender
roles (77e Magazine, 1981).
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Seeking to transfer I1he costs of amiily maintenancvback to
the family, the Reagan administration encouraged working and
middle-class women to return home. The attack on big governmen[ eliminated thousands of public sector jobs that employed
women and persons of color (Erie, Rein, & Wiget, 1983). Reduced child care, housing, health care, food benefits and social
services increased women's household burdens wvicl made it
harder for them to be enployed. l.ack of services also added to
the costs of family mainlnance pre.Iviously subsidized by the
state. Undoing the gender accord also weakened allirmaLive action and anti-discrimination laws. It iginored sex and race segregation of (lie workplace and refused to support family policies
to ease women's work and family burdens, In sharp contrast to
efforts to send middle-class women back home, ihe 1988 Family
Support Act replaced AFIC's voluntlry work incentives with
rules which forced poor women to work outside Iheir homes.
Those not deprived of support, saw (i, value of Iheir benefits
fall by a Ihird. AFDC, which allows women to raise children
without men, came in for especially harsh treatment because it
openly threatened patriarchal norms.
The attack on aburtion rights and Iamily plannicg services
and the rise of involuntary sterilizations undermined women's
control over their bodies, while less support for wonmtn's shelters, programs for batlered wives, and rape crises centers
implicitly endorsed male violence ag'aiist women. .Vitlh the introduction of Learnfare which docks about a $1001 a month from
the checks of welfare mothers whose children miss school without an acceptable excuse (Cerharz 1990), welfare programs becoie more coercive. Similar coercive tendencies characterize
awedfare' which gives women a bonus for marrying and
leaving the rolls (Kerr 1991), and plans that offer financial incentives
to wotnen for using Norplant, the new ldng-term contraceptive implant.
These and other measures strC( deeply at the inustitutions
which siipport the economic securitv and indlpendeince o f
women. The cuts also reversed gains that women along with
persons of color and organized labor have won siic 1he 1930's.
The attack on the qual Rights Amentndment and abortion 1)1u

the woiien's mowent onl the .lt't'iisive amid limited its ability
to seek new gains.
Condlo,'on
The historical forces thati underpin the extl,iusi on and r ii traction of tile wlfare stale,
st
thati li,Reagan legacy
goes beyond th' michi.nations of in actor t rnu'lI presiden I to
the roots of our economic and political system, rid
i that tile rise
and fall of the welfare state has more to do with maintainin.; orporate profitability, political legitimacy, racial hirarchies, aid
patriarchal arraillitients than [lit
satisfaction of human neds.
Reaganoiics was not fully iimplemented

Ii(rIotally

succes:v.

ful. Ti.i1
it did eng,,ineer a dramatic reversal of Iublic policy and
ignored the high human cost that accompanied the change. Altempting to secti re economic anid political control, tile presicntl
undermined the philosophy and structure of the liberal welfart'
state, weakened pol-uiar movenienls, and eroted deniocratic
struictures. Tile iew austerity proglli has fostered distrust and
violen et, as economic deprivation and inflaninaltory politics pil

one group against inother. l,i' ro, of busiles and the stille.
iil
creating the Reagan legacy is ttiscuired to Uhu ixtetl that observers blame the rear, chaos, pet'rty, social dtLcay, and loss
of communal solidlarilt that Io! platlSues (liir iliolitl, oil Ii'
behavior of thos, 1i1the bottom instead tile deisions made Ib)y
those at the top.
No social syst'rn cai fundiol for long wit ho- 't a vialath'
labor force, families ible to mairtain themselves, aid a minimally content and [oval citizenry. No social s'steni can thrive,
no mmtter how nirch military ni hlt and patriotism it musIer'S,
ifits people remain divided, and disaffected. Recognizing lii.
fact, leading bLusinI,'ss groups have begun to call for health ca't
and educational reforrms (The Committee on l-:onomic ltvlopment, 1987) and policies to reduce the rising rales of crini,
hunger, honelessnitss, illiteracy, illegal drug use, high ifila ut
mortality, and other by-pModtucts of Reaganomiit's (New York
Tini's, It88a, 19881)). IEven som, taxpayers have accepted Ilt'
neeid for more' revenues. Finilly, coalitons of social activists
have continued I resist the attack on the welfare state. These
move'ents have the potential to mndo tihe disastrous Reagan
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legacy. EventuinlV, their victories will confirm Ilit progressive
social change cannot arise without people's activism and "pressures from below."
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Unhousing the Urban Poor: The Reagan Legacy*
BETH A. RUBIN, JAMES D. WRIGHT,
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The Reagan era was characterized by the popularity of individual level
explanations and market based solutions for a range of social problems,
including homelessness. We argue that such an approach was inadequate and may, in fact, have toorsened the housing situation. We claim
that homelessness is fundamentally a housing problem linked to two key
trends of the 198Os: the increasing rate of poverty and the decliningsupply'f low-income housing. Market approaches to housing policy have
resulted in housing policies by default: gentrification,condo conversion
and displacement as well as tax policies that explicitly favor the nonpoor. Those policies gehred towards the poor, vouchers and subsidies,
were inadequate responses to increasing need. In suin, the Reagan years
witnessed dramatic declines in the supply of low-cost housing, substantial increases in the poverty rate, and drastic shifts in federal policy
towards housing the poor.
A sample of homeless people in San Francisco was once
asked to identify "the most important issues you face or problems you have trying to make it in San Francisco or generally
in life" (Ball and Havassy, 1984). The most common responses
were "no place to live indoors" (mentioned by 94%), followed
by "no money" (mentioned by 88%). No other response was
chosen by as much as half the sample. At a sufficiently abstract
level, the connections between poverty, the housing supply, and
homelessness may seem dim. At the level where life is lived,
the connections are stunningly obvious.
The clarity of perception revealed in these results may be
usefully contrasted with a piece by Randall Filer, "What do
we really know about the homeless," that appeared in the Wall
Our thanks to Brian T. Smith for comments on previous drafts and to
Martha Wittig for research assistance.
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Street Journal (10 April 1990). Filer is skeptical that homelessness has become a social problem that requires g ove,'nment
intervention. Like others, he views welfare benefits, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and any other "citizen
wage" as a threat to the market because they reward the poor
for being poor (or the homeless for being homeless). " . . . ITihe
more generous the programns for the homeless are, the greater
this number [of honelessl will be as people respond to the incentives created." He adds, "Despite the implication of the word
'homeless,' we know almost nothing about the comwielion between homelessness and housing markets. There is no reliable
evidence that homelessness is more extensive in cities wilh tight
housing markets."
Filer's comments mislead; as we argue in this paper, there
certainly is a relationship between the housing inarkut and
homelessness. The relationship is rather a simple one: the cost
of housing has come to exceed what many impoverished families and persons can afford to pay. We also argue that Filer's
sentiments, although incorrect, were shared by President Reagan throughout his administration and were institutionalized in
budgets and policies that exacerbated the homelessness problem. As a result, the homeless situation was much worse at the
end of the decade of the 1980s than it had been at the beginning. Unhousing the urban poor is a lamentable but enduring
legacy of his administration.
Ferrara (1990, p. 539) has pointed to increasing levels of
Federal expenditure to aid the homeless as evidence of Reagan's merit. For example, he notes that expenditures in tie Depatment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) increased
from $12.5 billion in 1980 to an estimated $22.8 billion in 1990.
But these figures do not reflect expenditures on low-incone
housing programs or on the homeless; they are, rather, total
IIUD expenditures on all programs (Table I). The 1990 HUD
pay-out specifically for low-income housing programs is about
$1.6 billion (Table 2), certainly not $22.8 biltion.
It is true that HUD expenditures on low-income )ublic housing programs and low-rent public housing loans more than doubled in the 1980s. In constant dollars, however, the increase is
unimpressive; in fact, corrected for inflation, HUt) expenditures
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Table 2
HUD Outlays for Low-fnconie and Low-Rent Public Housing (X$1,000)
Payments for Low-Income
Housing Programs

Low-Rent Public Iousing
Loans and Other Expenses

755,300
928,581
1,007,558
1,541,558
1,135,116
1,205,020
1,180,865
1,387,985
1,488,551
1,547,357
1,651,357

159,304
77,359
-21,118
110,603
1,111,012
13,885,412
977,001
1,355,655
1,172,953
922,407
634,323

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989S
199 0b

aChanged to 'operation of low-income housing'
bHUlD estimIe
Source: see Table 1.

at the end of the decade were nearly identical to those at the
beginning. It is also true that only a part of the total HUD budget is spent on housing subsidies for the poor, and that an even
smaller share is spent on the subsidized construction of new
low-income housing. To suggest that the federal expenditure
for this purpose is anywhere close to $20 billion seems intentionally misleading.
Expenditures on the homeless poor or on facilities to assist
the homeless are not tallied as a separate category in any of
HUD's documents prior to 1987. In 1987, $15,000,000 was appropriated for this purpose, although no figure for the actual
outlay is provided. Also, in 1988, within the category of "Policy
Development and Research Expenditures," there was an outlay
of $2,661,000 for "supplemental assistance for facilities to assist
the homeless." Expenditures on the homeless increased in 1988
and thereafter, under provisions of the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act; these expenditures are reviewed later.
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Ferrara also remarks that the total number of families assisted by HUD programs increased from 3.1 million in 1980 to
4.4 million today. But with a current poverty population in excess of 30 million, it is obvious that the I-IUD coverage rate of
households in need is very limited, whatever the total number of households receiving assistance. Table 3 shows state-bystate coverage rates for the very low-income renter population
(not the total poverty population); the coverage is almost never
above 50% and nation-wide averages less Lhan a third (Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, 1990). Itcan also be noted
that Ferrara's figures include nonpoverty households who receive HUD housing assistance, for example, the elderly (among
whom the poverty rate has been declining and who now enjoy
the lowest poverty rate of any age group in the nation).
By far the largest and most aggressive federal effort on behalf of the homeless is the McKinney Act, enacted in 1987.
Under the terms of this act, HUD has spent more than $200
million on the Supportiyr -ousing Demionstration Program,
an expenditure frequentij cited as evidence of the Reagan administration's willingness to solve the housing problems of the
homeless (e.g., Access, 1990). Other housing provisions within
the act have provided roughly $80 million to subsidize more
than 2,200 single room occupancy (SRO) hotels for a decade,
have underwritten the opening and operation of emergency
shelters for the homeless, and so on (see Table 4). The supportive housing program is a particular source of pride because it is
housing geared to the unique and diverse needs of subgroups
within the homeless population (the alcoholic, the mentally ill),
a pet theme of HUD Secretary Jack Kemp.
Close examination of the budgetary outlays from the McKinney Act reveals that relatively little of the budget goes to
the provision of permanent low income housing; much of it is
targeted towards other purposes and populations. In 1987, to
illustrate, a total of $80 million was appropriated for the supportive housing program. Of that $80 million, $20 million went
to transitional housing for homeless families, not to permanent
low cost housing. In 1988, $10(0 million was authorized for the
program but only $65 million was appropriated and of that,
$20 million was agaih for transitional, not permanent housing.

Unhousiig lhe Urban Poor

Table 3
Low-Income Housing Assistance

State

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

Number of
Number of
Renter
Very Low
Households Income Renter
Assisted
Households
1985
1983
75,469
9,224
34,638
38,709
336,310
39,605
64,225
10,422
28,131
134,471
115,297
16,175
9,072
168,448
79,052
31,076
26,702
68,314
69,307
21,473
81,215
144,990
123,958
77,519
40,148
73,636
14,346
22,715
15,016
16,042
139,169
21,749
454,852

224,320
16,980
139,320
130,840
1,564,110
159,850
154,030
29,060
69,330
587,050
337,760
53,160
40,630
646,150
214,860
115,350
103,130
192,420
261,240
54,720
210,330
347,830
409,380
169,070
143,000
237,110
38,290
67,950
47,620
40,530
403,040
69,530
1,484,980

Maximum'
Number of
Very Low Income
Renter Households
Assisted
33.6%
54.3
24.9
29.6
21.5
24.8
41.7
35.9
40.6
22.9
34.1
30.4
22.3
26.1
36.8
26.9
25.9
35.5
26.5
39.2
38.6
41.7
30.3
45.9
28.1
31.1
37.5
33.4
31.5
39.6
34.5
31.3
30.6

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

97,754
12,311
190,309
55,721
34,491
189,449
32,398
45,692
16,827
91,364
196,290
10,039
7,077
79,566
57,263
26,844
67,385
3,915

305,8411
27,840
537,230
153,030
154,350
564,120
63,37(1
156,080
35,230
259,260
766,090
57,390
26,220
262,530
224,990
86,230
193,200
16,620

32.0
44.2
35.4
36.4
22.3
33.6
51.1
29.3
47.8
35.2
25.6
17.5
27.)
30.3
25.5
31.1
34.9
23.6

Total

3,816,172

12,652,690

30.2

'This is a maximum because not all households receiving assistance have "Very low
incomes.' The number of "very-low ihcome" housing units in 1983 was compared
to the number of assisted units in 1985 because both sets of data are the latest
available on a state-by-stale basis.
Source: 1980 Census Data and 1983 Annual Ilnusing Survey. Data on programs
from Department of Housing, 1985 unpublished data.

As is apparent in the budgetary outlays, most of the McKinney housing money has been spent in marginal ameliorations
of the worst aspects d('the housing situation of the homeless
(shelters, SROs, transitional programs, etc.); relatively little has
been invested in adding permanent units to the low income
housing supply.
Despite the claims of Kemp and others within the Bush and
Reagan administrations, the homelessness problem worsened
in the 1980s and the federal response did very little to dampen
the trends. While some monies were being spent on low income housing and on programs specifically for the homeless,
the broader housing policies of the administration undid what
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good these low-income and homelessness programs might otherwise have accomplished.
In brief, housing policy in the Reagan years was twopronged: tax subsidies to underwrite the housing costs of upper income groups and a largely unrestricted private market for
lower income groups. This approach to housing policy was ideologically consistent with the overall Reagan agenda of deregulation, privatization and liberation of the "Invisible Hand," as
was the evident consequence: the institutionalization of the private market as the solution to the inadequate low income housing supply. Sadly, the private market has few if any incentives
to provide low income housing; there is much more money in
housing the rich than in housing the poor. Privatizing the low
income housing market means in essence that the federal government has abnegated its historical commitment to guarantee
to all citizens a minimum standard of housing adequacy.
Part of Reagan's reluctance to provide housing stemmed
from his well-known belief that many homeless people "are,
well, we might say, homeless by choice" (a spontaneous comment in a press conference). A related theme in the administration was that housing conditions reflect cultural problems specific to certain ethnic groups. Regarding the doubling-up that is
associated with a housing squeeze (Mutchler and Krivo, 1989),
Philip Abrams of HUD suggested that it is ". . . characteristic of
Hispanic communities, irrelevant to their social and economic
conditions ....It is a cultural preference, I am told" (quoted in
Momeni, 1990, p. 136). Even if true, which is unlikely, the relevance of this comment is uncertain since Hispanics comprise
only about a tenth of the total homeless population.
The viewpoint argued in this paper, although rather a simple one, would find little favor with Filer, Ferrara, Abrams,
Kemp, Bush, or Reagan himself. It is that homelessness is fundamentally a housing problem (or alternatively, that the key distinguishing feature of the homeless is that they lack an acceptable place to live). We provide evidence on two key trends of the
1980s: the increasing rate of poverty, and the declining supply of
low income housing. Our position is that continual increases in
the number of poor people, coupled with continual decreases in
the supply of housing that poor people can afford, necessarily

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
predestines an increase in homelessness, a point made insistently by scholars and analysts throughout- the decade.
Poverty and Housing during the Reagan Years
From 1978 to 198t.there was a 25% increase in the households living below the poverty line as well as an increase in
just how poor the poor are. For example, in 1985 the median
income of poor families was $4,000 beneath the poverty line; in
constant dollars, that amounts to being $600 deeper into poverty than the comparable 1978 figure (Hartman and Zigas, 1989,
p. 3). That the poor "are getting poorer" has been the theme of
countless recent newspaper and magazine articles.
Over the past thirty years, the number of Americans living
below the official poverty line has varied from a low of about
23 million in 1973 to a high of nearly 40 million in 1960. Yearto-year fluctuations in the number of the poor can be quite substantial. These annual changes, which often amount to several
million persons, result mainly from macroeconomic conditions
that affect the unemployment rate. During periods of general
economic growth (e. g., the 1960s), the rate of employment increases and the number of the poor goes down. Alternatively,
during recessionary times, unemployment and therefore poverty tend to increase. Other factors also influence the general
rate of poverty, but the rate of employment is probably the
most critical.
Decade by decade, the overall pattern is reasonably clearcut. The number of the poor declined steadily throughout the
1960s, from 40 million poor at the beginning of the decade
to about 25 million poor at the end. Not coincidentally, the
sharpest declines occurred after the onset of Johnson's War on
Poverty in 1964. Throughout the 1970s (often referred to as the
"Decade of Inflation"), the number in poverty fluctuated right
around the 25 million mark, with no obvious trend in either
direction. Then, starting in 1978, the number of the poor began
to increase, reaching the 35 million mark in 1983 and hovering
close to that number since.
The 1983 figure is of historical significance because it represents the largest number of persons in poverty ever recorded

. Unhousing Hie Ur1vin Prow

since the beginning of the War on Poverty in 1964. In five years,
the gains of the previous two decades were erased as some ten
million persons were added to the poverty count. In these respects, the Reagan years can only be described as a giant step
backward.
For comparative purposes, most observers prefer to look at
the poverty rate, rather than the raw numbers. The thirty-year
trend shows that the highest poverty rates-in excess of 20% of
the population-preceded the War on Poverty. From the early
1960s through 1973 (that is, from the beginning of the War on
'Poverty to the first Arab oil embargo and the ensuing collapse of
the world economy), the rate of poverty in America was halved
(falling from 22.2% to 11.1%). From 1973 through the end of
the decade, no further progress was made and beginning about
1980, the rate began to increase, reaching a post-1965 peak of
15.2% in 1983 and remaining at mid-60s levels since. Thus, the
secular trends in the poverty rate are much the same as the
trends in the total numbers; overall, the pattern is one of considerable progress in the 60s, stagnation in the 70s, and significant
deterioration in the 80s.
Not only has the number of the poor increased, but their
poverty has deepened. The total share of national income going
to the poorest tenth of the population has declined by more
than 10% in recent years; the share going to the most affluent
twentieth has increased by 37%. Accordingly, the gap between
the poverty line and the median US family incorne has widened
'(Table 5). In 1980, the "income deficit" for the poor (the distance
.between the 3-person poverty level and the median income)
was $14,458; the corresponding figure in 1988 was $22,755-a
57% increase.
In a privatized economy dictated by the laws of supply and
demand, an increase in the number of the poor and the ensuing increase in the "demand" for low income housing would
automatically produce an increase in the low-income housing
supply. This has obviously not happened, simply because need
and demand are not the same thing. A demand is a need (or a
preference) backed up with cash, which the poor lack by definition. The need for low income housing is large and growing,
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Table 5
Poverty 4evels, income Deficit and Maximum Affordable Rent, 1980-1988
Year

Weighteda
Poverty
Family of
Three

Median b
Family
Income

Income
Deficit

Maximumd
Affordable
Gross Monthly
Rent

1980

$6,565

$21,023

1981

-

22,388

-

-

1982

7,693

23,433

-15,740

256.00

1983

7,936

24,674

- 16,738

264.00

1984
1985

8,277
8,573

26,433
27,735

-18,156
-19,162

276.00
286.00

1986
1987c

8,737
9,056

29,458
30,970

- 20,721
-21,914

291.00
302.00

1988

9,436

k,32,191

-22,755

315.00

-$14,458

$218.00

'Moley income
bCurrent dollars

cBased on revised methodology
dBased on 40% of monthly income

but the demand (cash-backed need) is wanting. It is evident that
millions of poor people need decent housing that rents, say, for
$200 a month or less (see below), but it is foolish to see this
as an economic demand or to assume that there is profit to be
made in responding to the need.
A comparison of the number of units renting for less than
$250 a month (30% of a $10,000 annual income) and the number
of households with annual incomes under $10,000 reveals that
in 1985 there were four million fewer units than renter households needing units (Shapiro and Greenstein, 1988; from whence
Table 6). The discrepancy between the number of poor families
and the number of very low income rental housing units exists in every state. The shortage is lowest in West Virginia (11%
more low income households than low income units), highest
in California (268%) and nationwide stands at 94%. In the nation as a whole, in short, there are nearly twice as many very
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Table 7
Coniparison of HUD Subsidized Housing Assishuce for Fiscal M-ars 19801989
Reagan Budget

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Request

Funding Levels

Net Additional-

(in billions)

(in billions)

Hlouseholds Assisted

13.2
-5.0'
- 2.3'
6.2
.5
0
3.9
6.5

26.6
24.9
13.2
8.6
9.9
9.9
8.8
7.3
7.6
7.4

187,892
158,885
55,836
53,732
88,345
102,721
98,5851
92,980
75,802
83,685

'Represents Reagan Administration's attempts to rescind Budget Authorily already
appropriated by Congress.
Source: Subcommittee on Housing and Communil Development of the House
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. Serial 101-9. March, 1989.

low income renter households as there are low-cost units to
accommodate them.
Despite this gap, HUD funding levels for subsidized housing assistance declined sharply from 1980 to 1989. In 1980, the
funding for this purpose stood at $26.6 billion, and in 1989, $7.4
billion (Table 7). In recent years, the number of additional families receiving assistance has been less than 100,000 per annum
(recall that the poverty population exceeds 30 million).
The actual housing situation is apparently even worse than
the figures so far reviewed suggest. The count of very low income units shown in Table 6 may contain as many as 800,000
vacancies, nearly 20% of the total supply (Zigas and Hartman,
1989). Among other things, high vacancy rates often indicate
inadequate living conditions; many of these units are "vacant"
because they have been condemned. The number of truly
livable low-income hot,ying units available in the market is
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apparently not known, but is surely less than the total units
tallied in Table 6.
In contrast to claims by ACCESS and others that HUD plays
a major role in solving the housing crisis through an infusion of
funds into the system, HUD officials, in concordance with the
Reagan administration, have indicated that they are "backing
out of the business of housing" (Hartman and Zigas, 1989, p. 14).
The ideology of the Reagan administration opposed "market interventions" of every sort, preferring to let the market operate,
to the extent possible, free of governmental dictate. The spending trends indicated in Table 7 reflect this ideological imperative;
the consequent gap between the need for and supply of lowincome units has surely worsened the hornelessness situation.
In the meantime, as we discuss later, federal subsidies for highincome housing continue unabated. As others have noted, the
policies of the Reagan years amounted to socialism for the rich
and free-market capitalism for the poor.
These recent trends in the federal obligation to subsidize the
construction of low income housing reverse a long historical
commitment. The government undertook its first public housing program in 1937. That program provided federal subsidies
to amortize the cost of building low-cost housing, was administered by local housing boards, and was highly restrictive in
eligibility (Levitan, 1985). The Housing Act of 1949 established
a national goal of upgrading and augmenting the general housing stock so that every American would have a "decent home
and suitable living environment." Throughout much of the postWar period, the housing industry was highly productive, the
concern over "inadequate housing" referred to the quality, not
quantity, of available units, and the number of relatively affordable suburban single-family units steadily increased.
The Housing Act of 1968 set a goal of 26 million new units
over the next decade, six million of them targeted to low-income
households (Hartman and Zigas, 1989: 8). The goal was not met
and thereafter the government refrained from setting specific,
numerical housing goals. The 1980s witnessed lowered housing
production levels across the board and a sharp diminution in the
federal low-income housing effort. To be sure, national housing
policy has always been market determined, and that has always
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worked fairly well for moderate-to-tpper income groups. That
the market does not work particularly well for lower-income
groups has been recognized in federal housing policy since the
Depression. This half-century of recognition notwithstanding,
during the Reagan administration housing policy fur the poor
has been market-based with a vengeance, much to the overall
detriment of the low-income housing supply.
Gentrification, Cqjwlo.Conversion and Displacement:
Houging Policy by Default
A market-based housing policy implies that the private sector will invest in the housing options that generate the most
profit in the shortest time. Despite the growing need for lowincome housing in the 1980s, the decade witnessed considerable
outright destruction of the low income housing supply (through
urban renewal and the "revitalization of downtown") and a
great deal more conversion of low-income to upper-income
units, through a process that has come to be known as gentrification. Rather than increase the number of low-rent units to
meet the growing "demand," the "market" (which is to say, private investors) have destroyed much of the low income housing
that was there in the first place.
The process known as gentrification resulted in significant
declines in low income housing throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
According to Carliner (1987), gentrification "inverts the normal
flow of housing" from more to less affluent consumers. In the
conventional model of housing flow, older, less desirable units
are abandoned by the affluent in favor of newer housing in previously undeveloped areas; the units thus abandoned become
available to the poor. This is the "trickle down" theory of low
income housing and is much in the spirit of the Reagan administration's ideology. In the 1970s and especially in the 1980s,
however, older urban housing was sought out by affluent individuals and (typically child-less) couples for renovation and
reclamation; urban development policies throughout the nation
encouraged this practice (gentrification) as a means of making
downtown attractive once again to the middle class.The "downward trickle" of housing has thereby been interrupted. Hartman
and Zigas (1989, p. 6) estimate that gentrification has resulted
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in a loss of over a million units of SRO housing in the past two
decades. In general, "demolition, rehabilitation, abandonment
and condominium conversion have lessened the number of lowrent housing units in most major cities" (Huttman, 1990, p. 84).
Thus, "the revitalization of downtown" has been rather a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, no one can possibly object
to the razing of rotted urban slums and their replacement by
attractive boutiques, elegant restaurants, up-scale condominiums and the like. There is likewise little doubt that these developments have successfully lured a segment of the middle
class (and its tax base) back into some central city areas. At
the same time, these processes have displaced large sectors of
the urban poverty population and have destroyed large tracts of
low-income housing, particular SRO housing, which has always
served as the "housing of last resort" for the most down-and-out
among the urban poverty population (Kasinet, 1986). With little
regard for the replacement of lost low-income units, many of
those displaced by gentrification have come to be permanently
displaced, which is to say homeless (Wright and Lam, 1987).
The loss of singie room occupancy units has been particularly widespread and disturbing. SROs require relatively little
in the way of initial outlay and are most useful for the elderly
poor, the disabled, and other nonconventional households for
whom inner city living, with its proximity to business and transportation, is a boon if not an outright necessity (Kasinet, 1986;
Hoch and Slayton, 1989; Huttman, 1990). And yet, despite the
evident need for SRO housing, its availability continues to decline. For example, in San Francisco, from 1975 to 1979 alone,
17.7% of the existing SRO units were destroyed or converted,
with further losses since. Similarly, in New York City there was
an overall 60% loss of SRO hotels between 1975 and 1981 (Hoch
and Slayton, 1989). The number of New York hotels charging
less than $50 per week declined from 298 to 131 in that period; of those dropping out of the price range, the majority are
no longer even hotels and have been converted to other uses,
mainly to condos (Kasinet, 1986: 248; Huttman, 1990).
The SRO picture is evidently the same everywhere. Denver lost 29 of its 45 SRO hotels between 1971 and 1981, Seattle
lost 15,000 units of SRO housing from 1960 to 1981, and San
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Diego lost 1247 units between 1976 and 1984 (Hoch and Slayton, 1989: 175). Ironically., in one city, 1,800 SRO units were
converted by the City Social Service Department to temporary
use as emergency shelter for the homeless. In some instances,
SROs have been converted to tourist hotels, for example, the
Villa Florence hotel in the Tenderloin district of San Francisco
(Huttman, 1990, p. 84); in other cases SROs have been converted
to expensive apartment or condo complexes, sometimes with financing through Section 8 renovation funds. (On the Section 8
program generally, see below.) Whatever the end use, these converted SROs no longer function as low income housing, and this
has had obvious negative consequences for the most marginal
segments of the urban poverty population.
Unfortunately, the destruction of SROs is only part of a
larger process of displacement; the loss of low-income housing
extends well beyond the SRO sector (Huttman, 1990). Based on
data from the Annual Housing Survey, Huttman estimates that
somewhere between 1.7 and 2.4 million persons are being displaced annually through outright destruction of units. Razed
units are predominantly low income units; replacement units
frequently are not. For &xample,in 1.987 there were 346,500 new
apartments built nation-wide. Of these, only 23,500 (7%) rented
for less than $350 a month; 74% of these lower-income units
were occupied within 3 months. The median rent for new units
constructed in 1987 was nearly $550 per month, well beyond the
reach of low income families (Statistical Abstract, 1989: 704). In
the same vein, between 1980 and 1986, some 2300 rental and
cooperative units were built for lower income people in San
Francisco. While a positive step, it is clearly inadequate given
an estimated need for 2600 new units each year (Huttman, 1990).
Despite a growing need, the number of new low income public
housing units under construction nation-wide has been shrinking since 1983 (Table 8).
Conversion to condominiums is another way in which lowincome housing is transformed into housing for the upper middle class. From 1970 to 1975, 86,000 rental units were converted
to condos; from 1975 to 1979, another 280,0(10 were converted
(Hope and Young, 1986, p. 107), with these trends no doubt
accelerating in the 1980s. Condo conversion usually results in an
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Table 8

Low Income Public Housing Units (1,000s)
Year

Total

Occupied
Units1

Under
Construction

Other 2

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

1,321.1
1,404.0
1,432.2
1,483.3
1,368.7
1,378.0
1,365.0
1,371.7

1,195.6
1,229.3
1,231.4
1,262.5
1,312.9
1,344.6
1,333.8
1,339.1

20.9
51.5
66.7
86.7
24.0
9.6
12.1
9.5

10.6
123.2
134.1
134.1
31.8
19.5
19.3
23.2

1

Under management or available for occupancy

2

To be constructed or to go directly under management because no rehabilitation
needed

Source: Statistical Abstract, 1989

approximate doubling of housing costs and, according to HUD,
about two-thirds of the original occupants move out (Hope and
Young, 1986). In some cases, SRO units that once rented for
less than $200 per month have been converted to up-scale units
renting for $700 a month or more. Thus, gentrification and condominium conversion are housing policies that generate high
profits for developers and provide new and elegant urban housing for the affluent, at the direct expense of housing options for
the poor. To quote the Mayor of Boston, "Just look at the money
being made by conversions. It is second only to the lottery in
the amount of money you can make in one shot" (quoted in
Wright, 1989, p. 46).
Taxes: Housing Policy for the Non-Poor
Even as the Reagan administration was cutting back on
HUD's low income housing programs and encouraging "revitalization" efforts that further eroded the low-income housing supply, they also continued to support a long-standing and
very expensive program of housing subsidies for the affluent,
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namely, the provision of the tax code that allows homeowners
to deduct mortgage interest payments (and local property taxes)
from their taxable incomes. Although not usually considered an
element of housing policy, this direct tax subsidy of the housing
costs of homeowners in fact dwarfs the government's expenditures on low income housing and is in that sense very much a
part of the overall policy posture of the Reagan administration.
Disallowing the home mortgage interest deduction was considered as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, but the deduction
survived unscathed. Few people appreciate the magnitude of
this de facto federal subsidy for the hone-owning classes. Dolbeare (1988, p. 39) estimates that special housing deductionsprimarily, the deduction of mortgage interest and local property
taxes from one's taxable income-cost the treasury more in two
years than did the total outlay for subsidized housing over the
last half-century. Specifically, the total federal expenditure for
low-income housing payments plus public housing operating
subsidies from 1937 through the 1.987 fiscal year amounted to
$97 billion; in two years, 1986 and 1987, the total income tax
foregone via housing-related income tax deductions amounted
to $103 billion. At present, the federal tax subsidy for middle
class housing exceeds $50 billion per year (Dolbeare, 1988, p. 39;
see also Zigas and Hartman, 1989:2; Lang, 1989; Sanjek, 1986).
The income lost to the Treasury through housing-related tax
deductions (kniown among housing specialists as the "housing
tax expenditure") doubled in the 1980s, rising from $26 billion in
1980 to more than $50 billion in 1988. Table Nine shows how this
housing subsidy is distributed across income classes. As would
be expected, the largest share-about two-thirds of the totalgoes to families with incomes in excess of $50,000 per year;
about one-tenth of a percent goes to families with incomes less
than $10,000 a year. (MpVt low-income families, of course, rent
rather than own and af therefore excluded from the benefits
of these deductions.)
Comparing these data on the annual housing tax expenditure with HUD budgetary outlays (Table One) reveals that the
federal subsidy of middle-to-upper income housing exceeds the
total HUD budget by an approximate factor of two annually.
Thus, the government spends a great deal more subsidizing
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Table 9
Estimated Housdhl Inceont and Housing Subsidy Distribution, 1988
Annual Income

Housing Tax
Expeiiditures

Percent

Less than $10,000
$10-19,999
$20-29,999
$30-39,999
$40-49,999

$0.1
1.1
3.8
5.4
6.6

.1%
2.2
7.6
10.7
13.0

$50,000 & over

33.6

66.4

50.6

100%

Total
Source: Table 12, Dolbeare, 1988:41

the housing costs of the affluent than it does underwriting the
housing costs of the poor. Also of relevance in this connection,
Reagan's tax policies reduced the tax benefits of investment in
low-cost housing, as discussed in Lang (1989).
Vouchers and Subsidies: Housing Policy for the Poor
A major thrust of the Reagan administration's low-income
housing policy was to withdraw (as much as possible) from the
direct subsidy of new low-income housing construction and to
focus on the use of existing units to house the poor, this via the
Section 8 voucher program. Section 8 provides housing vouchers for qualifying low-income households that can be used in
lieu of cash for rent. In order to qualify as a Section 8 unit,
an apartment must rent for less than a designated "fair market
value." At the same time, to prevent obvious abuses, the unit
must also meet certain housing quality standards. Landlords
providing such units receive what amounts to a guaranteed
clientele whose rents are, in essence, being paid by the federal
government. In theory, Section 8 enhances the housing purchasing power (housing "demand") of the poor and this should in
turn cause landlords to increase the supply of eligible low-rent
units, either via new construction or through renovation of existing units to bring them up to the mandated quality standards.
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(Critically, Section 8 does not provide direct financing either for
new construction or for renovation; developers must find their
own financing throughprivate sources.) .
Section 8 relegates tite provision of low-income housing to
the private market. Qualifying households receive certificates
that make up the difference between what they can afford to pay
and the going price of rent. Consistent with the Reagan agenda,
this then gives poor families the freedom to find available Section 8 housing that suits their needs and purposes; it also gives
landlords and developers the incentive to supply housing that
satisfies this new demand. Section 8 is thus a classic market
solution to the low-income housing problem.
When Section 8 was first implemented, it was assumed that
a qualifying family could afford to spend 25% of its income on
housing; the voucher made up the difference between this income figure and the designated fair market rent. (Fair market
rent standards vary from city to city, as would be expected.)
The "affordability" standard was later raised to 30% of income,
to keep the total cost of the program down (Zigas and Hartman, 1989, p. 10; Lang, 1989, p. 77). Critically, and contrary to
a common misconception, Section 8 certificates are not considered to be entitlements given to every qualifying family; there
are a limited number of vouchers available each year and they
are given mainly to AFDC recipients.
By far the largest problem with the Section 8 program is
that apartments good enough to satisfy the quality standard
but cheap enough to satisfy the rent standard are few and far
between, this despite the supposed program incentive for private developers to create such units (Wright, 1989, p. 48). In
fact, approximately half the households who receive a Section 8
voucher in any given year must return it unused precisely because an acceptable qualifying unit cannot be found (Carliner,
1987). Thus, Section 8 has done little to address the low-income
housing supply problem, although it has certainly made some
difference to the (relatively few) low-income families who receive certificates and find acceptable units.
Since the gap between average rents and the ability of the
poor to pay those rents has increased substantially (see below),
the annual cost of the Section 8 housing voucher program has
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also grown. In order to fund the voucher system and keep total budgetary outlays within limits, federal funding for new
construction and for rehabilitation of existing units has been
slashed; thus, the Section 8 voucher system is practically all
that remains of the federal commitment to low-cost housing.
The recent and dramatic decline in federal subsidies for
the construction of new low-income housing was shown in Table Seven. At the same time, inflation, abandonment, conversion, and gentrification have seriously diminished the available
quantity of unsubsidized low income housing (Lang, 1989). To
illustrate, in 1980 there were some 350,000 "low-to-moderate
income" housing units produced; in 1985 only 200,000 were
produced. Most of the "low-to-moderate income" housing now
coming on the market is in fact occupied by families with incomes above poverty but below the median income, not by the
truly poor. Many of the landlords in these developments require a stable, secure source of income and thus exclude the
neediest sectors of the population. "Low to moderate" income
households are usually not poor but rather young middle class
families on their way up (Lang, 1989; Hartman and Zigas, 1989).
When all is said and done, HUD housing programs assist
fewer and fewer new households each year, for shorter periods of time (the standard HUD commitment has been reduced
from 24 to 12 years), and at a lower dollar subsidy per unit cost
of housing. The General Accounting Office has estimated that
without additional budget. authority, tenant based programs
with five year contracts will be eliminated completely by 1991 if
new contracts are not extended (American Association for the
Aging, 1987).
Additionally, despite the growing humber of assisted households, the lag between assistance and need continues to grow.
At present, for each low-income household that receives subsidized housing, there are three additional eligible households
that do not; in other words, existing subsidies supply relief to
only about a quarter of income-eligible families (Dolbeare, 1988).
Even among renters earning less than $2500 per year, fewer than
a quarter live in assisted housing.
With the supply of low-income housing continuing to shrink
and the need continuing to grow, it is not surprising that the
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waiting lists for subsidized housing have become interminably
long. The U.S. Conference of Mayors recently surveyed public housing waiting lists in 27 large cities. The average waiting
time from application to occupancy of a subsidized unit was 22
months. In Chicago, the average applicant will wait 10 Years for
Section 8 housing and in Washington DC, 8 years. It has been estimated that the waiting list for subsidized public housing units
is 17 years long in New York and 20 years long in Miami (Daly,
1990: 137). The Conference of Mayor's survey also showed that
waiting lists for assisted housing have been closed in 65% of
the surveyed cities due to excess demand. In Ohio, there are
40,000 people waiting for public housing; officials from the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment estimate that
in 1987, a half million fqtmilies nation-wide were on the waiting
lists for assisted housing,(Report to the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 1987). (Table Ten shows data on
waiting lists in selected cities.)
Reaganomics shifted the focus of federal low income housing policy away from the subsidized construction of low income

Table 10
Waiting List for Public Housing in Select Cities,I986

Akron
Baltimore
Buffalo
Chicago
Greensboro
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Sacramento

No. Applicants Waiting

Total Units

1,720
13,875
3,039
44,000
1,177
8,400
2,957
2,755

4,784
17,679
5,069
49,155
2,220
20,580
9,851
2,791

Source: Council of Large Public Housing Authority telephone survey, July 1986
from "A new housing policy": recommendation of nrganizations anti individuals concerned about affordable housing in America. U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1987.
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units and towards so called "tenant based" subsidies (Section 8
vouchers) that, contrary to theory, have not added to the housing supply. "In 1980, 81% of incremental HUD subsidized units
were new or rehabilitated Section 8 or public housing units; by
1988 that figure had fallen to 4%" (Zigas and Hartman 1989,
p. 19; see also Carliner, 1987, p. 126). So far as the remaining
"supply side" subsidies are concerned, HUD's current focus is
on projects with local governments as the housing providers.
Most of these projects are targeted to temporary shelter and
short-term services (Daly, 1990).
An additional problem for the 1990s is the possible loss of
subsidized housing units through expiration of their existing
HUD contracts. Lang (1989) estimates that there are presently
some 900,000 federally subsidized units that will be eligible for
refinancing over the next few years; in most cases, these refinanced units will be permanently subtracted from the lowincome housing stock. Already (according to Lang), numerous
public housing projects have been either demolished or sold to
the private sector.
As indicated earlier, what remains of the federal commitment to low income housing is mainly the Section 8 voucher
program. Section 8 vouchers are usually short term commitments (5 years) because HUD officials initially hoped that falling
interest rates would soon render the voucher system unnecessary. This, of course, has not happened and is not likely to
happen anytime soon. In the interim, only a quarter to a third
of income eligible households receive any form of federal lowincome housing assistance (Zigas and Hartman, 1989: 15).
Whether the households currently receiving housing voucher assistance will continue to do so is highly problematic. About
a million existing Section 8 contracts will expire between 1990
and 1994. In the face of the Reagan-induced budget deficit, the
cost of renewing them may well prove prohibitive. In this vein,
the Director of Housing and Monetary Policy for the AFL-CIO
estimates that "over a 5 year period and with a 5 year occupancy renewal cycle, the cost to-the Ifederal government] of [renewing] 5 year vouchers for 968,000 units would increase from
$29 billion in the 1990-1994 cycle to $33.5 billion for the next 5
years" (Schecter, 1989: 149). One is entitled to doubt whether
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the federal coffers will sustain "hits" of this magnitude in what
can be referred to as the Gramm-Rudman era; if not, roughly
a million families will soon be dropped from the housing assistance rolls.
It is obvious that the voucher program can only succeed if
there is an ample supply of acceptable units. Units meeting the
Section 8 rent and quality standards are in noticeably short supply, as we have already said, and the exceptionally low vacancy
rates in these units further compound the problem (Zigas and
Hartman, 1989: 12). While vacancy rates nation-wide have been
around 7-8% in recent years, the rates vary sharply by region
and by type of unit (Table Eleven). For example, vacancy rates
are lowest in the Northeast (usually around 4%). Vacancies in
larger apartments are lower still (about 3%). Nation-wide, most
vacant units are either high rent luxury apartments, suburban
units that are not available to the poor, very small units that
are not adequate for poor families, or simply substandard units
(Huttrnan, 1990). Among acceptable and adequate units within
the means of the poor, vacancy rates are minuscule. For example, the vacancy rate of apartments renting for less than $100 a
month was only about 2% in 1989.
Conclusions
The general portrait sketched here has been drawn by many
others; the principal feature that comes consistently into view
is more poor people co\ripeting for less low income housing
(Wright and Lam, 1987; Bassuk, 1986; Dolbeare, 1988; Lang,
1989; Hartman and Zigas, 1989; Zigas and Hartman, 1989;
Huttman, 1989; Sanjek, 1986; McChesney, 1988). The overall dimensions of the low income housing "squeeze" are easily illustrated. In 1970, there were two low-income units (renting for
less than $125 a month) for each low-income renter household
(annual income below $5,000). By 1983, that situation was reversed; two low-income renter households for each low-income
unit (Dolbeare, 1988). In 1975, 3.7 million low-income renters
paid more than 50% of their incomes for rent; in 1983, 16 million low-income renters paid more than 50% of their incomes
for rent, some two-fifths of the total (US Conference of Mayors, Report to the Subcommittee, 1989). In 1983, of the 2 million
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Table 11
Vacancy Rates, 1982-1987 (%)
1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

Total rental
units

5.3

5.7

5.9

6.5

7.3

7.7

Inside SMSAs
Outside SMSAs

5.0
6.2

5.5
6.3

5.7
6.4

6.3
7.1

7.2
8.2

7.7
7.8

Northeast
Midwest
South
West

3.7
6.3
5.8
5.4

4.0
6.1
6.9
5.2

3.7
5.9
7.9
5.2

3.5
5.9
9.1
6.2

3.9
6.9
10.1
7.1

4.1
6.8
10.9
7.3

3.6
6.2
6.5

3.7
6.7
7.1

3.8
7.0
7.5

3.8
7.9
8.8

3.9
9.2
10.4

4.0
9.7
11.2

Units with:
3 rooms or less
4 rooms
5 rooms
6 rooms or more

7.2
5.0
4.0
3.5

7.2
5.7
4.4
3.7

7.5
6.3
4.6
3.5

8.8
6.9
5.0
3.2

10.2
8.0
5.3
3.3

10.7
8.6
5,4
3.3

Monthly rent:
Less than $100
$100 or more

3.4
5.4

2.5
5.7

2.7
5.9

3.5
6.6

2.8
7.7

2.2
9.0

5.3
5.6
5.2
5.5

5.9
6.2
5.4
5,6

6.6

7.9

9.5

11.2

5.6
5.3

6.2
5.0

6.9
5.0

7.7
5,1

5.1
12.2

5.5
11.8

5.7
13.6

6.3
13.8

7.2
14.5

7.5
16.2

Units in structure:

I unit
2 or more
5 or more

Year built:
1960 or later
1965 or later
1940

-

1959

1939 or earlier
Plumbing:
With all facilities
Lacking facilities

Source: Statistical Abstract, 1989
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renters with incomes less than $3,000 per year, 86% paid more
than 60% of their incomes for rent (Nelson, 1990). The median
rent (in 1988) for a two bedroom apartment in San Francisco
was $850 per month; in Los Angeles, $616 a month; in NassauSuffolk county (New York), $670 a month; in Washington DC,
$563 a month; in St. Louis, $419 a month; and in Houston, $400
a month (Huttman, 1990: 89). Most rental housing in the urban areas is priced well beyond the means of the poor, even
as the number of the urban poor has increased. But even the
poor have to live soiewhere. Increasingly, "somewhere" has
meant on the streets. Even more frightening is the possibility
that as many as 3.5 million additional low cost rental units will
be taken out of the housing supply over the next few years
(Lang, 1989: 17).
The U.S. Conference of Mayors concluded (in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development) that none of the 27 cities they had surveyed would
be able to neet the near-term housing needs of their low income
families because of the continued federal cutbacks in housing
subsidies (1989: 293). The Subcommittee responded that from
1980 to 1989, its jurisdiction over low-income housing had been
dramatically reduced and that little (if anything) could be done.
'rhis reduction is reflected in a 72% cut in the Subcommittee's
budgetary authority for the Subsidized Housing Account and
a consequent decline in the number of households assisted by
that account, from 187,892 assisted households in 1980 to 83,685
in 1989.
As we and many others have shown, the Reagan years witnessed dramatic declines in the supply of low-cost housing,
substantial increases in the poverty rate (especially in the large
cities), and drastic shifts in federal policy towards housing the
poor. A related development, one that we have not touched on,
was an increasingly stringent, even punitive, attitude towards
low-income recipients of federal assistance, a tightening of welfare eligibility requirements, a reduction in the level of assistance, and the "purging" of the assistance roles (Hope and
Young, 1986; Stem, 1986: 117). The inevitable consequence has
been a crisis in low-incoi housing and an increase in the numbers without housing, which is to say the homeless.
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Next to adequate nutrition, suitable housing is the most basic element of social welfare and housing policy is therefore
a fundamental component of social policy in general (EspingAnderson, 1985). Most of the advanced industrial democrades
find it necessary to subsidize their housing supplies in order
to achieve their overall social welfare goals. In contrast, in the
United States, we have always subsidized a lower percentage of
the housing stock than virtually any other industrialized nation
(Hartman and Zigas, 1989, p. 9), a comparison that became even
less favorable in the Reagan years. For all practical purposes,
we now stand alone among the Western nations in our apparent
indifference to housing the poor.
Adequate housing has become, it seems, a privilege of the
affluent rather than a basic right of citizenship guaranteed to
all. There is obviously no philosophical or ideological objection
to the general notion of housing subsidies, since every homeowning household that itemizes its federal income tax deduction receives one. The objection, rather, is to providing housing
subsidies to those that truly need them.
The notion that the private market would somehow take
care of the housing needs of the poor, with only a little federal
voucher assistance to those of greatest need, must be counted
as one of the great delusions of the 1980s. "The Market" was
responsible for the outright destruction of a great deal of lowincome housing as the central cities were revitalized to accommodate the tastes of the young and wealthy, but it provided a
meager to non-existent backflow (or downward trickle) of lowcost housing for those displaced by the renovation effort. The
result is that hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, now
find themselves without housing and must either avail themselves of the good will of friends and families, utilize temporary over-night shelters, or sleep in the streets. This cannot in
good conscience even be called a housing policy. It is madness
masquerading as a "free market" ideology-perhaps the most
enduring legacy of the Reagan administration.
What can be done now to undo the harm inflicted on the
poor by the housing strategies pursued in the 1980s? There may
well be some alternative in all this to a renewed federal commitment to the subsidized construction of low-income housing
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units, but frankly, we fail to see what it might be. Unfortunately,
the size of the federal deficit (another inheritance firom the Reagan years) in essence rules out any bold, new, social welfare
programs for at least the next decade, In the meantime, it is an
easy prediction that the homelessness problem will continue to
worsen and that the new Millennium will find I's still grappling
with and embarrassed by this national disgrace.
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The Fall of the Industrial City:
The Reagan Legacy for Urban Policy
DAVID STOESZ
policyAmerica and San Diego State University
School of Social Work

The Reagan presidency reversed a half-century of federal aid to cities.
Poor minority comnnunities were particularly hard-hit, since this was
accompanied by a white flight to the suburbs and the replacement of better paying industrial jobs requiring little education with poorer paying
service jobs requiring iore education. Meanwhile wealthy communities
prospered. To address urgent social problems, urban politicians are advocating strategies such as industrialpolicy, public entrepreneurship,and
guerrilla wlfare.
The Reagan presidency oversaw a fundamental change in
American urban policy-the demise of the drab, industrial city
and the rise of its glittering, postindustrial successor. Reversing
a policy stance established during the New Deal, the Reagan
administration failed to develop federal legislation to ameliorate the social and economic dislocation concomitant with the
very substantial shifts in capital and population which have
occurred. In place of a visible and coherent urban policy, the
Reagan administration preferred an oblique, but highly successful, strategy in urban affairs. This strategy decimated categorical
grants to cities for the purposes of economic and community development, exacerbating an already-marginal standard of living
for the poor who were experiencing significant loss of benefits
through means-tested programs. Less recognized at the time,
tax cuts and deregulation served to accelerate the flight of capital from the industrial, "rustbowl" in favor of the postindustrial,
"sunbelt." A decade after the inauguration of Ronald Reagan,
the two issues most prominent in urban America follow from
this strategy: the emergence of an underclass in older cities, and
the massive Savings and Loan scandal attributable to speculation in the booming metropolitan areas of the West and South.
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Urban Policy and Social Welfare
Since its inception during the Progressive Era, urban policy
has been inextricably bound to the American welfare state. The
predecessors of modern social service agencies were established
in America's industrial heartland before the turn of the century:
the first Charity Organization Society in Buffalo in 1877; the first
Settlement House in New York City in 1887 (soon followed by
the most well-known Settlement-Hull House-in Chicago in
1889) (Axinn and Levin, 1982). The Progressive penchant for
efficient admninistration directly influenced the next generation
of social service agencies, as evident in the Milford Conference
Report, which detailed the structure and process of both public
and private agencies (National Associatioi) of Social Workers,
1974). This implicitly urban format for service provision was
replicated in virtually every city, leading Wilensky and Lebeaux
to conclude that "virtually all welfare service" was dispensed
through this model (1965, p. 231).
Progressives' concern for effective administration conplemented their campaign for good government, an attempt to rid
municipal governance from the corruption associated with the
likes of Tammany Hall's Boss Tweed and George Washington
Plunkett. "Good Government" becane a rallying cry for such
luminaries as Jacob Riis, Lincoln Steffens, and Upton Sinclair,
Together, the "clean administration" Progressives and the "good
government" Progressives laid the groundwork for what was to
become the New Deal. It is significant that many of the architects
of the American welfare state were tenants of Jane Addams'
IHTull House, among them Edith and Grace Abbott, Julia Lathrop, Florence Kelley, Frances Perkins, and John Dewey. Harry
Hopkins, a lightning-rod for many of FDR's initiatives, had
resided at New York'sk'Christadora House Settlement (Karger
and Stoesz, 1990, p. 339).
Federal urban policy began with passage of the Housing
Act of 1937, which provided assistance to states and cities for
purposes of eliminating unsafe and unsanitary housing. After
the War, the Act was amended so as to focus on slum clearance
and urban renewal (Karger and Stoesz, 1990, p, 243). The broad
authority granted to local government coupled with the lack
of advocacy by minorities and the poor resulted in federally-
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funded projects which severely damaged working class communities (Gans, 1962), often replacing them with housing projects
which resembled vertical concentration camps. In 1954, the Act
was again amended, eliminating a requirement that residential
housing be a substantial portion of federally-supported projects.
As a result, African-Americans claimed, by an ironic semantic
shift, that the "urban renewal" provision of the Act actually
meant "Negro removal."
The War on Poverty, declared by President Johnson, ushered
in a series of domestic programs which were intended to improve the plight of minorities and the poor. Because these populations disproportionately inhabited urban areas, programs
targeted for them were beneficial for cities. Among them, the
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 financed education and job training for the poor; the Civil Rights Act of 1964
enhanced the life opportunities for racial minorities; the Food
Stamp Act of 1964 improved nutrition of the poor; the Community Mental Health Centers Acts of 1.963 and 1965 funded
psycho-social services for the poor; the Medicaid and Medicare amendments to the Social Security Act provided health
insurance for the poor and elderly; and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1965 provided an umbrella for several important initiatives, including 1-lead Start, the Job Corps, the Legal Services Corporation, Model Cities, and the Community
Action Program.
The Community Action Program (CAP) quickly became the
most controversial facet of the War on Poverty. Because local
CAPs administered programs independent of municipal governance, they were viewed skeptically by city officials, However,
when CAPs were required to have one-third representation by
the poor in decision-making, and the poor challenged the power
structure in many cities, mayors reacted strongly (Moynihan,
1969). The instability generated by "citizen participation" in
poverty programs was punctuated by urban riots of the mid1960s which were attributed to prevalent racism and an absence
of opportunity for the poor (National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, 1968). Turbulence in federal urban policy was
addressed in the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, which reassigned virtually all of the CAP programs
to other agencies, dismantled CAPs as they were known, and
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relegated participation of the poor to an advisory function. Reinforcing the role of meI-Opolitan government, the 1974 Act incorporated a range of programs-including urban redevelopment
and beautification, Model Cities, neighborhood iinprovement,
and historic preservation-which were budgeted at $11 billion
for 1978-80. By 1981, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), the primary agency through which urban
policy was implemented, subsidized about 3.5 million housing
units (Karger and Stoesz, 199(0, pp. 244, 245).
The Reagan Era
With the inauguration of Ronald Reagan, a half-century of
progress in federal urban policy abruptly came to an end. The
federal reversal of aid to cities was the result of a dual strategydivesting the federal government of its responsibility for social
problems while assigning that task to subordinate levels of government (federalism), and delegating as much of the program
function as possible to nongovernmental providers (privatization). By the end of the decade, federalism and privatization
had had a profound impact on the welfare of America's cities
and their peoples.
For the record, it is important to recognize that the Reagan
legacy in urban policy was not completely remiss. During the
early 1980s, much legislative attention was directed at an initiative which promised to lure industry into the nation's, most economically depressed communities. Pioneered in Great Britain
and imported to the U.S. by Stuart Butler, a British analyst
recruited by the conservative Heritage Foundation, the Urban
Enterprize Zone (UEZ) concept was poised as the Republican
antithesis to a series of Democratic urban programs. In designating UEZs, government would offer business special considerations, such as tax rebates, reductions in the minimum wage, and
waving certain occupational and health protections, in order to
induce firms to relocate in poor areas. Aggressively promoted
by then-Representative Jack Kemp, UEZ legislation attracted
the endorsement of such disparate groups as conservative
ideologues, Democratic mayors, and civil rights organizations
(Stoesz, 1985). Yet, a combination of neglect on the part of the
Reagan administration and what was later to prove glaring
incompetence in the administration of the HUD, under the

Fall of fIdustrial Stmih'li
direction of Samuel Pierce, who was later charged with misappropriating S2 billion in low-income housing aid (Ostrow,
1990), effectively killed any prospect that UEZs would become
national policy. Ironically, the UEZ concept remains the most
viable urban policy option for the Bush administration, and it
is HUD Secretary Jack Kemp who is again promoting the idea
in the face of even greater obstacles.
Federalism and privatization provided a powerful rationale
for the withdrawal of the national government in urban policy. From 1980 to 1988, federal spending for housing decreased
from $27.9 billion to $9.7 billion (Leonard, Dolbeare, and Lazere,
1989, p. 32). As a result, the supply of low-income housing failed
to keep pace with the number of poor households. While the
number of poor renter households increased by 3.2 million between 1974 and 1985, the number of low rent units fell by 2.8
million (Greenstein and Leonard, 1990, p. 21). This, of course,
contributed significantly to increases in homelessness during
the same period.
Federal grants to cities declined sharply during the Reagan
administration. Between 1975 and 1980, federal aid to subordinate levels of government for community development block
grants increased from $38 million to $3.9 billion-but had declined to $3.3 billion by 1987. Similarly, the federal contribution
for community services block grants decreased from $557 million in 1980 to $354 million in 1986 (Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1988, pp. 260, 337). The House Ways and Means
Committee reported that "for HUD's programs alone, appropriations of budget authority declined (in 1989 dollars) from a high
of $57 billion in 1978 to a low of $9 billion in 1989 (Committee on Ways and Means, 1990: 1311). Still, in some respects Lhe
Reagan administration pales in its dunning of urban programs
compared to that of his successor. The Bush administration budget for 1991 proposes to further reduce federal assistance for
low-income housing by 4.2%. For the same year, federal allocations for community development block grants are dropped to
$2.7 billion, and federal support for community services block
grants plummet to only $42 million (Greenstein and Leonard,
1990, Table 1).
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An Urban Diaspora
During the Reagan presidency, federal urban policy failed
utterly to address problems associated with substantial shifts
in demography and capital affecting American cities. During
the last two decades millions of Americans abandoned older,
industrial cities for the "sunbelt." John Kasarda reports that between 1975 and 1985, "the South and West accounted for more
than 85% of the nation's population growth" (1988 p. 154). The
consequence for select cities is depicted in Table 1 below.
Table I
Population Changes of Seleled Major Cities (in thousands)
City
St. Louis
Detroit
Cleveland
Buffalo
Pittsburgh
Los Angeles
Dallas
San Antonio
San Diego
Houston
Phoenix

Population
1970

Population
1984

Percentage
Change

622.2
1,511.3
751.0
462.8
520.2
2,816.1
844.2
654.3
696.6
1,232.4
581.6

429.3
1,089.0
546.5
339.0
402.6
3,096,7
974,2
842.8
960.5
1,705.7
853.3

-31.0
-27.9
-27.2
-26.8
- 22.6
+ 10.0
+ 15.4
+ 28.8
+ 37.9
+ 38.4
+ 46.7

Source: Dearborn (1988, p. 256).

Most of the explosive growth of southern and western cities
was fed by flight from those of the Northeast and Midwest.
Residents left behind in older cities tended to be minorities.
Between 1975 and 1985, the minority population of northeastern
cities increased from 33% to 42% (Kasarda, 1988, p. 156).
As the white population fled industrial urban areas, the
economic base of America's cities changed dramatically-bluecollar jobs requiring less education vanished and were replaced
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by those of the information and services sectors. This penalized particularly the unskilled and poorly-educated minority
.population left behind in industrial cities of the northeast and
.midwest. "Unfortunately, the northern cities that have lost the
greatest numbers of jobs with lower educational requisites during the past three decades," concluded Kasarda, "have simultaneously experienced large increases in the number of their
minority residents, many of whom are workers whose limited
educations preclude their employment in the new urban growth
industries" (1988, p. 178). The interaction of white flight and
technological transformation has been devastating for minorities residing in older, industrial cities, particularly African
American males, as shown in the table below.
Table 2
Unemployment Rates and Proportion of Male Central City Residents Aged
16-24 Who Are Not in School and Not in the Labor Force, by Race and
Region, 1985
Region
and Race

All regions
White

Unemployment
Rate %

13.5

Percentage Not in School
and Not in Labor Force

6.1
14.1

Black
Northeast
White

37.1
16.7

9.4

Black
West

43.5

24.5

White
Black

11.3
29.6

5.5
9.3

Source: Kasarda (1988, p. 187).

If the unemployment rate is combined with the labor force nonparticipation rate, the plight of young blacks is immediately
apparent. For example, in 1985 68.0% of young blacks living in
the northeast were unemployed or not in school or not working,
compared to 38.9% who lived in the West.
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Tie Underclass
The consequence of these developnunts has been [lie spread
of an urban "underclass." From exploralory investigalions of
the deterioration of poor, urban neiglhborliuods (Glasgow, 1981;
Auletta, 1982;! 1 cinann, 1986), social restiarchers have developed
a more sophisticaled understanding of the correlates with underclass status (Wilson, 1987; McL.analion, Garfinkel, and Watson, 1988). In a synthesis of previous sludies, McLanaihan and
her associates identified three factors contributing Lo underclass
status: persistent and weak attachment to (lie labor force, intergenerational dependence, and ghettoii.ation. Of particular interest is the latter, tie increased social isolation of the very poor,
as shown in the following table.
Table 3
"ltendsin Social Condilhms in LOqe G'niral tCilics. 1970-1980

Census Tracts with
20 Percent Poor

Percentage

Percentage
1980

Indicator

1970

Employment rate
males, 16+
AFDC families
Black persons
Poor Blacks

N.
63.3 " 56.0
19.8
28.0
27.2 26.5
30.5
28.3

Census Tracts witlh
40 Percent P'oor

Ciangev

170

1980

Change

- 13
.10
--.3
18

56.5
30.2
6.3
9.4

46.0
42.0
8.3
13.1

-22
--,1
+ 32
+4,0

Adapted from ilariahart, Garfinkel, and Wisim, (1988, p. 130)

While poverty continued to impact poor neighborhoods (census tracts with 20 percent poor), it worsened considerably the
conditions of poorer neighborhoods (census tracts witlh 10 percent poor).
A conspiracy of events, then, transformed [le industrial city
beginning in the 1970s. White flight decimated cities of the
Northeast and Midwest, leaving behind larger concentrations
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of mnorities. Technological and econoitiic shifts reduced the
demand for unskilled labor, reducing sharply employment opportunities for African-Anericans. Concomnmiltantly federal r'eductions in grants to the poor and to cities failed to help those
left behind make tip fur lost ground. As a result, the social and
economic circumstanct oif (he poor worsened considerably, lirther isolating them from the American mainstream. Unarguablv,
a consequence of the Reagan administralion's unwillingness to
fashion a coherent urban policy is the emergence of an Amercan underclass. By he ItI,s, areas of maaily industrial cities had
virtually imploded (Jewcks, 1988; Williams, 1988).
The Overclass
While industrial l'rkimi areas withered, pustindustrial cities
expanded dramatically ls a result of mlssivet infusions of capital. Rejuvenating the econony had been a primary concern for
the Reagan administralion, .of course, especially after a blistering campaign assault onl the "stagflation" that plagued the
Carter presidency. More immediately, the severe depression of
the early 1980s made it imperative that the, administration m1ove
swiftly. In short order, Congress agreed to a sizable tax cut
which benefitted wealthy individuals and corporations, and it
stripped much of tht regulatory red-tape from the financiJal industry. 'he latter action would ultimately lead to the greatest
financial debacle hi the nalion's history-- the Savings and L.oa
(S&L,) scandal.
Deregulation of the financial industry had direct iniplications for social welfare, since poverty programs were funded
through public funds. According to "stlpply-side economic theory", government exlV
)IditUNs
must be reduced since federal
1
revenues are derived from taxes, monies that the private sector needs for capitalization. In effect, "Reaganomics" held that
government cornpted with industry for capita by levying tLvs
on private revenue, starving the goose that lays the golden egg.
As regards welfare, eventually an unfettered economy would
generate an even grelter surplus which could be taxed, thereby
compensating for earlier reductions in expenditures for dlit 'stic programs. However flawless it may have seemed in theory,
in practice "Reaganomics" proved abrasive to tie nation's social
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fabric. Reagan domestic policy led to a massive shift in wealth
from the poor to the wealthy, creating an income gap that
reached its widest point since data had been first collected in
1947 (Greenstein and Barancik, 1990). And, through the deregulation of the S&L industry, it 'esulted in an enormous development program-one which ultimately favors the burgeoning
cities of the "sunbelt" at the expense of those of the "rustbowl."
By deregulating the financial industry, the Reagan adrninistration was able to replace a diminished, yet enduring, government urban policy with a corporate policy which overwhelmed
federal programs of the previous half-century. The arnount of
this "corporate urban policy" is roughly the amount taxpayers
will have to fork-over to repay depositors for money lost to
speculative investments, primarily in real estate-between $300
and $500 billion over the next ten years (Greider, 1990, p. 11).
Because S&Ls in conservatorship tend to be located in the sunbelt, the S&L bailout represents an unprecedented, intranational
transfer of funds. According to Hill, 37 states will finance the
liquidation of debt incurred in the remaining 13. Of these, several stand to gain substantially: "Texas will receive 43.2% of the
gross bailout funds, followed by Arkansas (7%), Florida (6.8%),
California (6.7%), New Mexico (5.1%), Louisiana (4.6%), Arizona
(4.2%)" (1990, p. 42). As presently conceived and assuming a final cost of $300 billion, the bailout will penalize the "frostbelt"
states $123 billion.1 In presenting his analysis, Hill identified
the bailout as an "economic development program in the same
sense that debt forgiveness" is offered to third-world nations,
except in reverse. "The bulk of the transfer will be coming from
the Northeast and Midwest, regions attempting to renew their
economies. The recipients are mainly located in regions that
have experienced rapid job growth," noted Hill. "Money capital is being taken from regions that are attempting to renew their
infrastructure, or physical capital, and given to regions with the
newest physical capital" (1990, p. 44).
While the S&L scaridal has substantial implications for urban policy, it also affec'tls the national culture. If one aspect of
the Reagan legacy in urban policy is the ridse of the "underclass" due to cutting benefits to the poor, its corollary is the
rise of the "overclass" as a result of tax cuts for the wealth, and
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fiscal wheeling and dealing. Here, Sidney Blumenthal's acerbic
portrayal is worth reprinting.
The overclass is the distorted mirror image of a caricature of
the underclass. It is not the old establishment of Prescott Bush,
George's father; it is, rather, the demimonde of rentiers who, under Reagan, elbowed their way to the top, where they hastily built
mahogany-paneled offices to create an aura of settled legitimacy.
This overclass piled up vast wealth shuffling junk bonds, paper
assets, and real estate. Its monuments are not factories but Atlantic City casinos and boarded-up department stores. The overclass battened under Reagan; under Bush it sought to consolidate
its respectability (1990, p. 20).
In an exhaustive analysis of the excesses of the Reagan era,
Kevin Phillips (1990) profiled the American "plutocracy" which
emerged during the 1980s. "Corporate executives and investors
were the prime 1980s beneficiaries," he concluded (p. 166).
Yet, the contradictions posed by an ostentatious overclass
are not so facilely reconciled with a stricken underclass. ConIsider that the $1 billion in indiscretions of Silverado S&L-in
which the President's son, Neil, is irnplicated-easily exceeds
the $691 million proposed by his father in aid for the home.less for 1991. Or, that the amount taxpayers will absolve Lin,coln S&L's Charles H. Keating, Jr. of $2.5 billion, eclipses what
the Bush administration proposed for the Women, Infants, and
Children Supplemental Food Program for 1991.2
Reconstructing Urban America
As a result of the feceral retreat from urban policy, mo'mentum gained on several fronts to address the increasingly
dire straights of many American cities. Since the programmatic
articulation of these orientations has yet to be broadly demonstrated, they are largely expressions of ideology. Still, a post'Reagan urban policy is likely to be influenced by present discussions around "industrial policy," "public entrepreneurship," or
*"guerrilla welfare." While these differ in important ways, they
'share an important dimension-an acceptance of the premise
*that the federal government is not the sole actor in resolving
urban problems.
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Industrial Policy

Citing lhe decline o" Ain,ric-iin industrv in an increasingly
competitive global economy, sevral analv,,, have called for the
creation of a national industrial policy. ILeaving tie particulars
aside, such a policy would be negotiated through a troika consisting of go',rnment,&induslrv, and labor. Since an industrial
policy would attemupt t6 bolstr e\isting indlwury threatened by
rnergkence of new
international competitors as Myell as foster theiu,
Tlrough
uril'aniipclicy.
for
inlplitaLtions
enterprises, it has direct
a national urban policy, dera ying urban inlrlki ructure could
be rebuilt, blue-collar workers retrained for riew higih-tech jobs,
cornmunities where heavy industry had prt'donlilated could be
transformed to showcases for light manufacluring and information technology. As exemplars, proponents of national industrial
policy point to Japan and West Germany wiiich have benefited
mightily from a high degree of economic nhtnagenlent during
the post-war era.
To some extent the prospets that urban America will benefit from an industrial policy are contingenl til which form of
economic management is prolosed. Drawing from leftist theoreticians (O'Connor, 1973; Cough, 1979), some analysts called
for an industrial policy heavily influenced by a national government (Thurow, 1980; Kultner, 1984, 1987). Others, showing allegiance toward labor and community, advanced more populist
initiatives (Bowles, Gordon, and Veisskopf, 1983; Alperovitz
and Faux, 1984; Harrison and Bluestone, 1988). To the righlt,
Kevin Phillips proposed a variant in which the corporate sector
was dominant (1984). Playing a middle ground, Robert Reich
opted for greater coordination amiong principles, a de facto industrial policy without calling it as mcICh (I 3, 1987).
Yet, for all the intellect aimed at developing a national economic recovery policy, a decade of deliberation failed to deliver such a policy. In fact, cit (he national level, government
pursued a laissez-faire tack, seeking further integration of the
U.S. economy in international capitalism. At the state level, tie
sole effort to develop industrial policy was reiected by Rhode
Island voters in the mid-1980s (Reich, 1989, pp. 255-57). Short of
a major economic dislocation -attributable ito a global depression, the consolidation of lheIFuropean Ectinomic Community
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in 1992, or, quite pusilhly, the S&L crisis-the prospects of the
U.S. forging an indt .ial policy remain slim. In its absence, the
industrial cities of [Ie Northeast and Midwest will contlinue to
lose capital and plpulation.
Public Entreprencurslip
Facing the political equivalent to Chapter 11, mayors sought
alternate supports as the federal government reneged on its
comminlment to the nation's cities. Stales would pick up somle of
the slack, though some, such as California and Massachusetts,
had passed initiatives which limited state tax increases. Ultimately, city leaders had little choice but to turn to the private
sector, experimenting, with "public-private partnershis". Labeled "public en trep.renen rship" by John Kirlin, urbilellhaders
sought "to mainlain local business and employment growthand thus local government revenues-by stimulating private
sector involvement in local economic developpment projects and
urban service delivery" (Kirhin and Marshall, 1988, p. 3,19).
This strategy led mayors to inioative relationships with
foundations and business. For example, after experimenting
with locating computer assembly facililies in poor neighborhoods, Control Data Corporation established the Citv Venture
Corporation to further its plans in civic responsibilily (McKinnon et al., 1982). In order to wtean community development
progrnams from dependency on donors, the Ford Foundation
established the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (iSC) to
make them economically self-sufficitnt. By the mid-19811s, IISC
claimed assets of over $100 million and projects in 23 cities (Osborne, 1988, pp. 30.1-5). The Enterprise Foundation, founded by
developer James RoLse in 1981, tused revenues from a ])irofitmaking subsidiary to fund housing developments for the poor.
By 1984, the Enterprise Foundation claimed projects in 12 cities
and had targeted 51 cities for intervention by the uld of the
decade (Enterprise Foundation, '1983).
Such endeavors led to the creation of Community )cvelopment Corporations in several cities in order to better focus
the interests of government, fotundations, and business on distressed neighborhoods. In a review of such efforts, Osborne
urged the creation of "development banks" to regenerate poor
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communities. Citing examples such as Chicgo's Shorebank
Corporation and the Kenliick' Highlands Iniivestment Gwrlporation, Osborne concluded Ilhal
tht' idal community tlevetpieitst rah'
t y wi itld
build conijrt'hensive dec veloplenl tr 014Ili,,alions" each lailcred to IChe realities
of lhe local communit . llie,;w inslitution,; would have significant resotiurces. They would focts on hoth c'r)noinic and social
problems. Their goals would he investinrei, rather than spending. 'I
lhey would leverag as much private invstimenl as possible.
They wvould seek to build the capacity ol local people and institutioins. They would have built-in market feed back mechanisms.
And they would have hi capital and political commilmenl to
remain in place for the lonig haul (1488, p..0 21 .
What remains to be seen Of the public t'ntrepreneurial sirategy is whether it is possible to generate the capital and will
to address luhe tenacious problens associated with deteriorating
urban neigliborhoods.in habiled by the underclass. With present
government expenditures already restricted by the deficit and
future apl ropriations committed to the S&L bailout, public
funds are not likely to be fortHhcoming. Private sources, either
from foundations or corporations, are conlingent on a healthy
economy. The market crash of October I187 and wild stock
fluctuations accompanying events in the Mideast in 1990 tend
to dampen the enthusiasm of business leaders for civic projects.
Under the best of circumstances, privale sector innovations are
unlikely to produce the capital necessary to freshen the nation's
economic backwaters. SIill, considering the federal retreat from
urban affairs and the fiscal straightjacket stifling city management, mayors have little choice but make the most of "public
entreprenCLI rship".
Guerrilla IVelf'ie
Inevitably, the social and economic pathology besetting
many cities drove some community activists to radical tactics.
Radicalism has been a continuous feature of the American urban experience, so this is hardly surprising. Much of the social
programming of the American welfare state can be attributed
to radical organizers of lhe labor moveneni, reflected in the
New Deal, and the civil rights movement, reflected in the War
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on Poverty. In their classic historyN of public assistante benefits,
Piven and Clowalrd (1971) dernonsl rRled that the "generosity"
of welfare programs is actually cyclical, contingent on political and economic iistability, which is, to a degree, generated

by radical organiirs. Saul Alinsky's organizing stralegies (and
antics) in Chicag,,o, and Buffalo hav become as legendary as his
writings (1972),
Still, the 1980s narked a particularly mean period iii the nation's treatment of the economicall' and socially dispossessed.
Despite worsenin, conditions, civil disturbances of lhe 1980s
failed to materialize on a scale of those of the 1960s. To address problems of the homeless in Washington, D.C., Mitch
Snyder and olher pacifist radicals, founded the C1ommnitV
for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV). While the Reagan administration launched its assault on lpoverty programs in the early
1980s, CCNV began its offensive against Reagan. " hrough such
dramatic actions as creating a symbolic cemetery--in .afayette
Park across from the White House-of those having died of exposure, and undertaking several hunger strikes, CCNV seized the
moral high ground. Ultimately, CCNVs radical tactics not only
led to concessions by the Reagan administration in aid to the
homeless in the nalion's capital, but contributed to the passage
of the McKinney I lomeless Assislamce Act in 1987 (I lomnbs and
Snyder, 1983; Simon, 1990; fill, 199(1). In Milwaukee, a classic
example of the disinvestment alfteting older, indtisIrial cities,
alderman Mike Mt e formed the Black Panther Nlilitia, threatening the city %vith violence unless $100 million was invested
in the African-Anierican comm unity there. Milwatike&'s director of the department of 9ocial services, I loward Fuller, pointed
to the city's loss of 25,000 manufacturing jobs during the last
15 years as the source of growing militancy by Blacks. McGee
has hinted at a terrorist strike at convention facilities or rolling
burning tires onto frTeways, tactics that do not scm so farfetched once the uniformed and cadenced Militia is considered.
"I've been studyinig this. I've got 1,001 ways that we can completely disrupt while life in Milwaukee," observed McCee, "It
ain't going to take a lot" (Maraniss, 1990, pp. 9-10).
The 1990s are apt to see an upsurge in radicalism in American cities. As the federal government walked away from cities
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and business migrated to tie sunbelt (andltoverseas), mayors
scrambled to cobble togetlhwr resources W1dh,,l with a host of
festering problems. Increasingly, urban factions had to compete
for diminishing resources. In particular, corn tpelit ion increased
among those trying to clean tup the social debris left behind,
a problem exacerbated since their consLituents Vere economically and politically peripheral. Radical tactics were a quick
and visible methodtof climbing to the t op of lie public agenda.
The problem with guerrilla welfare, as Max Weber would have
noted, is routinizing civil disobedience. With Snydt'r's suicide,
it is difficult to identify a figure capable (f Iransforming local achievements into a populist movement m behalf of the
disenfranchised.) Insurgent tactics will protbably become more
plausible among frutsrated urban activists, but radicalism in the
U.S. has not always been progressive. Social and economic conditions which marginalize the poor, fostering the likes of CCNV
and McGee, also inarginalize the working class, breeding the intolerance of evangelical reactionaries and wi hile sulpremacists.
Denouement
Approaching the end of the century, it is difficult to be sanguine about the emergence of an urban policy that is beneficent toward minorilies and [lie poor. Evoking federalism and
privatization, the Reagan administration was able to reverse a
half-century of federal support for the nation's cities; yet, a conservative, governmettal program of urban development failed
to emerge. Instead, deregulation of financial institutions resulted
in a massive, corporate urban aid program-.more popularly
known as the S&L c.its-which benefits cities of the "sunbelt"
at the expense of those in the "rustbowl". lb worsen matters,
Reagan rhetoric was followed by Bush's ingenuous appeal to
American altruism as a substitute for effective action. In a real
sense, the Reagan legacy for urban policy has been "a thousand
points of blight."
For their part, advocates for the urban poor have begun the
task of fashioning a post-Reagan urban policy, but they have
much work to do. 1he prospects of a comprehensive strategy
through industrial policy are faint; private-public partnerships
have been noteworthy, but spotty; and, radical action is even
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more idiosyncraLiC, Still, it has been out of such cunfusion and
despair that major initiatives have been advanced in the nation's
welfare experience. Social activists can look to leaders of the
Progressive and Civil Rights movements for models of those
who have championed efforts to deal with urban povurty while
advancing social justice. However discouraging the recent past,
the future is redolent with opportunity.
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Notes
1, For this calculation, a ratio used by Hill was employed. Hill's penalty for
the frostbelt states was placed at $51.6 billion, but this was based on an
earlier, low assessment of bailout costs.
2. Details on Neil Bush's activities can be found in Day (1990), those on
Keating, in Adams (1990), Budget figures are from Greenstein and Leonard

(1990).
3. For details on Alinsky, see Horwitt (1989); on grassroots organizing, see
Paget (1990).
4. The most-likely candidate is Jesse Jackson; however, his political philosophy has become more mainstream as a result of his involvement in presidential politics and those of (he District of Columbia.
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A priority item on the Rnigani actninistratio 's social oliVy agenda
was the (ra ion of chty model of welJore, in which rtl-nwrrning

seriicS to the deserving poor an /ir-profil(*I''r;prises cater to the mitdile and upper class. This model ms inplemrernted
because human service luut ecs of iublic a ,lecies were slashed and sullsidies reducerd for tihe nol-for-proi t sector. This reducluti resulhl ill
substantial tmet needs for social services. which hare Plotibeen cudeqilaely addressed.
Tie authors conftalt that tie lpofessiot if social rork was ntl as
directly attc/ed by these canies as may be' surmised simc professiial
social workers did not constituh a large part oq the pidie"social ser'ice
laborfarce. icreased aut'ocr-acj is mconumerdrl'd as part of the sonhuiol,.
volholeers plnovrd

The impact of the Reagan era on this country's hunai services has been well documented. Funding was reduced, with
consequent changes in the social service infrastructure, and ideological support built over the decades was simificnntly altered.
Although the challenges to tie social work profession were
many, they were not as direct, immediate, or fundamental as
they were to the public social services targeted. To demonstrate
this point, it is important to examine the historical development
of the profession and the primary ideology of the Reagan era.
This article examines the size and centrality of tie profession of social work to public social services before and after
the Reagan era and the trickle down effect on the not-for-profit
169
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services. Strategies to reduce the severit
funding cuts are described.

of fitLure policies and

Development of the Profession: Charity to professionalism
(1880-1980)
Social work had its beginnings in the friendly visitors of
the settlement houses and the Charity Organization Societies,
and in the activists who founded and staffed these early notfor profit organizations. Consequently, in the early days social
work was synonymous with charity and volunteerism. How-

ever, with industrialization, urbanization, and in migration, city
and community problems became more complex and family life
more separated from work and less well supported.
Fornally organized services emerged, creating the increased
need for training for service deliverers which contributed to the
establishment of the early schools of social work. With the depression of 1929, publicly funded social services began. They
were strengthened and expanded twice more, in the 196(]s and
the 1970s: first with the enactment of the Economic Opportunity Act and the Community Mental Health Centers Act, and
then with the passage of the Title XX amendments to the Social Security Act. Such ,xpansions broadened the support and
funding for social servicOs, but did not include professional social workers either in the policy making process or in actual
service delivery (Reeser & Epstein, 1991 p. 15).
Although the profession may have viewed these sweeping

bills as opening new vistas, opportunities, and roles for professional social workers, in fact, there were insufficient numbers of Masters in Social Work (MSWs) to even begin to fill
these new positions. By the late 1960s, there were only 70 graduate schools of social work in the United States, producing
approximately 5,600 MSWs annually (Council on Social Work
Education, 1971). Therefore, the profession was unable to fill
all of the direct service delivery positions available. Similarly,
policy making positions might have included social workers
trained at the doctoral level in research and/or policy analysis. But by 1970 only 1,000 doctorates in social work had been
awarded; again, an insufficient number for leadership in establishing policies.

Social Work & the Rcagan Era

Although the decade of the 1970s saw growth in social work
education and its expansion to three educational levels (adding
the Baccalaureate in Social Work [BSWJ to the MSW and Ph.D.
levels) this expansion did not occur early enough, or in sufficient scope, to create an impact on these public sector services.
The initiation of BSW accredited programs in 1974 began the
step to further differentiation of skills, but the total BSW labor
force by the end of this decade was still inadequate to serve the
social service labor force. While new doctoral programs begun
during the 1970s produced another 1,000 graduates, most were
employed by the expanding social work education programs.
The membership of the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) grew approximately 35% during the 1970s. Although this increase was dramatic, the total NASW membership was still under 75,000 by the late 1970s. Fewer than half
of these professional social workers (37,000) were reported to
be in the public sector. Therefore, despite this growth in the
production of BSW and MSW social workers, they represented
less than one quarter of the nation's social service labor force
at the beginning of the Reagan era (Statistics on Social Work
Education in the United States, 1979; Bureau of Labor Statistics,
*1979). Additionally, the activism of the 1960s and the accountability focus of the 1970s occurred outside the boundaries of
professional roles. Although community organization as a legitimated social work method began in the 1960s, many nonsocial
workers were active and became organizers Further, the management focus of the 1970s caused many employers to look to
other degrees to provide the technical expertise in budgeting,
program evaluation, personnel management, and management
information systems.
Thus the organizing and local initiatives required by the
Economic Opportunity Act and the Community Mental Health
Centers Act did not lure many professional social workers into
either direct service or policy making positions. The managerial expertise required by the Title XX granting mechanisms
appeared more compatible with the skills and values of graduates from masters degrees in business administration (MBA),
public administration (MPA), and health administration (MI-IA)
programs.
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Another reason for social work's absence from the public
sector was its focus on improving its professional stature. As a
consequence, it turned its attention to issues of legal regulation
of social work practice, labor force differentiation, and scientific research. The 1970s, more than any previous time, was a
decade of the profession's internal reassessmt'nT1, reorganization,
and reprioritization. NASW created a new structure with state
chapters, established a national Political Action for Candidate
Endorsement (PACE) committee and an Education Legislation
Action Network (ELAN), and drafted model legal regulation
bills. Although PACE and ELAN were advocacy focused, they
were in too early a developmental stage at the beginning of the
Reagan era to be of significant utility.
A final reason is that the education of the vast majority of
the professional social work labor force historically and at the
beginning of this decade was directed at individual solutions
and therapeutic interventions. Consequently, the fit between the
new public social services labor force needs and the professional
social worker's training was not compatible (Reeser & Epstein,
1991, p. 12).
Therefore, as the 1970s drew to a close, it was evident that:
(a) the public support of services had expanded; (b) public social
services had not replaced the traditional not-for-profit services;
(c) professional social workers were still employed predominantly in the historic and traditional fields of practice such as
not-for-profit family and children's services, mental health services, and hospital-based services and (d) social activism had
diminished in social work, as it had throughout the nation,
since the 1960s.
Thus, the authors contend that professional social workers
historically were never a signilicant portion of the public sector, and were therefore not a large part of the huge federal/state
bureaucracies created in the decades preceding the Reagan administration. This is not t odirninish the important public policy
roles of professional social workers such as Jeannette Rankin,
Harry Hopkins, Jane Addams, and Wilbur Cohen, but to emphasize that there were not large numbers of professional social workers in the public sector to be displaced by Reagan's
policies.
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The Reagan Agenda: The Charity Model
The central thrust of the Reagan presidential agenda was
to return to the former model of social services as charity delivered to the worthy poor by well-meaning volunteers. Since
the enormity of the federal deficit had to be acknowledged and
reduced, President Reagan chose to slash domestic social services, and espoused it as the return of decision-making to local
units of government.
The blame for the deficit, rather than being focused on the
escalating military expenditures, was placed on the increased
public social service costs. Given no visible reduction in poverty, the blame was once again laid at the feet of the profession
and the social welfare structure which had been incrementally
established over decades, And once again the policies of welfare
reform focused on reform of these antiquated systems rather
than on the larger and real problems of illiteracy, high school
dropouts, teen pregnancies, and unemployment.
Continuously the rhetoric in the early 1980s was the safety
net for the worthy poor. However, the passage of the GramnmRudman Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
.1985 signalled that indeed these deficit reductions would only
be achieved through benefit cuts and other reductions in virtually every low-income entitlement program. The Federal argument was that there would not be cuts in essential programs
for the truly needy because state and local governments and
philanthropic associations would replace the lost federal dollars. The further argument was that waste and fraud would
.'be reduced.
One extremely detrimental effect on the profession which
began in the 1970s and continued during the 1980s was declassification of social service positions. Arguments were that professionally educated social workers were not interested in public
social services; that on-the-job training was sufficient; and that
employees who were professionally educated were overqualified. Thus, by reducing educational qualifications, salaries could
be reduced (NASW, 1981).
To provide empirical supports for this argument, bench
mark task analyses were conducted and the public social service
labor force was asked to describe what tasks it performed. The
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tautology of this research design -

given that this preponder-

ance of this labor force was neither professionally educated nor
trained and thus would describe tasks and skills that did not
require professional training - was either lost on bureaucratic
administrators or provcted the desired assessment regardless
of the flawed methoddogy.
Therefore, even in the more advanced states where enlightened administrators understood that qualified, professional staff
might be part of the long-range solution, particularly in the reduction of recidivism, these research outcomes and the demand
to cut budgets forced declassification to become an acceptable
solution. Consequently, at what might have been a pivotal point
in the movement of professional social workers into the public sector in large enough numbers and high enough places to
make a difference, budget reductions and declassification activities occurred.
Thus professional social workers had to develop arguments
and research in a reactive posture to attempt to protect against
any further declassification efforts. Unfortunately, part of this
debate included the opposition's argument that if these positions were not declassified (or conversely, if positions were reclassified to account for the need for professionally educated
social workers), there would be insufficient numbers of professionally trained social workers to fill these positions.
While these reductions were not directed to the not-forprofit sector, the trickle-down effect reduced the number of
people eligible for public services and the number and diversity of public social services, thereby increasing the demand on
the not-for-profit sector, Although the planned Reagan agenda
was to return to the private philanthropic model, the ability
of the private sector to move in and replace these cuts in federal expenditures was greatly diminished by the recession and
the emergence of new social problems. As a consequence, the
biggest demand on the profession was to address the ever increasing needs for all services with reduced budgets.
Although differentially impacted, many private not-forprofit social services suffered reduced or stagnant budgets because the private mechanisms of the United Way campaigns,
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annual donor drives, private foundations, and public demonstration and training grants were also affected by the recession.
Most not-for-profits were hit with higher caseloads shifted from
the public sector or due to new problems emerging. Consequently, many of these not-for-profit agencies experienced re-

ductions in funding and increases in caseloads as did the public
sector (Gibelman & Demone, 1990; Demone & Gibelman, 1984;
[atridis, 1988).
Unfortunately, the profession entered the 1980s without
sufficient interest or expertise in political activity, neither entrenched in the public sector nor immersed in advocacy. As
earlier noted, this was partly due to the management and ac.countability era of the 197f05; partly because political activity
has always been somewhat suspect in professional social
work circles; and partly due to our acceptance of the privatization model.
The New Right: Instituting the Charity Model
The profession of social work in the early 1980s found itself
in the age-old dilernma of either being agents of social control
Ior agents of social change and chose the former role. In order
to cope with these reductions in funds and increases in service demands, not-for-profit agencies decided not to turn clients
away or turn them against the government, which would have
represented a social change model. Instead they utilized social
control solutions that didn't increase service delivery budgets.
Approaches such as higher caseloads, increased use of volunteers, consumers as deliverers of service, and increased fees for
services were employed. In some instances, agencies have been
able to compensate for federal reductions but have not increased
revenues sufficient to cover the increased caseloads (Gibelnan
& Demone, 1990).
There are several explanations for the acceptance of a
social control model and the utilization of privatization as a
solution. First was the emergence of the New Right, which Reagan capitalized on and which represented a combination of economic libertarianism and social traditionalism, This paradoxical
combination invoked different themes. The New Right spoke of
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"freedom and individualism on economic matters, restraint and
community on social matters, and total mobilization on national
security matters" (Himmelstein, 1983, p. 17).
Given that these issues emerged with such force and had
linkages in American culture, there was something for everyone to grab on to, even though one might not agree with the
total package. For example, how could anyone disagree about
the importance of the family? However, a simple position statement such as "keeping the family together" did not convey the
total philosophy of this new American conservatism because
the statement really meant that women should stay home. The
subtle effectiveness of this strategy is evident when one realizes
that to speak out against this message was then interpreted as
an "against the family" statement. Reagan and the New Right
artfully employed phrases which utilized a positive "pro" terminology and forced liberals and social workers to be'labelled
"anti": antifamily; antichoice.
Reagan and the New Right had as their enemy liberals who
operated through the federal government. As previously noted,
social workers were not employed in great numbers by the federal government but they did use these programs to assist their
clients. Consequently, social workers were included on the enemy list. To combat this attack or to differentiate themselves
from the untrained public employees, new labels were used to
describe professional social workers clinical social worker, therapist, family or marriage counselor, manager.
Although it seems inconsistent with our professional history to adopt threads of the New Right philosophy, not only
was it adopted, but it appears to have become quite imbedded
in our practices. For example, with the renewed emergence of
the issues of hunger and homelessness, social workers and the
private sector were quick to mount food drives and create temporary shelters rather than to mount large-scale campaigns to
expand AFDC benefits, food stamp eligibility, and public housing. As people began to beg in the streets, previously an uncommon sight in many parts of the country, the public became
uncomfortable. Social workers responded with approaches such
as meal tickets which the public could purchase and give to the
beggars to use in the agency's soup kitchen. Such a response
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was cited as a creative approach to addressing the needs of
the new street people as well as to developing revenue for the
agency. What this creative approach did was to accept begging
rather than question hunger in this wealthy nation. It was creative in relieving the public's guilt.
The expanding problems related to the increase in AIDS or
domestic violence resulted in similar creative mechanisms such
as the increased use of self-help groups and reliance on volunteers for hospices and shelters, rather than to demand more
professionals, increased funding for research on effective methodologies, or funding for preventive strategies.
Also, these creative solutions helped to set the profession
behind other professions. For example, an additional creative
response was to schedule time for essential training or planning
activities through the use of staff's personal time. Administrators who argued that they could not spare social workers from
direct service delivery because of the high caseloads suggested
that these on-the-job training or long-range planning activities
could be conducted after hours and on Saturday with no additional remuneration. Such approaches perpetuated the myth
that social workers must be dedicated and altruistic and accept
long hours, low pay, and negative public images, while other
professionals, such as medical doctors, nurses, and lawyers,
demanded and received better salaries and greater resources
to accomplish their duties, particularly when their caseloads
increased.
Traditional social service agencies were quick to call these
solutions creative and proactive. Professional social workers began to defend, if not promote, them in professional circles as
acceptable solutions. While it is clear that these ideas may be
acceptable Band-aids, they cannot be conceived of as part of
the long-term structural solution.
It has been argued by many, including the authors, that once
again the profession accepted society's definition of the problem, which included the social work profession as part of the
problem. The profession was labelled either as overly educated,
liberal dogooders, or unscientific bleeding hearts.
Another reason that the profession accepted the social control model is the public's acceptance of Reagan's attitude toward
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the disadvantaged. Unfortunately, the great communicalor was
successful not only in changing the public's attitude but the
social work profession's as well (Reeser & Epstein, 1990, p. 14).
Shortly into the decade there was a change in attitude
toward the unemployed. President Reagan was seen holding up
the want ad page and saying that with all these jobs, anyone
can work. While this may have been ludicrous for those who
are knowledgeable about labor force supply and demand, it
nonetheless left in the mind of the public a nagging thought that
the unemployed could work if they wanted to. Similar rhetoric
toward civil rights, poverty, and women's roles led to a resurgence and acceptance of previous stereotypical attitudes.
The community felt strongly that canned food donated to
the poor was an acceptable method of feeding the hungry in
this country. The public could feel charitable and helpful and
again, the profession was placed in a position of being seen as
anti-charity. Thus, professional social workers got behind these
movements and convinced themselves that these were stopgap
until such time as structural and institutional solutions could
be reinitiated. The concern is that such a philosophy seems to
have become well imbedded and mainstreaned.
For example, during the Reagan era, homelessness became
a major national issue. The response to this new social problem
was to provide programs such as daycare service for homeless
children, special classes, meals, or mail delivery. The supply of
public, low-income housing did not increase and consequently
the country has now in titutionalized hornelessness.
Given this strong movement and the fact that the social work
profession was caught short of social workers trained in or even
interested in advocacy, either as a professional career choice or
at least as an adjunct to clinical practice (Haynes & Mickelson
1991, p.xvi), and given that they did not exist in the public sector in large numbers, it is understandable that the profession
accepted the social control model. Although it would seem logical that social workers would have been the professional group
to defend and support human service programs, such support
was almost nonexistent.
Therefore, instead of mounting proactive campaigns, the
profession's position was of reacting to these cutbacks and
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counting success by holding off further reductions. Thus social work strategies that were consistent with the privatization
model, which had same bases in the New Right, were utilized,
The Reagan era found social workers using seemingly creative mechanisms to fill the holes in the safety net and trying
to explain how this creativity' did not diffuse professionalism in
responding to human need - a professionalism that had taken
i00 years to construct.
In Response to Reagan; Advocacy
While undoubtedly the Reagan era had a devastating effect
on public social services and created new obstacles to professional social workers who wanted to enter or move up in the
public social services, it may have had a positive although cer.tainly unintended effect on the profession.
Although it was slow in starting, a resurgence of advocacy
began in the 1980s. In 1982 the Council on Social Work Education included in its curriculum policy statement that students
should be prepared "to exert leadership and influence as leg'islative and social advocates, lobbyists, and expert advisors to
.policy makers and administrators". . in ways that "will further
,the achievement of social work goals and purposes." The inclusion in curriculum is still uneven, as school bulletins, catalogue
descriptions, and CSWE self-study submissions reveal.
Increased interest in social work education particularly during the latter half of the 1980s is well documented through the
:enrollment and application data(CSWE, 1979; 1985; 1990), Fur.ther, the managerial and bureaucratic language of the i970s is
.being replaced in the classroom with the language of advocacy.
In a 1989 survey, 42 of 100 graduate schools had courses on community organization, advocacy, and/or planned change (Corn.man, 1989). In fact, one graduate program has established a
.specialization in political social work; another in social justice
(Reeser & Leighninger, 1990).
Further evidence of this change is an increase in professional
articles and textbooks addressing issues of advocacy. Some of
these works are about political skills; Burghardt's The Other Side
of Organizing; Fisher's Let the People Decide; Neighborhood Organizing in America; Haynes and Mickelson's Affecting Change: Social

','
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Workers in the Political Arena; and Mahaffey and Hanks' Practical
Politics: Social Work and Political Responsibilify (Burghardt, 1982;
Fisher, 1984; Haynes and Mickelson, 1986; and Mahaffey and
Hanks, 1982). Others were about organizing and other advocacy
roles to influence policy makers. still others found increases in
the political awareness and advocacy of social workers in the
late 1980s (Ezell, 1989; Reeser and Epstein, 1990).
The reduction of governmental supports coupled with the
recession brought many social problems closer to home and
made them more publicly visible. Additionally, unanticipated
consequences 'of the new philanthropy, which promoted the
use of affluent volunteers and consumers as service deliverers,
were to broaden the base of support for services; to increase
the understanding of human suffering; to enlighten more people about the cause of that suffering; and to value the need
for professional, systematic, and institutionalized responses to
that suffering.
The increased development of coalitions composed of an
assortment of sometimes disparate groups were constructed to
combat further reductions. Generations United is a good example of an effort to address the Reagan administration's question,
"Where do we cut - children or senior citizens?" This divisive
effort by the administration, although not entirely eliminated
by such coalitions, was confronted. An additional by-product
of these coalitions was that other professional and volunteer
groups became more educated about and more supportive of
professional social workers' roles and skills and of the need to
form coalitions for increased advocacy.
Another example of this increased advocacy by both volunteers and social workers can be seen in support of one group of
the population that was especially hard hit by the Reagan era
(Phillips, p. 206). Children took the brunt of the Reagan administration's cuts (Kids Count, 1991). Frorn this despair sprang a
renewed form of child advocacy different from previous advocacy efforts.
In 1984 the Association of Child Advocates was established
with 14 member organizations which grew to over 50 by the
time Reagan left office and to 90 by the end of the decade.
The Children's Defense Fund
increased its staff and budget and
I,'
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the Child Welfare League of America took a new and stronger
role in advocacy. These efforts encouraged the profession to
continue on this steady course of increased advocacy, not only
in children's issues, but across the human service continuum
as well.
With the increased pressure on the not-for-profit human service organizations, executive directors increased their political
activities to advocate for clients to receive governmental social
services. Although directors faced conflicting expectations and
demands from different constituencies about political activities,
research indicates that they were engaged in a variety of advocacy activities on and off the job (Pawlak and Flynn, 1991).
Social workers learned advocacy techniques from the Reagan administration as well. Advocates who had always struggled with the question of where the additional money was
going to come from found the answer in Secretary of Defense
Weinberger. His response to such a question when he proposed
a tremendous increase in the defense budget: "That's not my
problem. I'm here to tell you what needs to be done."
I Also during this era there was a change in the number of
.social workers elected to political office. On local levels there
Was a greater effort to elect social workers to city council seats,
Icounty commissioner positions, and mayoral posts. MSW social
workers became mayors of major cities and state legislators.
Additionally, not only was one more social worker elected to
.Congress, but the first social worker in history was seated in the
:United States Senate, thereby establishing excellent role models
of political advocates for others to follow.
In the early 1980s, social worker/politicians were reluctant
to identify themselves with the profession because of public and
professional pressure. As more support came from the profes.sion, these social worker/politicians became mare public about
their professional identity (Haynes & Mickelson, 1991, p. 146).
The profession's support for political activity can also be rneasured in the growth of NASW's political action committee,
PACE. From 1982 to 1988 annual contributions almost doubled.
PACE also encouraged and supported student placements and
created a paid political scholarship.
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These activities may suggest that the profession has made
significant strides in its advocacy efforts, However, it must be
remembered that this resurgence in advocacy has occurred because of the devastation to social services and to clients. It is
important to continue this trend, given the dark ages of the
Reagan era.
Conclusion
The Reagan era had some detrimental effects on the profession, although thesi, were neither as devastating nor as permanent as an uninfoftied or superficial examination might
suggest. It is evident that the Reagan era did slow same gains
which might have resulted in the profession's assumption of a
greater leadership role in the public sector during the 1980s.
The profession found itself opposing Reagan's ideology, but
nonetheless adopting the methodologies of the charity model.
However, this conflict and the continued assault on clients gave
rise to the seeds of advocacy. It had become self-evident that
complacency and absence from the political and legislative
arenas left the profession and our clients vulnerable to any ideological shift, Therefore, resurgence of advocacy in the profession, if nurtured and sustained, will serve as some protection
to the profession and its clientele fron capricious extremism in
the future.
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